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QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in upholding the trial 
court's decision valuing and distributing any "goodwill" of 
Dr. Sorensen7 s solo dental practice as an asset of the 
marital estate, contrary to this Court's well articulated 
decision in Jackson v. Caldwell, 415 P.2d 667 (Utah 1966)? 
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in failing to follow 
this Court's decision in Doau v. Doaur 552 P.2d 1308 (Utah 
1982) by including Dr. Sorensen's accounts receivable in the 
valuation and distribution of his solo dental practice, while 
also requiring him to pay child support and alimony from the 
income generated by that practice and those accounts 
receivable? 
3. Did the Court of Appeals abuse its authority and 
err in concluding that the trial court's failure to include 
$10,129 of accounts payable in the valuation of Dr. 
Sorensen's dental practice was simply "harmless error?" 
4. Did the Court of Appeals err in failing to follow 
this Court's decisions in Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P. 2d 1380 (Utah 
1980) and Frampton v. Wilson. 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980) by 
requiring Dr. Sorensen to contribute towards Mrs. Sorensen's 
expert witness fees, contrary to the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann., Section 21-5-4 (1953 as amended)? 
REFERENCE TO COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at 
Sorensen v. Sorensen, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 44 (opinion filed 
February 10, 1989). It is contained in the Appendix to this 
Petition, 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The decision to be reviewed was filed by the Utah Court 
of Appeals on February 10, 1989. On February 24, 1989, 
Respondent filed a Petition for Rehearing seeking an award of 
her attorney's fees on appeal. That Petition was originally 
granted without providing Dr. Sorensen an opportunity to 
respond. It was then set aside and finally denied on March 
23, 1989. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann., Section 78-2-3(a), Section 78-2a-4 (1987) 
and Rule 42 of The Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Utah Code Ann., Section 21-5-4 (1953 as amended) 
Utah Code Ann., Section 30-3-5 (1987) 
Doau v. Doau, 552 P.2d 1308 (Utah 1982) 
Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988) 
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980) 
Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81, 415 P.2d 667 (Utah 1966) 
Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980) 
Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah CA 1987) 
Rayburn v. Rayburn, 735 P.2d 238 (Utah CA 1987) 
Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952 (Utah CA 1988) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce case tried before the Honorable Rodney 
S. Page. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a 
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Decree of Divorce were signed and entered on February 24, 
1987. The husband timely appealed to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. After full briefing and oral argument, the Court of 
Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The wife then 
filed a Petition for Rehearing, which was ultimately denied 
on March 23, 1989. The husband has now timely filed a 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari with this Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS* 
The parties were married on April 10, 1975 (R.l). At 
the time of the marriage, Mrs. Sorensen was a registered 
nurse with a bachelor7 s degree. Dr. Sorensen was a 
successful dentist who had been a practitioner in Roy, Utah, 
for five years prior to the marriage (R.66). He brought the 
assets related to his dental practice into the marriage 
(R.73), including the building which was ultimately awarded 
to him. 
The parties had four children, all of whom were minors 
at the time of trial (Vol. I, p. 105). There was no dispute 
as to child custody and visitation. 
At the time of trial Mrs. Sorensen was unemployed, but 
during the marriage had secured an M.S. Degree in nursing and 
completed all classes for her Ph.D. in public health (Vol. I, 
p.158). Dr. Sorensen worked throughout the marriage in his 
solo dental practice, which was his sole source of income. 
*References to the Court's file are designated as follows: 
Record (R. ) ; Exhibits (Ex. ) ; and Transcripts 
(Vol. , p. ). 
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The practice had been continuously listed for sale for three 
to four years prior to trial for $62,000. No offers had been 
received. At the time of trial, he had fewer patients and 
greater overhead than at the time of marriage (Vol. II, 
p.121). His annual income, after CPI adjustments, was less 
at the time of trial than at the time of marriage (Vol. II, 
p.27). 
Mrs. Sorensen argued that the practice was worth 
$100,000, 11.5/16th of which, or $65,792, she felt to be a 
marital asset, since she had been married to Dr. Sorensen for 
11-1/2 of the 16 years of his practice. She called as her 
witness, Dr. Austin, a dentist in practice for 4-1/2 years 
who brokered dental practices (Vol. I, p.59). Based 
substantially upon Dr. Sorensen's past earnings, Dr. Austin 
concluded that the dental practice was worth $100,000 (Vol. 
I, p.76) consisting of $15,330 in tangible assets, $22,170 in 
discounted accounts receivable and $62,560 in "goodwill" (Ex. 
D) . The assigned value did not include accounts payable 
(Vol. II, p.23). Dr. Austin acknowledged that the estimate 
of value was based primarily on the assumption that Dr. 
Sorensen's gross receipts for services rendered would 
continue to increase in future years (Vol. I, p.72), that an 
actual sales price would be the best evidence of the value of 
the practice (Vol. I, p.77) and that physical disability 
would cause the value of the practice to rapidly diminish 
(Vol. I, p.83). 
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Dr. Sorensen called two expert witnesses in opposition 
to Mrs. Sorensen's evidence of value. Dr. Sorensen's 
accountant, Mr. Gerald Peters, stated that the practice was 
"a little better" in 1986 than at the time of the marriage. 
Further, "goodwill" had never been shown as an asset of Dr. 
Sorensen's practice (Vol. I, p.321). Mr. Roger Nuttal, a 
CPA, stated that Dr. Austin's value of the practice failed to 
consider $10,129 in accounts payable (Vol. II, p.23). In 
addition, Dr. Sorensen was earning a median dentist's income 
in both 1974 and 1986 (Vol. II, p.27), and any value 
attributable to "goodwill" would be "very questionable" (Vol. 
II, p.24). Finally, Mr. Nuttal challenged Dr. Austin's 
valuation because it used a single non-traditional income 
approach, rather than comparing that valuation method with 
values obtained by one or two other common methods (Vol. II, 
p.78) . 
Each party also called their separate real estate 
appraisers as experts to testify as to the value of their 
real estate interests. Mr. Alan Heiskenan testified for Mrs. 
Sorensen (Vol. I, p.6-36), and each of his higher values were 
accepted. Dr. Sorensen had initially advanced Mr. 
Heiskenan's fees, but the ultimate responsibility for payment 
was reserved as an issue for trial (R.57-58). The trial 
court ordered each party to share Mr. Heiskenan's total fee 
equally. That fee included appraisal costs and time for 
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trial preparation and testimony and was presented as a lump 
sum without differentiation. 
The pertinent provisions of the trial court's ruling, as 
related to this Petition, are as follows: 
1. Mrs. Sorensen was awarded custody of the parties' 
four minor children [R.92]. 
2. Dr. Sorensen was ordered to pay $3 00.00 per month, 
per child, as child support, for a total of $1,200.00 per 
month [R.93]. 
3. Dr. Sorensen was ordered to pay alimony to Mrs. 
Sorensen of $600 per month for six months, $500 per month for 
one year, $250 per month for three years, and $1.00 per year 
for two years, with alimony to then terminate [R.96]. 
4. The marital property was distributed as follows: 
RESPONDENT (Mrs. Sorensen) 
Home 
Car 
Furn & Fix 
Piano 
Guitar 
Wolf Creek Memb. 
Yard equipment 
Camera 
Pension int« 
TOTAL 
Less equity 
brought in 
$100,000 
750 
6,500 
7,500 
160 
1,000 
555 
600 
20,104 
$136,169 
interest 
5,800 
PETITIONER (Dr. Sorensen) 
Dental Practice 
Farm 
Farm Equip. 
Truck 
Spa 
Dental Bldg. 
Piccolo 
Computer 
Motorcycles 
Pension int. 
TOTAL 
$ 62,100 
30,422 
4,000 
400 
250 
11,457 
2,000 
3,000 
1,500 
31,241 
$146,370 
$131,369 
Less equity interest 
brought in 15,000 
$131,370 
(R. 94, 95 and 97.) 
5. Dr. Sorensen was ordered to pay one-half of Mrs. 
Sorensen's real estate appraiser fees, including time for 
trial preparation and testimony [R.96]. 
The trial court found the total value of Dr. Sorensen's 
practice, including "goodwill," to be $100,000 and that 
dental practices sell for 90% of appraised value (R.67). The 
trial court then concluded that 11.5/16ths of the resulting 
value, or $62,100, was marital property based upon the 
parties' 11-1/2 years of marriage during the sixteen years of 
Dr. Sorensen's practice (R.72). 
Dr. Sorensen thereafter filed his Notice of Appeal on 
March 24, 1987 (R.98). No cross-appeal was filed. The case 
was briefed and argued before the Utah Court of Appeals 
(Judges Billings, Garff and Jackson) on November 28, 1989. 
Dr. Sorensen claimed the trial court erred in the way it 
valued and distributed his dental practice and in its award 
of attorney's fees and expert fee contribution. The Court of 
Appeals' opinion filed February 10, 1989, was written by 
Judge Billings, concurred in by Judge Garff and dissented 
from by Judge Jackson. The majority held as follows: 
1. That Dr. Sorensen's solo professional practice had 
"goodwill" which was properly valued and distributed as 
marital property. 
2. That the accounts receivable of Dr. Sorensen's solo 
professional practice were appropriately included as an asset 
in the valuation and distribution of that practice. 
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3. That the trial court may have not included $10,129 
in accounts payable in valuing Dr. Sorensen's practice, but 
that such an omission was "harmless error." 
4. That the trial court's Order recjuiring Dr. Sorensen 
to contribute towards Mrs. Sorensen's expert witness fees was 
appropriate. 
5. That the trial court's award of attorney's fees to 
Mrs. Sorensen was error, where there was no evidence to 
support the reasonableness of the fees incurred. 
On February 24, 1989, Mrs. Sorensen filed a Petition for 
Rehearing, seeking an award of her attorney's fees incurred 
on appeal. That Petition was granted without providing Dr. 
Sorensen an opportunity to respond. It was then set aside on 
Motion of Dr. Sorensen and ultimately denied on March 23, 
1989. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD ISSUE BECAUSE THE 
COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION UPHOLDING THE TRIAL 
COURT'S VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF 
"GOODWILL" ATTRIBUTABLE TO A PROFESSIONAL IN 
SOLO PRACTICE AS MARITAL PROPERTY IS CONTRARY 
TO THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT, IN CONFLICT 
WITH PREVIOUS DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF 
APPEALS, AND INVOLVES AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF 
STATE LAW TO BE SETTLED BY THIS COURT 
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The Court of Appeal's ruling upholding the 
valuation and distribution of "goodwillw in 
Dr. Sorensen#s professional practice as 
marital property is contrary to this Court's 
decision in Jackson v. Caldwell, 415 P.2d 667 
(Utah 1966) and inconsistent with prior 
decisions of the Court of Appeals. 
In Sorensen v. Sorensen, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 44 (opinion 
filed February 10, 1989), two Judges of the Utah Court of 
Appeals stated: 
. [We] hold that the goodwill of a 
professional practice is a marital asset 
subject to valuation and distribution in 
the appropriate circumstances. Id. at 
10. 
They then went on to affirm the trial court's distribution of 
"goodwill" of Dr. Sorensen7s solo dental practice as marital 
property. This result is directly contrary to the decision 
of this Court in Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81, 415 P.2d 
667 (Utah 1966). While this Court has generally recognized 
"goodwill" as property subject to bargain and sale, in 
Jackson, the Court excepted professional "goodwill" from the 
general rule and held that "goodwill" is not an element of 
value in a business which depends for its existence upon the 
professional qualities of the persons who carry it on. Id. 
at 670, 671. In so doing, this Court specifically stated: 
We subscribe to the general rules as 
stated in 40 Am.Jur., Partnership, 
Section 271, page 316: 
The general rule is that a 
professional partnership the 
reputation of which depends on 
the individual skill of the 
members, such as partnerships 
of attorneys or physicians has 
no 'goodwill' to distribute as 
a firm asset on its 
dissolution. Id. at 670 
The Jackson exception is particularly applicable to Dr. 
Sorensen's dental practice where he maintains his 
professional corporation as a sole practitioner, the ongoing 
success of which is completely dependent upon the investment 
of his individual professional skill and reputation, not 
saleable to others. The Court of Appeals chose to simply 
ignore the holding in Jackson, supra, and as Judge Jackson 
quite correctly observed in his dissent, created "yet another 
species of new property through their broad definition of 
"goodwill" in the professional practice context. . ." Id. at 
102 Utah Adv. Rep. 14. 
In ignoring the Jackson exception, the Court of Appeals, 
in Sorensen, relied on dicta in this Court's opinion of 
Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988). There, 
Justice Stewart was concerned about the adequacy of the 
findings as they related to Dr. Gardner's involvement in the 
Ogden Clinic, an ongoing business concern employing twenty-
three physicians. He specifically distinguished that type of 
business from a practice where one individual, such as Dr. 
Sorensen, is employed by and works for himself. Id. at 1079-
80. As Judge Jackson correctly noted in his Sorensen 
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dissent, the facts of Gardner are simply different than the 
facts of Sorensen. 
Subsequent to Gardner. another panel of the Court of 
Appeals reaffirmed the exception to "goodwill" as created in 
Jackson v. Caldwell, and the general rule set out in Gardner 
and stated in Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P. 2d 952 (Utah CA 
1988) : 
The presence or absence of goodwill 
depends upon the facts and circumstances 
of the particular case. See Jackson v. 
Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d at 86-87, 415 P. 2d 
at 67 0-71. Where appropriate, the 
goodwill value of a business enterprise 
is subject to equitable distribution. 
Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076, 1080 
n.l (Utah 1988). There can be no 
goodwill in a business that is dependent 
for its existence upon the individual who 
conducts the enterprise and would vanish 
were the individual to die, retire or 
quit work. Jackson v. Caldwell. 18 Utah 
2d at 86, 415 P.2d at 670. 
The holding in Stevens is consistent with the holdings 
in Jackson and Gardner on the issue of "professional 
goodwill." The holding in Sorensen is not and is wrong. 
This Court also implicitly reaffirmed the Jackson 
exception to "goodwill" in Doau v. Doau, 552 P.2d 1308 (Utah 
1982), where the trial court's valuation and distribution of 
Dr. Dogu's well-established anesthesiology practice to him 
was upheld. In so doing, this Court stated: 
The district court awarded 
respondent as his separate property the 
entire interest in his professional 
corporation, of which he is the sole 
shareholder and only employee and from 
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which he draws a salary and bonuses as 
needed. Aside from its liquid assets of 
$25.000 in accounts receivable and 
$26.300 in bank accounts and savings 
certificates. the corporations only 
earning power is in respondents ability 
to work. Id. at 1309. (Emphasis added.) 
Similar to Dogu, supra, the only earning power of Dr. 
Sorensen7s professional practice is his ability to work as a 
dentist to generate personal income from which he can pay 
ongoing and prospective support obligations. In Sorensen. 
Judge Billings stated that Dr. Sorensen7s earning power could 
not be valued and distributed as a marital asset (Sorensen. 
supra, at 19) . Yetf that is precisely what the Sorensen 
Court did. The value attributed to Dr. Sorensen7s "goodwill" 
was a projection based upon Dr. Sorensen7s average 
professional revenues over the prior three years (Vol. I, 
p.70). This "goodwill" earning capacity, consisting of over 
62% of the total value assigned to Dr. Sorensen7s practice, 
was then awarded to him as part of his professional practice. 
This result is not only contrary to Jackson. Gardner and 
Dogu. supra. it is also inconsistent with the logic behind 
prior decisions of the Utah Court of Appeals. In Petersen v. 
Petersen. 737 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1987), followed by Ravburn 
v. Ravburn. 738 P.2d 238 (Utah App. 1987), the Utah Court of 
Appeals held that: 
. . .an advanced degree is or confers an 
intangible right which because of its 
character, cannot be characterized as 
property subject to division between 
spouses. Peterson at 241. 
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There, the Court distinguished divisible property which can 
be sold, from educational degrees which are personal to the 
recipient and, therefore, not subject to distribution upon 
divorce. Id. at 240. This distinction applies equally to 
the so-called "goodwill" of a professional practice; the 
ongoing success of any such practice is a measurement of the 
earning capacity of the professional resulting from personal 
skills and reputation not transferrable to others. In both 
cases the "assets" involved have intangible value to the 
individual only to the extent that it promises future 
earnings. This is particularly true in Dr. Sorensen's case, 
where he is a solo practitioner, and Mrs. Sorensen did not 
assist in any way in acquiring his education or establishing 
his practice. Mrs. Sorensen7s expert witness acknowledged as 
much when he testified that the value of Dr. Sorensen7 s 
practice would rapidly diminish were he to become disabled 
(Vol. I, p.83). The trial court also acknowledged this in 
stating: 
. . .that the large portion of the value 
of the practice has to do with goodwill 
and reputation. . . (R.87) . 
The holding in Sorensen is in conflict with existing 
Utah case law, as established by this Court. As Judge 
Jackson's dissent in Sorensen correctly points out: 
The instant case is the fourth attempt in 
Utah to create "new property" in the 
professional arena. My colleagues have 
cooperated by uncritically embracing a 
new definition equating "goodwill" with 
13 
"reputation" • . . I agree that we must 
strive for equity and fairness in divorce 
actions, but I do not agree with the 
means they have chosen. Id. at 23. 
As such, a Writ of Certiorari should issue. 
B. 
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the 
distribution of any "goodwill" attributable to 
Dr. Sorensen#s professional practice as a 
marital asset where there was no evidence 
establishing its value at the time of marriage 
and the evidence showed any such value to be 
premarital. 
Mrs. Sorensen failed to present any evidence at trial 
establishing "goodwill" values attributable to Dr. Sorensen's 
professional practice at the time of marriage. Instead, her 
expert focused only upon the present value of the practice. 
The evidence showed that Dr. Sorensen had maintained a 
successful solo practice in the same location for five years 
before the marriage. At both the time of marriage and upon 
divorce, he was earning a median income for a dentist in 
established practice (Vol. II, p.27). However, at the time 
of divorce, he had fewer patients and greater overhead (Vol. 
II, p.12). These facts were not controverted and lead to the 
inescapable conclusion that any "goodwill" value Dr. Sorensen 
may have accumulated in his practice through his reputation, 
expertise and client loyalty existed prior to the parties7 
marriage. 
In Preston v. Preston, 649 P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 1982), 
this Court recognized that, generally, premarital property 
14 
should be considered as separate property not subject to 
distribution upon divorce. The record, in Sorensen, is 
devoid of any peculiar circumstances which should vary this 
general rule. In fact, the courts below followed this 
general rule in crediting Dr. and Mrs. Sorensen with their 
premarital property values in distributing the marital estate 
as to all property except the "goodwill" value assigned to 
Dr. Sorensen's professional practice (R.94, 95 and 97). 
Instead, the trial court arbitrarily and without evidence 
proportioned this "goodwill" value over the course of the 
practice, and treated a percentage of this "goodwill" as 
marital property. The Court of Appeals then improperly 
affirmed this arbitrary approach, overlooking Mrs. Sorensen's 
fatal proof defect in failing to establish what portion of 
the "goodwill" was accumulated during the marriage. 
In so doing, the Court of Appeals has substantially 
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings, which would require that the trial court have 
before it evidence on the value of an asset as of the date of 
marriage and the date of trial. Therefore, a Writ of 
Certiorari should issue. 
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POINT II 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD ISSUE BECAUSE THE 
COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION TO INCLUDE ACCOUNTS 
RECEIVABLE IN THE VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION 
OF PR, SORENSEN#S SOLO DENTAL PRACTICE. WHILE 
REQUIRING HIM TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY 
FROM THOSE RECEIVABLES. IS DIRECTLY CONTRARY 
TO THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT AND INVOLVES AN 
IMPORTANT QUESTION OF STATE LAW WHICH SHOULD 
BE SETTLED BY THIS COURT 
In Sorensen, the trial court specifically included the 
accounts receivable in the valuation of Dr. Sorensen7s dental 
practice (R.82) . It then awarded Dr. Sorensen this practice 
(R.94, 95, 97) and ordered him to pay child support and 
alimony from the income derived from his practice (R.93, 96). 
The Court of Appeals affirmed this approach. In so doing, it 
failed to follow the law as set out in Doau v. Doau, 652 P.2d 
1308 (Utah 1982) . 
There, in unanimously affirming the trial court's 
property award, this Court stated: 
The district court awarded 
respondent as his separate property the 
entire interest in his professional 
corporation, of which he is the sole 
shareholder and only employee and from 
which he draws a salary and bonuses as 
needed. Aside from its liquid assets of 
$25,000 in accounts receivable and 
$26,300 in bank accounts and savings 
certificates, the corporation's only 
earning power is in respondent's ability 
to work. Id. at 13 09. (Emphasis added.) 
However, it went on to say: 
The corporation's accounts receivable 
represent deferred income from which 
respondent may meet his ongoing alimony 
and child support obligations to 
appellant. Id. 
Like Dr. Dogu's professional corporation, the success of 
Dr. Sorensen's professional corporation depends solely for 
its existence on personal professional talents. The only 
earning power of that corporation is Dr. Sorensen7s ability 
to work. His income comes from his accounts receivable, when 
paid. This income, in turn, was also considered by the trial 
I 
court in its support awards. In failing to follow this 
Court's decision in Doqu, supra, the Courts below have 
provided Mrs. Sorensen the double benefit of receiving 
ongoing support awards based substantially on Dr. Sorensen's 
income (which includes accounts receivable as paid) and 
property values to offset the accounts receivable awarded to 
Dr. Sorensen - a "double-dip" for Mrs. Sorensen! 
The Court of Appeals failed to follow the law 
established by this Court and, in so doing, approved of an 
unfair result for Dr. Sorensen. Accordingly, a Writ of 
Certiorari should be granted on this issi^ e. 
POINT III 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD ISSUE BECAUSE THE 
COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT COMMITTED HARynr.F.S.q FPRQR IN FAILING TO 
INCLUDE $10.129 ACCOUNTS PAYABLE IN THE VALUE 
OF PR, SORENSEN #S DENTAL PRACTICE IS 
ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND AN ABUSE OF THE 
COURT OF APPEALS' AUTHORITY 
The trial court accepted the value of Dr. Sorensen's 
dental practice as assigned by Mrs. Sorensen and her expert 
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witness, Dr. Austin. (See paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 of the 
Findings in relation to the content of Exhibit D.) However, 
Dr. Austin's valuation failed to consider $10,129 in "hard" 
accounts payable (Vol. II, p.23). On appeal, the Court of 
Appeals held that even if these accounts payable were 
overlooked by the trial court, such error was simply 
"harmless." 
By no stretch of the imagination can it be fairly 
concluded that an error of over $10,000 in the valuation of 
the Sorensens' property is "harmless." The valuation of Dr. 
Austin does not include the accounts payable (see Exhibit "DM 
in the Appendix to this Brief). The trial court accepted Dr. 
Austin's valuation. In affirming on the accounts payable 
issue, the Court of Appeals rationalized and, in essence, 
concluded that even if 10% of the value of the business had 
been overlooked ($100,000 minus $10,129 accounts payable), 
that oversight was harmless. To the contrary, this is a 
clear case of the Court of Appeals attempting to "cut the 
pattern to fit the cloth" to avoid a reversal on the dental 
practice valuation issue. It cannot be sanctioned. To do 
so, creates a "harmless error" category into which almost any 
aspect of a decision can fall, should an appellate court 
chose to do so, and gives absolutely no guidance to trial 
courts and litigants as to what is or is not "harmless 
error." 
18 
Dr. Sorensen and the writers of this brief are certain 
that an oversight of $10,000 is "harmless" to very few people 
in our society. A Writ of Certiorari should issue to allow 
this Court to correct the Court of Appeals' departure from 
the accepted and usual understanding of what constitutes 
"harmless error" in appellate review. 
POINT IV 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD ISSUE BECAUSE THE 
COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION REQUIRING DR. 
SORENSEN TO PAY HALF OF MRS. SORENSEN'S EXPERT 
WITNESS FEES IS DIRECTLY CONTRARY TO THE 
PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANN. . SECTION 21-5-4 
(1953 AS AMENDED) AND THE DECISIONS OF THIS 
COURT. 
Each party called their own witnesses to testify as to 
the value of the real property interests. Mr. Heiskenan, the 
expert whose fees are in question, testified on behalf of 
Mrs. Sorensen only. Though Dr. Sorensen had previously 
agreed to advance the initial appraisal fee, he never agreed 
to assume responsibility for it and expressly reserved 
ultimate responsibility as an issue for trial (R.57-58). In 
spite of this, Dr. Sorensen was ordered to pay half of Mr. 
Heiskenan's entire fee (R.96), which by that time included 
fees related to his trial testimony. The Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court's award of expert witness fees in 
direct contradiction to the decision of this Court in Kerr v. 
Kerr, 610 P.2d 138 (1980), where it was held that: 
This court has recently held in the 
d e c i s i o n in Frampton v. Wilson (footnote), that expert witness fees may 
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not be taxed as costs over and above the 
statutory rate (footnote). We therefore 
remand to the trial court for an 
adjustment of the award, id. at 138. 
The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in 
requiring Dr. Sorensen to pay one-half of these charges. A 
Writ of Certiorari should issue because the Court of Appeals7 
decision is contrary to the decisions of this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Under Utah law: (1) goodwill of a professional's solo 
practice is not an element of value subject to distribution 
as marital property; (2) premarital property is not subject 
to distribution as marital property absent extraordinary 
circumstances; (3) accounts receivable are deferred income 
not subject to distribution as marital property; (4) accounts 
payable must be included in the valuation process; and (5) a 
litigant's expert witness fees are not costs taxable to the 
opposing party beyond the statutory rate. In all five 
instances, the opinion in Sorensen is contrary to the 
decisions of this Court. Petitioner respectfully requests 
that a Writ of Certiorari issue as to each of the points 
raised in this Petition. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of April, 1989. 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
By 
KENT M. KASTING 
Attorneys for Petitioner/ 
Appellant/Defendant 
(On the Appeal/Petition) 
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simply does not match or even come close to the 
magnitude of conduct expressly proscribed by 
§76-9-702.5. Based on the foregoing, Ms. 
Serpente's conviction for lewdness involving a 
child is reversed. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1. Utah does not have an 'indecent exposure" 
statute per sev however, other jurisdictions have 
treated indecent exposure as a form of lewdness. See, 
c.g.t Sute v. Nelson, 178 N.WJd 434, 436 
(Iowa 1970), cert, denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1970); State 
v. Sousa, 2 Conn.Cir.Ct. 452, 201 A.2d 664, 666 
(1964). 
2. See, e.g., Gty of Portland v. Catewood, 76 Or. 
App. 74, 708 P.2d 615, 617 (1985); Martin v. State, 
674 P.2d 37, 39 (Okla. Grim. App. 1983), cert. 
denied, 465 U.S. 1081 (1983); State v. Bull, 61 Haw. 
62, 597 P.2d 10, 11 (1979); City of Tucson v. Lee, 
16 Ariz. App. 449, 494 P.2d 54, 57 (1972); In re 
Smith, 102 Cal. Rptr. 335, 497 ?2d 807, 808 
(1972). 
3. In L.G.W., the Utah Supreme Court ultimately 
adopted a definition of "an act of gross lewdness" 
as it appeared in Utah Code Ann. §76-9-702 
(1978Xamended 1983), the predecessor to the current 
lewdness statute. See 641 P.2d at 131. However, 
subsequent to the Court's decision in L.G.W., the 
Legislature enacted the Sexual Abuse of a Child 
Statute, a second degree felony, which the State 
correctly notes criminalizes conduct previously 
defined by the Court as constituting in act of gross 
lewdness, at least in the case of victims 14 or older. See 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-404 (1988). Interpr-
eting an act of gross lewdness for purposes of §76-
9-702.5, a class A misdemeanor, according to the 
L.G.W. definition potentially raises problems add-
ressed in State v. Shondcl, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 
146 (1966). In Sbondd, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated, "where there is doubt or uncertainty as to 
which of two punishments is applicable to an 
offense an accused is entitled to the benefit of the 
lesser." Id. at 148. Accord Stare v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 
439, 479 (Utah 1988). A Shondcl challenge to Utah 
Code Ann. §76-9-702.5 is not before this Court, 
and thus, we need not decide this troublesome issue. 
4. The defendant challenged Utah Code Ann. §76-
5-404 (1953). The relevant provisions of this 
statute were unchanged by subsequent amendments. 
See id. at §76-5-404 (1988). 
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OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
In this divorce action, defendant/appellant, 
Clifford G. Sorensen ("Dr. Sorcnsen*) appeals the 
trial court's property valuation and distribution, 
award of attorney fees to Mrs. Sorensen, and the 
allocation of expert witness fees. We affirm the 
property distribution and allocation of expert 
witness fees but reverse the award of attorney 
fees. 
FACTS 
The parties were married on April 10, 1975. Mrs. 
Sorensen was a registered nurse. Dr. Sorensen was 
a dentist and had practiced in Roy, Utah for 
approximately six years prior to the marriage. The 
parties have four children, ages 10, 9, 6, and 3 at 
the time of trial. There is no dispute as to 
custody, child support, or alimony. 
During the marriage, Dr. Sorensen continued to 
practice as a dentist in Roy. Mrs. Sorensen retu-
rned to school and received her masters degree in 
nursing and also completed all the necessary 
courses for a Ph.D. in public health. 
At trial, Mrs. Sorensen claimed Dr. Sorensen's 
dental practice, a professional corporation, was a 
marital asset subject to valuation and distribution 
by the court. Mrs. Sorensen called Dr. Richard 
Austin as an expert witness. Dr. Austin had been 
a dentist in Utah for four and one-half years. 
Dr. Austin also worked for a Denver company 
that brokered the purchase and sale of dental 
practices. His brokerage company had appraised 
and sold approximately 250 dental practices. Dr. 
Austin had participated in 12 appraisals and 7 
sales of dentistry practices. Six of the 7 sales 
occurred in the Salt Lake City area. 
Dr. Austin testified that the fair market value 
of Dr. Sorensen's dental practice was $100,060 
and that dental practices in Utah generally sold 
for 90 to 95 percent of their appraised value. In 
REPORTS 
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connection with his testimony. Dr. Austin prese-
nted the trial court his written valuation of Dr. 
Sorensen's dental practice. Dr. Austin's valuation 
was based on unaudited information previously 
provided by Dr. Sorensen through discovery. Dr. 
Austin's calculation was the combined value of 
three components: 1) tangible assets, i.e., furni-
ture and equipment-$ 15,330, 2) accounts rec-
eivable--$22,170,1 and 3) intangible assets or 
•goodwill "-$62,560, for a total market value 
of $100,060. Dr. Austin further testified *[i]t is 
important to realize that this evaluation has been 
made [according to] the standards that are curr-
ently acceptable for this purpose. Existing market 
trends in the state of Utah for the disposition of 
dental practices were given consideration." 
To determine the goodwill value, Dr. Austin 
reviewed the income and expenses of Dr. Sore-
nsen's practice for a three year period, 1983 
through 1985. During this time, Dr. Sorensen 
averaged $184,000 in gross receipts. Dr. Austin 
testified that the "goodwill" value of dental pra-
ctices he had appraised in Utah ranged from 15 to 
80 percent of their gross receipts depending on a 
number of factors. These factors include: the 
length the practice had been operating, location, 
number of patients, profitability, currency of 
accounts receivable, and an evaluation of the 
transferability of profit to a prospective buyer. 
Applying the foregoing factors to Dr. Sorensen's 
practice, Dr. Austin concluded the goodwill value 
was 34 percent of the gross receipts for a total of 
$62,560. Specifically, Dr« Austin testified: 
The age of a dental practice plays an 
important role in determining its 
value. Dr. Sorensen has been practi-
cing in the community for a number 
of years and has established a good 
reputation for family dental care. The 
number of patients of record and the 
maintenance of healthy production 
figures attest to this. 
Dr. Sorensen's practice location is on 
a very highly traveled street and is in 
an excellent location for visibility and 
public exposure. Parking is conven-
ient. The office space is adequate and 
functional. However, updating equi-
pment and leasehold improvements 
would increase the value of this prac-
tice. 
The aging of the accounts receivable 
indicates that the practice has a 
healthy collection policy and that the 
receptionist is doing a good job of 
collecting. 
The community of Roy has a healthy, 
growing economy. The influx of new 
dentists into the area quickly absorbs 
patients seeking new dentists. 
In response to Dr. Austin's testimony. Dr. 
Sorensen called two expert witnesses: Mr. Gerald 
Deters, his accountant, and Mr. Roger Nuttal, a 
CPA. Mr. Deters compared the respective 
income, expenses, and profit of Dr. Sorensen's 
dental practice for the years 1974 and 1986, and 
concluded that since the date of the marriage, Dr. 
Sorensen's practice was "a little bit bigger, a little 
better." Mr. Deters further testified that goodwill 
had never been shown as an asset of Dr. Sore-
nsen's professional corporation. 
Dr. Sorensen also called Mr. Roger Nuttal, who 
evaluated the Sorensen's entire financial situa-
tion, both business and personal. Mr. Nuttal tes-
tified that he believed some goodwill existed, but 
found Dr. Austin's calculations "very question-
able." He further testified that Dr. Austin failed 
to consider $10,129 in accounts payable. Therea-
fter, relying primarily on Dr. Austin's calculat-
ions less the amount for accounts payable, Mr. 
Nuttal testified that Dr. Sorensen's. dental prac-
tice was worth approximately $87,096. 
With reference to the dental practice, the trial 
court concluded with our emphasis: 
[Defendant has continued to practice 
dentistry in Roy, Utah, during the 
course of the marriage and has an 
office with an excellent location; has 
continued to build his clientele; has a 
good fee collection record and a good 
reputation in the community. 
The Court finds the total value of the 
practice to be $100,000 including acc-
ounts receivable and all equipment 
with the exception of the computer. 
That dental practices usually sell for 
approximately 90 percent of the app-
raised value.... 
The defendant should be awarded the 
dental practice including all equipment 
and accounts receivable the Court 
feeling that the large portion of the 
value of the practice has to do with 
good will and reputation built up in 
the practice over the years of marr-
iage. The only reasonable way to value 
said practice is to proportion it based 
upon the years the parties have been 
married during the practice. Based on 
their eleven years of marriage over 
sixteen years of practice for the 
purpose of distribution, the Court 
values the practice at 69 percent of the 
value as found above for a total of 
$62,100. 
The trial court then ordered essentially an equal 
division of the parties' property crediting $62,100 
to Dr. Sorensen for his practice and an equal 
amount of offsetting property to Mrs. Sorensen. 
The trial court also ordered Dr. Sorensen to 
contribute $2,000 toward Mrs. Sorensen's atto-
rney fees. Mrs. Sorensen testified she had incu-
rred fees, but she had no present income to pay 
those fees. Mrs. Sorensen's attorney proffered an 
exhibit reflecting the time spent and the rates 
charged. Dr. Sorensen's counsel stipulated that 
the proffer could be received but expressly refused 
to stipulate that the fees were reasonable. 
The trial court also ordered the parties to bear 
the expense of their own expert witnesses, with 
the exception of Allan Heiskanen, a real estate 
appraiser, whose fees the parties were ordered to 
split. The Sorensens, by pretrial stipulation, 
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agreed to have their real property appraised by 
Mr. Heiskanen. The stipulation provided that the 
expense of the appraiser was to be paid initially 
by Dr. Sorensen with the ultimate responsibility 
for payment to be determined by the trial court. 
Dr. Sorensen raises three issues on appeal. 
First, he claims the trial court erred in its valua-
tion of his dental practice by, 1) determining that 
'goodwill* was a marital asset subject to equit-
able distribution, 2) including Dr. Sorensen's 
accounts receivable in the valuation of the dental 
practice, and 3) failing to consider accounts 
payable in its evaluation of the practice. Second, 
Dr. Sorensen claims the trial court erred in awa-
rding Mrs. Sorensen a portion of ber attorney 
fees. Finally, Dr. Sorensen claims the trial court 
erred by ordering him to pay a portion of Mr. 
Heiskanen's expert witness fee. 
1 
VALUATION OF DENTAL PRACTICE 
In a divorce proceeding, 'determining and assig-
ning values to marital property is a matter for the 
trial court and this Court will not disturb those 
determinations absent a showing of dear abuse of 
discretion/ Talley v. Tallcy. 739 ?2d 83, 84 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). "In making such orders, 
the trial court is permitted broad latitude, and its 
judgment is not to be lightly disturbed, so long as 
it exercises its discretion in accordance with the 
standards set by this Court.' Newmeyer v. New-
meyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1987) (citations 
omitted). An appealing party bears the burden of 
establishing that the trial court violated those 
standards "or that the trial court's factual find-
ings upon which the [property] division is grou-
nded are clearly erroneous under Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 52(a)." Id. Furthermore, assessing 
the weight and credibility of expert witness testi-
mony is a matter for the trier of fact. See Yelde-
nnan v. Yelderman, 669 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 
1983) ("it is within the province of the fact finder 
to believe those witnesses or evidence it chooses"). 
Goodwill 
In its property distribution, the tnal court cred-
ited Dr. Sorensen with $62,100 which represents 
the trial court's assessment of the total value of 
Dr. Sorensen's dental practice. As part of its 
calculations, the trial court assignee a substantial 
value to the goodwill of Dr. Sorecsen's professi-
onal dental corporation. On appeal we must first 
determine whether goodwill is property considered 
a marital asset subject to distribution, and if so, 
whether there is competent evidence to support 
the trial court's finding as to the goodwill value 
of Dr. Sorensen's professional corporsaon. 
In a divorce action, trial courts should distri-
bute marital property and income in order that 
"the parties may readjust their lives to their new 
circumstances as well as possible.' Gardner v. 
Gardner, 748 P .2d 1076. 1078 (Utah 
1988)(citations omitted). "(M]antal property 
'encompasses all of the assets of every nature I 
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and 
from whatever source derived ....'* Id. at 1079 
(citation omitted). The Utah Supreme Court has 
emphasized: 
UTAH ADVAN 
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(W]hether a resource is subject to 
distribution does not turn on whether 
the spouse can presently use or control 
it, or on whether the resource can be 
given a present dollar value. The ess-
entia/ criterion is whether a right to 
the benefit or asset has accrued in 
whole or in part during the marriage. 
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 432-33 
(Utah 1982Xemphasis added). 
The question of whether the goodwill of a 
professional corporation is a marital asset, prop-
erly subject to equitable distribution in a divorce 
action, is one of first impression for this Court,2 
although the Utah Supreme Court recently addr-
essed the issue indirectly in Gardner v. Gardner, 
748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988). In Gardner, the trial 
court awarded Dr. Gardner his retirement account 
and medical assets without assigning them a 
present value. The Utah Supreme Court reversed 
the trial court's decision, and remanded for 
further proceedings for a valuation of the medical 
assets and retirement account. In considering the 
valuation and distribution of the doctor's medical 
assets, the Court stated "[t]he ability of a business 
to generate income from its continued patronage 
is commonly referred to as good will. Good will is 
properly subject to equitable distribution upon 
divorce.0 Id. at 1080 n . l ( c i t a t i o n s 
omittedXemphasis added). The dissent chastises us 
for our reliance on the language in Gardner clai-
ming Justice Stewart intended to limit his endor-
sement of goodwill as a marital asset to multi-
membered professional corporations. However, 
Justice Stewart does not make a distinction as to 
the "type" of business entity and in fact, in Gardner, 
the Utah Supreme Court relied on Dugan v. Dugan, 
9 2 N . J . 4 2 3 , 4 5 7 A . 2 d 1 ( 1 9 8 3 ) , 
and In re Marriage of Fleege, 91 Washed 324, 
588 P.2d 1136 (1979), to support its conclusion 
that the goodwill of a professional corporation is 
subject to distribution in a divorce proceeding. See 
Gardner, 748 P.2d at 1080 n.l. Both decisions 
involved solely owned or operated professional 
practices. 
The prevailing view among 20 other jurisdict-
ions is that the goodwill of a professional practice 
or business is a marital asset, subject to valuation, 
and therefore, should be considered in a divorce 
proceeding.3 Jurisdictions holding to the contrary 
include Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Pennsylv-
ania, Wisconsin, Texas, and Tennessee.4 
The most common legal definition describes 
"goodwill* as: 
[T]he advantage or benefit, which is 
acquired by an establishment, beyond 
the mere value of the capital, stock, 
funds, or property employed therein, 
in consequence of the general public 
patronage and encouragement which it 
receives from constant or habitual 
customers, on account of its local 
position, or common celebrity, or 
reputation for skill or affluence, or 
punctuality, or from other accidental 
circumstances or necessities, or even 
REPORTS 
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from ancient partialities or prejudices.5 
In the accounting field, goodwill is referred to 
generally as "the summation of all the special 
advantages, not otherwise identifiable, related to 
a going concern. It includes such items as a good 
name, capable staff and personnel, high credit 
standing, reputation for superior products and 
services, and favorable location."* 
'There can be no doubt that goodwill exists. It 
is a legally protectable interest/? Goodwill has 
been held to constitute "property" within the 
meaning of the fourteenth amendment due 
process clause1 and is subject to being bought and 
sold.9 Goodwin may be present whether the bus-
iness form is a sole proprietorship, partnership,10 
association, joint venture, or corporation.11 
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions 
considering the issue find that goodwill is a pro-
perty interest, and as such, it must be considered 
in divorce proceedings. Whether goodwill exists 
and has value in a particular case, is a question of 
fact. Accordingly, we agree with the majority of 
jurisdictions and the dicta in Gardner v. Gardner, 
and hold that the goodwill of a professional pra-
ctice is a marital asset subject to valuation and 
distribution in the appropriate circumstances. 
Judge Jackson, in his dissent, criticizes the 
approach taken by the Washington and California 
courts in valuing goodwill before they address 
whether it exists at all. Judge Jackson adamantly 
asserts that any approach to valuing goodwill 
should involve a two-step inquiry: does goodwill 
exist in this particular entity, and if so, what is its 
value. Although some courts do go directly to the 
valuation issue, a conclusion that a value exists 
implicitly answers the first inquiry in the affirm-
ative. More importantly, however, we think our 
opinion clearly directs trial courts to engage in the 
two-part approach. 
We concede that there is a spot of authority on 
this issue, but we find those jurisdictions holding 
to the contrary unpersuasive. Courts that refuse 
to recognize goodwill as a marital asset base their 
conclusions, generally, on three grounds. First, 
opponents contend that goodwill is not an asset 
separate and apart from the individual practiti-
oner and in this respect, goodwill b analogous to 
a professional degree.12 Second, they claim that 
goodwill is indistinguishable from future earning 
capacity and is valuable to the individual only to 
the extent that it assures substantial earnings in 
the future.13 Finally, opponents assert that goo-
dwill is difficult to value, hence a should not be 
considered in divorce settlements.14 We address 
each of these arguments separately. 
In Holbrook v. Holbrook, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court expressed the view that goodwill 
does not "bestow on those who have an owner-
ship interest in the business, an actual, separate 
property interest." 103 WisJd 327, 309 N.W.2d 
343, 354 (Ct. App. 1982). Accordingly, the Wis-
consin Court determined that goodwill is more 
analogous to a professional degree than a prop-
erty interest. Id. 
We disagree with Wisconsin's rationale* There 
are significant and distinctive differences between 
the goodwill of a professional practice and a 
professional degree.1S Unlike a professional 
degree, goodwill is traditionally defined as an 
intangible 'property right.0** It is a separate and 
distinct asset, not merely a factor contributing to 
the earning capacity of the practitioner. See In re 
Marriage of Hall, 103 Wash.2d 236, 692 P.2d 
175, 178 (1984). The theory underlying goodwill is 
that an on-going business has a value beyond 
mere tangible assets. These intangible assets are 
independent of the proprietor, and as such, can 
be sold on an open market. In re Marriage of 
Nichols, 43 Colo App. 383, 606 P.2d 1314, 1315 
(1979). In Nichols, the Colorado Court of 
Appeals stated: 
While we recognize that professional 
goodwill is not an asset which has an 
independent market value, it can, in 
conjunction with the assets of the 
practice, be sold. This limited marke-
tability distinguishes professional 
goodwill from the advanced educati-
onal degree, which, because it is per-
sonal to its holder and is non-
transferable, [is] held not to be prop-
erty.... 
Id. 
When goodwill exists, it may well be regarded 
as "the most lucrative asset of some enterprises. " n 
It is the property attributes of goodwill that 
distinguish it from a professional degree, which 
we have held on prior occasions does not consti-
tute marital property subject to distribution.11 
Several courts have found that "[tine better 
analogy is to pension rights which are marital 
property." Mitchell v. Mitchell, 152 Ariz. 317, 
732 P.2d 208, 211 (1987) (and citations therein). 
Both are property rights acquired during the 
marriage although their enjoyment and benefits 
are deferred. Id. Our Supreme Court has stated 
that marital property encompasses pension funds. 
Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 
1988); Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 
432 (Utah 1982). 
In Woodward, the Court declared with our 
emphasis: 
[Appellant's] argument fails to reco-
gnize that pension or retirement ben-
efits are a form of deferred compens-
ation by the employer. If the rights to 
those benefits are acquired during the 
marriage, then the court must at least 
consider those benefits in making an 
equitable distribution of the marital 
assets. 'The right (emphasis in the 
original) to receive monies in the 
future is unquestionably ... an econ-
omic resource, subject to equitable 
distribution based upon proper com-
putation of its present dollar value.'19 
Similarly, if goodwill can be shown by compe-
tent credible evidence to exist at the time of diss-
olution and that it was acquired or accrued during 
the marriage, trial courts must "at least consider 
those benefits in making an equitable distribution 
of the marital assets." Id. See also In re Marriage 
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of Lopez, 38 Cal.App.3d 93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 
68(1974). 
The second major criticism of treating goodwill 
as a marital asset is that goodwill is indistinguis-
hably tied to personal future earnings. Thus, if 
the practitioner dies or retires, "nothing remains/2* 
We believe to the contrary. We note at the 
outset, that goodwill is and must be distinguished 
from a professional practitioner's future earning 
capacity, an issue more fully addressed below. A 
number of jurisdictions have held :hat goodwill is 
not, however, per se synonymous with future 
earning capacity.21 
In addition to those jurisdictions, one comme-
ntator opined that #[t]here is nc talid basis for 
the argument that since goodwill ts essentially a 
measure of future earnings, it cannot properly be 
treated as a marital asset ...." 2 Valuation and 
Distribution of Marital Property, §23.05[2] at 23-
69 (1988). The commentator further declared that 
"(i]t is an economic truism that the value of any 
income-producing asset is its capacity to produce 
future income. In this regard, goodwill is just like 
any other asset. Goodwill differs only insofar as, 
unlike a.stock or bond, it will not produce income 
by itself. "Id. 
The argument that goodwill disappears in a 
case where the practitioner dies or retires is also 
unpersuasive. The possibility of continued patro-
nage, despite the absence of the selling practiti-
oner, has present value to a prospective buyer of 
a professional practice. See In re Marriage of 
Nichols, 43 Colo. App. 383, 606 P J d 1314, 1315 
(1979). Moreover, the value of goodwill freque-
ntly remains notwithstanding the practitioner's 
death, resignation, or disability. See In re Marr-
iage of White, 98 Ili.App.3d 380, 424 N.E.2d 421, 
424 (1981). "If it were otherwise, w* are unable to 
conceive the basis for the popular practice of 
retaining the names of deceased or withdrawn 
members in many professional fcas long after 
their death or withdrawal." Id. The possibility of 
death or retirement of the practiucaer may reduce 
the value of goodwill, but it does cot in all circ-
umstances eliminate its existence, h re Marriage 
of Hall, 103 Wash.2d 236, 692 P.2d 175, 178 
(1984). 
When a professional retires e: dies, his 
earning capacity also either retires or 
dies. Nevertheless, the goodwill that 
once attached to his practice may 
continue in existence in the form of 
established patients or cliecta. refer-
rals, trade name, location izc associ-
ations which now attach :o former 
partners or buyers of the ~-3Ctice .... 
(A) professional can transpen all of 
his skill (earning capacity) :c a new 
town, but patients or clienis. reputa-
tion and referrals (goodw£) cannot 
always be transported. 
Id. If the facts in a particular case demonstrate 
that there is no goodwill value remaining in the 
absence of the practitioner, then a irial court may 
properly declare in its detenninanoa of a prac-
tice's worth, that there is no value attributable to 
goodwill. 
The third and most unpersuasive argument is 
that goodwill is difficult to value, therefore, it 
should not be considered in the distribution of 
marital assets. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Holbrook, 
103 Wis.2d 327, 309 N.W.2d 343, 354 (Ct. App. 
1981). This also seems to be the position taken by 
the dissent. 
We concede that in some cases, valuing good-
will is difficult. Even so, if a party's expert 
witness cannot adequately demonstrate that goo-
dwill has a present value, then there is simply an 
evidentiary defect and goodwill should not be 
considered. However, the mere fact that goodwill 
may be difficult .to value or elusive in nature, 
does not justify ignoring or disregarding it altog-
ether in the valuation of marital property. In re 
Marriage of Nichols, 43 Colo. App. 383, 606 
P.2d 1314, 1316 (1980); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 152 
Ariz. 317, 732 P.2d 208, 211 (1987). As in Mifc-
hell, "[w]e prefer to accept the economic reality 
that the goodwill of a professional practice has 
value, and it should be treated as property upon 
dissolution of the community, regardless of the 
form of business." Mitchell, 732 P.2d at 212. We 
are mindful that not every professional practice 
necessarily has goodwill. See, e.g., In re Marriage 
of Hall, 692 P.2d at 179. Some courts, however, 
hold that sole proprietorships per se do not have 
goodwill because the business's existence depends 
exclusively on the professional spouse's contin-
uing efforts. See, e.g„ Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 
761 (Tex. 1972). We are not prepared to rule so 
broadly. Instead, we emphasize that the issue is 
one of proof, and not the particular form the 
business takes. "It would be inequitable to hold 
that the form of the business enterprise can defeat 
the community's interest in the professional 
goodwill. Such a result ignores the contribution 
made by the non-professional spouse to the 
success of the professional....* Mitchell, 732 P.2d 
at 211. 
Valuation of Goodwill 
Because we find that the goodwill of Dr. Sore-
nsen's dental practice was properly considered by 
the trial court in its property distribution, we next 
address Dr. Sorensen's contention that the trial 
court erred in the value it ultimately placed on the 
goodwill of his dental practice. 
"It is a difficult task at best to arrive at a value 
for the intangible component of a professional 
practice attributable to goodwill." Mitchell v. 
Mitchell, 152 Ariz. 317, 732 P.2d 208, 214 (1987). 
The valuation of goodwill is a question of fact 
and is dependent upon the particular circumsta-
nces.22 In order to establish that the goodwill of 
a divorcing spouse's professional practice is a 
marital asset, a party must produce sufficient 
expert testimony to show that the goodwill cons-
titutes a valued business asset, independent of the 
continued presence of the professional spouse.23 
Trial courts may consider any legitimate valuation 
method "that measures the present value of goo-
dwill by taking into account past results, and not 
postmarital efforts of the professional spouse...." 
Poore v. Poore, 75 N.C. App. 414, 331 S.E.2d 
266,271 (1985). 
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Factors courts have frequently found to affect 
the value of goodwill include: 
(T]he age, heahh, and professional 
reputation of the practitioner, the J 
nature of the practice, the length of j 
time the practice has been in existence, 
its past profits, tts comparative prof-
essional success, and the value of its 
other assets.24 
Similarly, the Oregon Court of Appeals obse-
rved that the value of goodwill may be shown in a 
number of ways. "Dements which may be con-
sidered are, length of time the business has been 
in existence; the nature and character of the bus-
iness; its success or lack thereof; its average 
profits; and the probability of its continuance 
under the same name.** In re Marriage of Goger, 
27 Or. App. 729, 557 P.2d 46, 47 (1976Xquoting 
Levene v. City of Sakm, 191 Or. 182, 229 P.2d 
255, 263 (1951)). "Past profits may be establi-
shed, and the value of the goodwill estimated 
therefrom as a basis, subject to being reduced by 
a showing of a depression in trade or other circ-
umstances that would tend to make the business 
less valuable . . . ."Jd. 
Trial courts should make specific findings, first 
indicating whether goodwill exists under the par-
ticular circumstances of the case, and if so, its I 
value. Findings should dearly state the evidence I 
upon which the valuations are based, and prefe- I 
rabiy, the valuation method or methods on which I 
the court relied. See Poore v. Poore9 78 N.C. 
App. 414,331 S.E.2d 266,272 (1985). 
We emphasize, however, one factor that clearly 
should not be considered in the valuation of 
goodwill is the professional spouse's future 
earning capacity. Consistent with our position 
that professional degrees are not assets capable of 
distribution, we sinrihrty hold that the future 
earning capacity of the divorcing professional 
should not be considered. To consider future 
earning capacity in the valuation of the professi-
onal corporation's goodwill would have the effect 
of double counting, as earning capacity is also 
utilized in determining an appropriate alimony 
award. See, e.g., Ohoo v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 
566 (Utah 1985). 
In this action, Mrs. Sorensen called Dr. Austin, 
an expert witness eminently qualified to appraise 
dental practices. Dr. Austin had practiced denti-
stry in Utah for approximately four and one-
half years and worked for a firm which is in the 
business of appraising and selling dental practices. 
Dr. Austin's brokerage firm has been in business 
over eighteen yean and sold more than 250 dental 
practices. Dr. Austin has personally been involved 
in 12 appraisals and soid 6 practices in Utah. 
Based on financial information supplied by Dr. 
Sorensen, Dr. Austm determined that the good-
will value of the corporation was $62,560. The 
procedure employed by Dr. Austin is one comm-
only used by his brokerage firm, and is also 
consistent with the methodologies recognized and 
approved in other jurisdictions previously discu-
ssed herein.29 The goodwill figure was derived by 
considering factors men as a history of the corp-
oration's earnings, the length of time Dr. Sore-
UTAH 
nsen had been in practice, the number of his 
patients, the location of the practice, his facilities 
and equipment, accounts receivable, and an eva-
luation of the transferability of profits to a pro-
spective buyer. 
Dr. Austin further testified that the goodwill 
value of dental practices in Utah ranged from 15 
to 80 percent of their gross receipts. Accordingly, 
based on an analysis of the factors previously 
described, Dr. Austin calculated a 34 percent 
factor for goodwill and then reduced Dr. Sore-
nsen's average gross receipts by 66 percent. The 
34 percent goodwill factor was on the low end of 
the 15 to 80 percent which he testified had been 
used by his brokerage corporation to value and 
sell other Utah dental practices. 
To refute Dr. Austin's valuation, Dr. Sorensen 
called Mr. Deters, his accountant, and Mr. 
Nuttal, a CPA. Neither witness demonstrated 
expertise in appraising dental practices, and their 
testimony was virtually nonresponsive on the issue 
of a professional corporation's goodwill. The 
trial court apparently chose to believe Dr. Austin, 
and we will not disturb the trial court's factual 
findings unless they are dearly erroneous. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). A trial court's fundame-
ntal role in the adversary process is to judge the 
credibility of witnesses and he or she is free to 
choose among expert testimony. See Canning v. 
Canning, 744 P 2d 325, 329 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). See also Lockwood v. Lockwood, 205 Neb. 
818, 290 NeW.2d 636, 640 (1980). "[Tlhis court 
will give weight to the fact that the trial court 
observed the witnesses and their manner of testi-
fying and accepted one version of facts rather 
than the opposite.' Id. 
Other jurisdictions have upheld a trial court 
choosing the testimony of one party's expert over 
the other's expert in the context of valuing goo-
dwill See, e.g„ Kowalesky v. Kowalesky, 148 
Mich, App. 151, 384 N.W.2d 112, 115 (1986); In 
re Marriage of Hull, 712 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Mont. 
1986); Wright v. Wright, 469 A.2d 803, 808 (Del. 
Fam. Ct. 1983). In Wright, the Delaware Court 
indicated that one of the important considerations 
for its decision to accept one expert's testimony 
was that the husband's expert had never been 
involved in the sale or liquidation of like pract-
ices. 469 A.2d at 808 (emphasis added). Similarly, 
in Kowalesky, a case involving the valuation of a 
dental practice, the Michigan Court of Appeals 
held that the trial court's valuation, which 
seemed to favor the plaintiff, was not dearly 
erroneous. The trial court's valuation was based 
on the plaintiffs expert testimony, and the app-
ellate court noted that plaintiffs expert was 'actively 
involved in the sale of dental practices 
and the valuation of those practices.0 384 N.W;2d 
at 115 (emphasis added). In Kowalesky, the court 
stated: " (defendant's expert, a certified public 
accountant who has a number of dentists as 
clients, did not have similar valuation experience 
[as plaintiffs expert). * Id. 
We find these cases analogous. Dr. Austin has 
considerable experience in the valuation and sale 
of dental practices. Conversely, Dr. Sorensen's 
experts both candidly admitted that they were not 
involved in the sale and valuation of dental pra-
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ctices. 
Our able colleague in dissent takes a novel 
approach to the review of expert testimony. He 
goes even further than rejecting the expert found 
more credible by the trial court and adopting 
another. He gives his own "expert' opinion on 
the valuation of Dr. Sorensen's professional 
corporation, ignoring the testimom of all the 
experts and the findings of the trial judge. We 
think he simply believes that as a matter of law, 
the goodwill of any professional association 
should not be valued and distributed in a divorce 
action. We believe the overwhelming authority is 
to the contrary. 
Based on the foregoing, we find the trial 
court's valuation of the goodwill of Dr. Sore-
nsen's practice, relying on the testimony of Dr. 
Austin, was not an abuse of discretion. 
Accounts Receivable 
Dr. Sorensen claims that the trial court improp-
erly considered accounts receivable m the valua-
tion of his dental practice. We disagree. 
Dr. Sorensen relies on Dogu v. Dogu, 652 P.2d 
1308 (Utah 1982). In Dogu, the trial court excl-
uded $25,000 of accounts receivable in its consi-
deration of the value of the defendant's profess-
ional corporation. Finding the trial court had not 
abused its discretion, the Utah Supreme Court 
summarily stated "(t]he corporation's accounts 
receivable represent deferred income from which 
respondent may meet his ongoing alimony and 
child support obligations to appellant." Id. at 
1309. 
We are not persuaded that this satement from 
Dogu stands for the proposition that accounts 
receivable may never be considered in the valua-
tion of a professional corporation. Dr. Sorensen 
has not cited additional authority for this propo-
sition, and we note other jurisdiction's commonly 
hold that accounts receivable may be considered 
in the property distribution.2* In fact, the Mich-
igan Court of Appeal concluded thai the trial 
court committed reversible error oy failing to 
consider accounts receivable in its valuation of a 
dental practice. Kowalcsky v. Kowalesky, 148 
Mich.App. 151,384N.W.2dll2,115(1986). 
Based on the foregoing, we coodude the trial 
court properly considered accounts receivable in 
its valuation of Dr. Sorensen's dental practice. 
Accounts Payable 
Dr. Sorensen claims that Dr. Ausan's valuation, 
which was apparently adopted by the trial court, 
failed to consider $10,129 in accounts payable 
The record is ambiguous on this point, but even if 
the full amount of the accounts payable was not 
considered, we find the error was hamJess. 
Both parties to this action were awarded appr-
oximately $131,000 in marital assets. Property 
distributions in divorce actions need not be 
"equal* but rather 'equitable/ See generally 
Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695 (Utah 1985). 
"While equality is a worthy goal, precise mathe-
matical equality is not essential or required. * Canning 
v. Canning, 744 P.2d 325, 329 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987). Accordingly, we find mat even if the 
trial court failed to consider the full amount of 
accounts payable in its calculations, such a 
mistake was harmless error considering the total 
property distribution. 
Conclusion 
Based on Dr. Austin's testimony, the trial court 
found that Dr. Sorensen's practice was worth 
$100,000 which included tangible assets, accounts 
receivable, and goodwill. The trial court further 
found that dental practices sell for approximately 
90 percent of their value, hence $90,000 was des-
ignated as the total value of the practice. The trial 
court then discounted this figure to account for 
the time the parties were married. The trial court 
found that Dr. Sorensen had been practicing for 
sixteen years/and the parties had been married 
for approximately eleven and one-half years. He 
further concluded the majority of the goodwill 
value of the practice had been established during 
the marriage.27 Thus, he reduced or multiplied 
11.5/16 or 69 percent by $90,000 to arrive at 
$62,100, the total value he assigned Dr. Sore-
nsen's dental practice as a marital asset. 
Having concluded, 1) the trial court properly 
considered accounts receivable and goodwill in its 
valuation of Dr. Sorensen's dental practice, and 
2) that failing to consider accounts payable in its 
entirety was harmless error, we find the trial 
court's ultimate valuation of Dr. Sorensen's 
professional dental corporation is supported by 
the record, and accordingly, the trial court's 
valuation is affirmed. 
EL 
ATTORNEY FEES 
In order to recover attorney fees in a divorce 
action, the moving party must set forth evidence, 
1) demonstrating that the award is reasonable, 
and 2) establishing the financial need of the req-
uesting party compels the award.2* The relevant 
factors for determining the reasonableness of the 
request include, the necessity for the number of 
hours dedicated, the reasonableness of the rate 
charged in light of the difficulty of the case and 
the result accomplished, and the rates commonly 
charged for similar services in the community.29 
In the instant case, there is sufficient evidence 
to demonstrate Mrs. Sorensen's financial need. 
However, counsel for Mrs. Sorensen concedes 
that no evidence was offered regarding the 
"reasonableness1' of the attorney fees incurred to 
maintain this action. Instead, Mrs. Sorensen's 
attorney proffered an exhibit reflecting only the 
time spent and the rates charged. Dr. Sorensen's 
counsel stipulated that the proffer could be rece-
ived, but expressly refused to stipulate to the 
"reasonableness" of the fees. No evidence was 
presented relating to the reasonableness of the 
number of hours, the usual hourly rate for 
divorce cases in the community, nor the overall 
reasonableness of the fee. See Talley, 739 P.2d at 
84. Additionally, the court's written findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, as well as the decree 
of divorce, make no reference to the reasonable-
ness of the fees. Accordingly, we find the proff-
ered testimony insufficient to sustain the award of 
attorney fees, and therefore, we reverse. 
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EXPERT WITNESS FEES 
Ordinarily, a trial court cannot require one party 
to pay the other party's expert witness fees in 
excess of the statutory rate.* Kerr v. Ken, 610 
P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1980). See also Frampton 
v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1980). 
However, in this case the parties agreed by pret-
rial stipulation to have their real property appra-
ised by Mr. Heiskanan. They further agreed that 
his fee would be paid initially by Dr. Sorensen, 
with the ultimate responsibility for payment to be 
determined by the trial court. Stipulations are 
conclusive and binding on the parties unless good 
cause is demonstrated warranting relief therefrom. 
Higley v. McDonald, 685 PJd 496, 499 (Utah 
1984). Dr. Sorensen has not set forth adequate 
justification to discharge his obligations under the 
pretrial stipulation Simply because Dr. Sorensen 
did not agree with the appraiser's valuation of 
the parties' real property, and instead chose to 
hire additional experts, does not constitute the 
requisite good cause. We find n o abuse of discr-
etion and. affirm the trial court's allocation of the 
appraiser's fee. 
In sum, we affirm the trial court's valuation 
and distribution of the parties' property, and its 
allocation of expert witness fees. We reverse the 
award of attorney fees. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Regnal W Garff, Judge 
1. To arrive at a dollar value attributable to acco-
unts receivable, Dr. Austin excluded all accounts 
unpaid over 120 days, and discounted the resulting 
amount by 12 percent to account for uncollectibles. 
2. In Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988), Judge Jackson, writing for this Court, 
found that the appellant confused "goodwill* with 
"going concern value," and failed to prove the exi-
stence of goodwill by competent evidence. Id. at 956-
57. 
3. See, c.g„ Rostd v. RoszeL 622 P.2d 429 (Alaska 
1981), rev'd on other grounds, 749 P.2d 343 
(Alaska 1988)(close corporation-husband and 
wife sole shareholders); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 152 
Ariz. 317, 732 P.2d 208 (1987) (partnership); Wilson 
v. Wilson, 294 Ark. 194, 741 S.W.2d 640 
(1987Xprofessional corporation); In re Marriage of 
Watts, 171 Cal.App.3d 366, 217 Cal. Rptr. 301 
(1985Kprofessional corporation); In re Marriage of 
Nichols, 43 Colo. App. 383, 606 P.2d 1314 
(1979Xprofessional association); Wright v. Wright, 
469 A.2d 803 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1983Xsole practiti-
oner); In re Marriage of White, 98 Ill.App.3d 380, 
424 N.E.2d 421 (1981Xprofessional corporation); 
Heller v. Heller, 672 S.W.2d 945 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1984Xprofessional corporation); Kowalesky v Kow-
alesky, 148 Mich. App. 151, 384 N.W.2d 112 
(1986Xprofessional corporation); Roth v. Roth, 406 
N.W.2d 77 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)(sole practitioner); 
Hanson v. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d 429 (Mo. 
1987Xptrtnership); In re Marriage of Hull, 712 P.2d 
1317 (Mont. 1986Xprofesaonal corporation); Taylor 
v. Taylor, 222 Neb. 721. 386 N.W.2d 851 
(1986Xprofessional corporation); Dugan v. Dugan, 
92 N.J 423, 457 A.2d 1 (1983)(solc practitioner); 
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Hertz v. Hertz, 99 N.M. 320, 657 P.2d 1169 
(1983Kprofessional corporation); Dorton v. Dorton, 
77 N.C. App. 667, 336 S.E.2d 415 (1985); Jondahl 
v. Jondahl, 344 N.W.2d 63 (N*D. 1984Ksole pract-
itioner); In re Marriage of Reiling, 66 Or. App. 284, 
673 P.2d 1360 (1983Xsole practitioner); Fait v. Fait, 
345 N.W.2d 872 (S.D. 1984)(professional associa-
tion); In re Marriage of Hall, 103 Wash.2d 236, 692 
P.2d 175 (1984Xprofessional corporation). 
4. See, e.g., Powell v. Powell, 231 Kan.App.2d 456, 
648 P.2d 218 (1982); Pearce v. Pearce, 482 So.2d 
108 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (expert testimony failed to 
prove sole proprietorship had goodwill value); Carter 
v. Carter, 616 S.W.2d 543 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1981); Beasley v. Beasley, 518 A.2d 545 (Pa. Super. 
1986); Holbrook v. Holbrook, 103 Wis.2d 327, 309 
N.W.2d 343 (Ct. App. 1981); Nail v. Nail, 486 
S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972Xno goodwill in sole propri-
etorship). Bur see Geesbreght v. Geesbreght, 570 
S.W.2d 427 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978KgoodwUl of profes-
sional corporation is marital asset). See also, 
Smith v. Smith, 709 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1985). 
5. Comment, Identifying, Valuing, and Dividing 
Professional Goodwill or Community Property at 
Dissolution of the Marital Community, 56 Tul. L. 
Rev. 313, 314 (1981Xquoting J. Story, Commenta-
ries on the Law of Partnerships §99, at 170 (6th 
ed. 1868)). See also Hanson v. Hanson, Mitchell v. 
Mitchell: The Division of Professional Goodwill 
Upon Marital Dissolution, 11 Harv. Women's L.J. 
147, 149 (1988); and Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 
2d 81,415 P.2d 667,670 (1966). 
6. Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d 1, 4 
(1983Xquoting J.M. Smith and K.F. Skousen, Int-
ermediate Accounting 283 (7th ed. standard vol. 
1982)), 
7. Dugan, 452 A.2d at 4. 
8. McDermott v. City of Seattle, 4 F.Supp. 855, 857 
(D. Wash. 1933Xand citations therein). 
9. Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81, 415 P.2d 
667,670(1966). 
10. In Mitchell v. Mitchell, the Arizona Supreme 
Court noted that there is confusion in this area of 
the law, partly because the analysis of whether 
goodwill should be considered an asset often invo-
lves the dissolution of a partnership which is some-
times controlled by a partnership agreement, as 
opposed to the dissolution of a marriage 152 Ariz. 
317, 732 P.2d 208, 211 (1987). The Arizona Court 
described the dissolution of a marriage as follows: 
A professional practice goes automatic-
ally to the spouse licensed to practice it. 
He is not selling out or liquidating, but 
continuing in business. Effectively, it is 
the case of the silent partner withdra-
wing from a going business. And, if 
such partner is to receive fair compens-
ation for her share, or her enforced 
retirement, it should be so evaluated. 
Id. 
Such is the case in Jackson v. Caldwell, authority 
relied on by Dr. Sorensen for the proposition that 
goodwill should not be considered marital property 
subject to distribution in divorce proceedingSc See 
Jackson, 415 P.2d at 670-71. 
11. See, e.g., Dugan, 457 A.2d at 4; Mitchell, 732 
P.2d at: 210-11; Heller v. Heller, 672 S.W.2d 945, 
947 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984); Hanson v. Hanson, 738 
S.W.2d 429,435 (Mo. 1987). 
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12. See Powell v. Powell, 231 Kan.App.2d 456, 648 
P.2d 218. 223 (1982); Holbrook v. Holbrook, 103 
Wis.2d 327, 309 N.W.2d 343, 354 (Ct. App. 1981); 
Nail V. Naif, 486 S.W.2d 761,764 (To. 1972). 
13. See Powell, 648 P.2d at 223; Holbrook, 309 j 
N. W.2d at 354; Nail, 486 S.W.2d at 764. 
14. Sec, e.g., Holbrook, 309 N.V* .2d at 354. 
15. Sec, e.g., Mitchell v. Mitchell, 152 Ariz. 317, 
732 P.2d 208, 211 (1987); In re Mamagc of Nichols, 
43 Colo. App. 383,606 P. 2d 1314,1315 (1979); Hdlcr 
v. Hdlcr, 672 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1984); DugMn v. Dugan, 92 .N.J. 423, 457 A.2d 1, 6 
(1983). 
16. See, eg.. In re Marriage of Nichols, 606 P.2d at 
1315. in addition to those authorities holding that 
goodwill is a marital asset, see note 3, supra, even 
those jurisdictions holding to the contrary, noneth-
eless find that good will is a property interest. Sec, 
eg., Powell v. Powell, 231 Kan .App.2d 456, 648 
P.2d 218, 222 (1982); Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761, 
763 (Tex. 1972); Beasley v. Beasky, 518 A.2d 545, 
552 (Pa. Super. 1986); Pearce v. Pearce 482 So.2d 
108, UI (La. a . App. 1986). Instead, these cases 
typically find that the particular facts did not dem-
onstrate that the goodwill had value, and therefore, 
goodwill per se should not be considered a marital 
asset. See Powell, 648 P.2d at 222*24; Nail, 486 
S.W.2d at 764; Beasley, 518 A.2d at 552; Pearce, 
482So.2datl l l . 
17. Dugan, 457 A.2d at 5. See also In re Marriage 
ofGoger, 27 Or.App. 729,557 P.2d 46,47 (1976). 
18. See Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987); Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). In Petersen, we held that an 1 
educational degree is not encompassed within the 
broad views of the concept of * property „ * 
*It does not have an exchange value or 
any objective transferable value on an 
open market. It is personal to the 
holder. It terminates on death of the 
holder and is not inheritable. It cannot 
be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed, 
or pledged .... It is simply an intellectual 
achievement that may potentially assist 
in the future acquisition of property. In 
our view it has none of the attributes of 
property in the usual sense of that 
term.' 
737 P.2d at 240 (quoting In re Mamagc of Graham, 
194 Colo. 429,574 P.2d 75,77 (19781). 
19. Woodward, 656 P.2d at 432 (quoting Kikkert v. 
Kikkert, 177 N.J. Super. 471, 427 A.2d 76, 78 
(1981), quoting Kruger v. Kruger, 73 N.J. 464, 375 
A.2d 659, 662 (1977), afVd, 88 NJ. 4f 438 A.2d 
317(1981)). 
20. Powell v. Powell, 231 Kan.App.2d 456, 648 
P.2d 218, 223 (1982). See also, Holbrook v. Holb-
rook, 103 Wis.2d 327, 309 N.W 2d 343. 354 (Ct. 
App. 1981) (goodwill is valuable oory to the extent 
that it assures continued substantial future earn- I 
ings). 
21. See, e.g., Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 423, 457 
A.2d 1, 6 (1983); In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 
Cal.App.3d 93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 67 (1974); In re 
Marriage of Hall, 103 Wash.2d 236, 692 P.2d 175, 
178(1984). 
22. WHson v. Wilson, 294 Ark. 194, 741 S.W.2d 
640, 647 (1987); Carriker v. Gamier. 151 Ariz. 296, 
727 P.2d 349, 350 (Ct. App. 1986). Accord Poore v. 
Poore, 75 N.C. App. 414, 331 S.E.U 266 (1985); in 
re Marriage ofGoger, 27 Or. App. 729, 557 P.2d 46 
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(1976); Hurley v. Hurley, 94 N.M. 641, 615 P.2d 
256(1980). 
23. See Taylor v. Taylor, 222 Neb. 721, 386 N.W.2d 
851, 858 (1986); Hanson v. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d 
429,434 (Mo. 1987). 
24. Poore, 331 S.E.2d at 271 (citing Hurley v. 
Hurley, 94 N.M. 641, 615 P.2d 256 (1980)); Accord 
In re Marriage of Goger, 27 Or. App. 729, 557 P.2d 
46 (1976). See also In re Marriage of Hall, 103 
Wash.2d 236, 692 P.2d 175, 179 (1984); Hertz v. 
Hertz, 99 N.M. 320, 657 P.2d 1169, 1174 (1983). 
value of the goodwill estimated therefrom as a basis, 
subject to being reduced by a showing of a depres-
sion in trade or other circumstance* that would tend 
to make the business less valuable....'" Id. 
25. Although not specifically stated by either party, 
Dr. Austin appeared to use in part a market value 
methodology to value Dr. Sorensen's dental prac-
tice. A market value approach has been cited with 
approval in other jurisdictions, sec, eg.. In re 
Marriage of Hall, 103 Wash.2d 236, 692 P.2d 175, 
180 (1987); and in at least one jurisdiction, is the 
only acceptable methodology. See Hanson v. 
Hanson, 738 S.W.2d 429, 435 (Mo. 1987). Of the 
five methodologies, a market value approach often 
produces the most conservative estimate for good-
will. 2 Valuation and Distribution of Marital Prop-
erty, §23.05(2](a] at 23-66 (1988). 
26. See, eg., Kopptin v. Kopplin, 74 Or App. 368, 
703 P.2d 251, 253 (1985Xtrial court did not err by 
discounting accounts receivable by 30 percent); In re 
Marriage of Reiling, 66 Or.App. 284, 673 P.2d 
1360, 1365 (1983Xaccounts receivable are property 
to be included In the valuation of a law firm); In re 
Marriage of Bayer, 687 P.2d 537, 538 (Colo. Ct. 
App. l984Xaccounts receivable represent debts for 
services already rendered and therefore constitute 
marital property); In re Marriage of Goldstein, 120 
Ariz. 23, 583 P.2d 1343, 1344 (1978Xtrial court 
properly included accounts receivable as a marital 
asset). 
27. Although the record does not conclusively esta-
blish that the goodwill value of Dr. Sorensen's 
practice increased at a constant rate throughout the 
marriage, there is also no controverting evidence 
establishing that it did not. In fact. Dr. Sorensen 
presented very little credible testimony regarding the 
goodwill value of his corporation. Based on the 
evidence before the trial court, its method of appo-
rtionment was not an abuse of discretion. 
28. Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384-85 (Utah 
1980); Talley v. Talley, 739 P.2d 83, 84 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987). 
29. Kerr, 610 P.2d at 1384-85; Talley, 739 P.2d at 
84. 
30. Utah Code Ann. §21-5-4(1) (1988), provides 
that * [ejvery witness legally required or in good 
faith requested to attend... [trial], is entitled to $14 
per day for each day in attendance and 30 cents for 
each mile actually and necessarily traveled in going 
only.-
JACKSON, Judge (Concurring In part and 
dissenting in part): 
I dissent from Part I of the majority opinion. 
Why are my colleagues and others in the legal 
system trying to create "new property" in the 
context of marriage dissolution? Because of real 
and perceived injustices and inequities in property 
settlements in divorce decrees. As a result of their 
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high income production, professionals are prime 
targets for the new, expansive definitions of pro-
perty that include: (1) advanced university 
degrees; (2) licenses to practice; (3) equitable res-
titution; and (4) professional goodwill. Propon-
ents of 'new property* justify new definitions 
because they believe those definitions provide the 
divorce system with additional means to be fair. 
STATUS OF THE "NEW PROPERTY" IN 
UTAH 
In Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237, 241 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987), this court held that "an advanced 
degree is or confers an intangible right which, 
because of its character, cannot properly be cha-
racterized as property subject to division between 
the spouses." We also stated it is proper to cons-
ider advanced degrees or professional licenses 
when determining a spouse's ability to provide 
support, because an advanced degree is ordinarily 
an indicator of potential future earnings. 
But it is the discrepancy in their 
earning power which is the basis for 
alimony, not the discrepancy in their 
educations.. . . Whether a spouse's 
ability to provide support is the result 
of an advanced degree or professional 
license is irrelevant to the analysis. 
The key is the spouse's ability. 
Id. at 243 (emphasis in original). 
In Rtyburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238, 24(M1 
(Utah Q . App. 1987), we reaffirmed our holding 
in Petersen, but acknowledged there will be situ-
ations involving advanced degrees and professi-
onal licenses where an award of non-terminable 
rehabilitative or reimbursement alimony would be 
appropriate. See Petersen. 737 P.2d at 242 n.4. In 
my view, reimbursement alimony is a return on 
investment in one spouse made by the financially 
supporting spouse. In contrast, rehabilitative 
alimony relates to lost investment in one's self, 
resulting in lost or lower future income stream. 
The need for reimbursement is most pronou-
nced in "threshold" divorces, where the parties 
split up before the benefits of one spouse's enh-
anced earning potential are realized. Like Rayburn, 
the instant case does not involve a thr-
eshold divorce. Dr. Rayburn acquired his medical 
degree before the parties married. Mrs. Rayburn 
did not endure substantial financial sacrifices or 
defer her own education to assist his education. 
She shared the financial rewards of the degree for 
several years. His income production brought 
considerable real and personal property into the 
marriage that was equitabty divided. 
Similarly, Or. Sorensen acquired his degree, 
license, and dental clientele and equipment six 
years before marriage. Mrs Sorensen contributed 
nothing to assist him in those acquisitions; she 
made no sacrifice, financial or otherwise. She 
shared his financial rewards for eleven years and 
received considerable tangible property in the 
divorce decree, plus alimony and child support. If 
the facts had warranted it, she could have been 
awarded non-terminable rehabilitative or reim-
bursement alimony. 
In another recent divorce case involving a pro-
UTAH 
fessional spouse, Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 
69 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), the majority followed 
Petersen and Rayburn insofar as it held that a 
medical degree is not property subject to valua-
tion and distribution in a divorce. However, 
stating that Mrs. Martinez's situation required 
"more creative" analysis than the usual case, Mar-
tinez, 754 P.2d at 76, the majority then 
moved beyond rehabilitative or reimbursement 
alimony to create new property by requiring an 
award of "equitable restitution" in addition to 
traditional alimony and property division.1 See 
id. at 78. In a footnote, the majority emphasized 
that equitable restitution would not be awarded 
where the marriage lasted for many years after 
receipt of the professional degree; in such a case, 
sufficient assets would be accumulated and an 
appropriate distribution to the requesting spouse 
would provide a share of the economic benefits 
earned as a result of the degree. Id. at 78 n. 10. 
Equitable restitution, this new animal not to be 
confused with traditional alimony or property, 
was described by the Martinez majority as 
"nothing more than an equitable sharing of the 
rewards of both parties' common efforts and 
expectations." Id. at 78. As I stated in my dissent, 
the effect of that decision is to unnecessarily 
aeate a distinctly new and unprecedented form of 
marital property. Id. at 82 (Jackson, J., dissen-
ting). 
The instant case is the fourth attempt in Utah 
to create "new property" in the professional 
arena. My colleagues have cooperated by uncrit-
ically embracing a new definition equating 
"goodwill" with "reputation," discussed below. I 
agree that we must strive for equity and fairness 
in divorce actions, but I do not agree with the 
means they have chosen. Under our statute, Utah 
Code Ann. §30-3-5 (1988), equity can be 
achieved through non-terminable alimony 
awards consistent with Rayburn and Petersen. 
This method is preferable to the judicial selection 
of new definitions of property. 
ORIGINS OF PROFESSIONAL GOODWILL 
Like many legal doctrines, that of professional 
goodwill as a marital asset divisible at divorce had 
one of its earliest airings in the California appel-
late courts. In Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 
2d 245, 301 P.2d 90, 94-95 (1956), the Third 
District Court of Appeal quoted what it believed 
to be the 'general rule" in 28 Am. Jur. 808 that 
goodwill could exist in a professional practice or 
business dependent on the personal skill and 
ability of a particular person, but did not adopt 
that rule. The authority relied on in Mueller, 
however, focused on an actual sale of a professi-
onal practice. In any case, the Mueller court dis-
posed of the case by assuming no goodwill could 
attach to such a business and then holding that 
the dental laboratory business at issue did not 
depend solely on the divorcing husband's pers-
onal skill. Six years later, the same court said-
again in dicta-that the value of a professional 
practice was property to be considered at marr-
iage dissolution; the appellant ex-wife had not 
even appealed the trial court's failure to award 
her any of the value of the respondent's law 
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practice. Bnwman v. Brawman, 199 CaL App. 2d 
876, 19 Cal. Rptr. 106, 109 (1962). Finally, 
relying on Mueller and firawman, the Second 
District Court of Appeal explicitly embraced the 
doctrine in Go/den v. Golden. 270 Cal. App. 2d 
401, 75 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1969), and stated the 
following rule: 
(IJn a divorce case, the good will of 
the husband's professional practice as 
a sole practitioner should be taken 
into consideration in determining the 
award to the wife .... (IJn a matrim-
onial matter, the practice of a sole 
practitioner husband will continue, 
with the same intangible value as it 
had during the marriage. Under the 
principles of community property law, 
the wife, by virtue of her position of 
wife, made to that value the same 
contribution as does a wife to any of 
the husband's earnings and accumul-
ations during marriage. 
Id. at 405, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 737-38. The Califo-
rnia cases involving professional goodwill .after 
Go/den did not even argue about whether good-
will can exist in a professional practice. Instead, 
they assumed both that such goodwill could and 
did in fact exist, and focused on how to put a 
price tag on it. £.£., In re Marriage of Fortkr, 34 
Cal. App. 3d 384, 109 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1973); In 
re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 113 
Cal. Rptr. 58 (1974); In re Marriage of Foster, 42 
Cal. App. 3d 577, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1974). As 
discussed more fully below, this shift in focus has 
two unfortunate results: (1) the use of a broad, 
new definition of 'goodwill/ only in the profes-
sional practice context, that equates it with pers-
onal reputation; and (2) the assumption that 
goodwill exists in every professional practice, 
relieving the requesting party of the burden of 
proving that it exists. 
Tracking the elevation of professional goodwill 
from dicta to law in California, one writer has 
summarized: 
Thus in just 17 years ... California 
carried a passing quotation from a law 
encyclopedia that goodwill now could 
be sold as part of a professional pra-
ctice, to a dear acceptance, in Fortkr, 
that professional goodwill was an asset 
accountable as property upon a hyp-
othetical sale at marriage dissolution. 
Lurvey, Professional Goodwill on Marriage Dis-
solution: Is it Property or Another Name for 
Alimony?, 52 Cal. State Bar J. 27, 82 (1977). The 
result, Lurvey claims, is a 'confusion of rules and 
methods for valuation, compounded by inconsis-
tencies in logic and application and conceptual 
problems over possible duplication of spousal 
support and denial of equal protection.' /d. at 
85. 
EXISTENCE OF PROFESSIONAL 
GOODWILL 
Judges, like valuation formulas, are leapfrogging 
over the threshold question of whether goodwill 
exists at all in a particular professional business. 
moving directly to the issue of what the value of 
that goodwill is. The court in In re Marriage of 
Hah9, 103 Wash.2d 236, 692 P.2d 175 (1984), 
takes a stab at existence first, valuation second, 
but ultimately caves in and comingles the two 
issues: 
Two areas surrounding the (factors 
relevant to valuation of goodwill, set 
out in In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 
Cal. App. 3d 93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58 
(1974) and adopted in In re Marriage 
of Fleege, 91 Wash 2d 324, 588 P.2d 
1136 (1979),] must be clarified: (1) the 
first step in evaluation [of goodwill] 
under the Fleege factors is the deter-
mination of the existence of goodwill 
and (2) several accounting or appraisal 
methods may be used by the trial 
court in conjunction with the Fleege 
factors. 
The Lopez court warned that eval-
uation of goodwill must be done with 
considerable care and caution. In 
carrying out this warning the court 
instructed that the trial courts should 
first determine if goodwill exists in a 
particular practice. Not every profes-
sional business as a going concern 
necessarily has goodwill. The Washi-
ngton goodwill cases to date have not 
recognized this preliminary inquiry 
and we do so today. 
Hall, 692 P.2d at 179 (citations omitted). Unfor-
tunately, the Hall court then states, 'This preli-
minary inquiry takes place during the general 
evaluation process. The trial court must bear in 
mind that there may be zero goodwill.' Id. Thus, 
even after Hall, the existence of goodwill is going 
to be determined by a calculation or formula 
determining whether it has a value; if it has a 
value, then it exists.2 'One or more [approved 
valuation] methods may be used in conjunction 
with the Fleege factors to achieve a just and fan-
evaluation of the existence and value of any pro-
fessional's goodwill.' Id. at 180. The Fleege 
factors referred to in Hall, 692 P.2d at 179, which 
are also the factors set forth in Lopez, are the 
professional's age, health, past demonstrated 
earning power, professional reputation in the 
community as to his judgments, skill, and know-
ledge3 and his comparative professional success. 
But these are the factors outlined in Fleege and Lopez 
as relevant to the valuation of professional 
goodwill, not its existence. See Fleege, 588 P.2d 
at 1138; Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d at 109, 113 Cal. 
Rptr. at 68. Thus, after this bit of sleight of hand 
in Hall, Washington uses the same factors to 
determine both that professional goodwill exists 
and that it has some value. Then the amount of 
that value is determined with the aid of an expert 
who is to use one of the five approved formulas. 
Accordingly, goodwill exists when a professional 
has health, a financial track record, and reputa-
tion. Thus, every professional who does not work 
as a salaried employee4 automatically has good-
will because every professional has all or most of 
these factors. 
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My colleagues in this case adopt the California 
and Washington approach and make the same 
unfortunate mistake. Their position, boiled down, 
is that a non-salaried professional person's 
reputation is 'goodwill' and, therefore, property. 
Failing to discern the necessity of a preliminary 
factual finding, based on supportive evidence in 
the record, that such professional goodwill exists, 
the majority opinion jumps right into valuation of 
Or. Sorensen's dental practice. 
In California, the professional goodwill doct-
rine found its roots m dicta. Here, my colleagues 
think they have found identical roots in dicta in Gard-
ner v. Gardner, 748 PJd 1076 (Utah 1988). 
In Gardner, however, Justice Stewart was conce-
rned that the parties' experts had failed to 
address the goodwill of an established business 
organization, the Ogden Omk, not the personal 
reputation of Mr. Gardner 
The Ogden Clinic, of which Mr. 
Gardner is a member, is a well-
entrenched institution, whose twenty-
three members have banded together 
in a business organization. It is not 
likely to be highly susceptible to ear-
nings interruptions because of the ill 
health of one of its members. The 
Ogden Clink is not entirely valueless 
.... Mrs. Gardner's accountants value 
the business much higher [than Mr. 
Gardner does]0 Neither gave conside-
ration to the good wffl inherent in the 
professional clinic. 
Id. at 1080 (footnote omitted). The footnote to 
this text also dearly refers to goodwill as an asset 
of a business, not of a person. 'The ability of a 
business to generate income from its continued 
patronage is commonly referred to as good will.0 Id. 
at 1080 D J 
The twenty-three member Ogden Clinic is the 
perfect contrast to Dr. Sorensen's one-man 
dental practice, which b highly susceptible to 
earnings interruptions from many causes. More-
over, when well, he can work only so many hours 
a day and that is the end of his production. His 
opportunities to increase earnings are negligible. 
As the court in Gardner seems to recognize, 
traditional nonkgal definitions of goodwill focus 
on it as the asset of a business, not of an indivi-
dual. The goodwill concept used by accountants 
focuses on its measurement through a deductive 
process, not on its nature. Parkman, The Treat-
meat of Professional Goodwill in Divorce Proc-
eedings, 18 Fans. L. Q. 213 (1984). Thus, their 
criteria for goodwill are aimed at something that 
can be measured, such as excess earning power or 
payments made in excess of an established value 
of a resource. Id. To economists, the value of an 
asset depends on the future profits it can produce. 
Thus, the economic concept of goodwill focuses 
on the fact that an established business can make 
greater profits than new businesses because of its 
internal and external relationships; once the 
revenue produced by these relationships is capit-
alized, it can be viewed as an asset of the busi-
ness, i.e.. goodwill. Id. at 214. 
In contrast, the legal concept of goodwill 
focuses on the idea that it is an asset 
which generates excess earnings. 
Because the legal concept has not been 
fitted into the existing accounting and 
e c o n o m i c f ramework , h o w e v e r , 
experts have had a difficult time app-
lying the concept. In particular, the 
legal concept does not clearly differe-
ntiate between excess returns to indi-
viduals and excess returns to busine-
sses. This confusion is especially not-
iceable in the case of professional 
practices. 
In both the accounting and econ-
omic literature, goodwill is an asset of 
a business based on earnings in excess 
of normal profits. It is based on the 
intangible, but generally marketable, 
existence in a business of established 
relations with employees, customers, 
and suppliers. The same analysis 
would not view goodwill as being 
reflected in an individual. If excess 
profits of a business are attributable to 
an individual, that individual should 
be able to capture that value in higher 
wages. It would be appropriate to view 
personal attributes as 'reputation* 
rathei than as 'goodwill/ By using 
reputation and goodwill interchange-
ably, the courts have created a conf-
used situation in the evaluation of 
professional businesses. 
Id. at 215.* 
In a professional practice, goodwill can exist in 
the business, but not in the individual practicing 
the profession. A large professional business 
organization can have substantial goodwill. The 
Ogden Clinic fits the example of such an organi-
zation given by Parkman. See id. at 216. It does 
not have any one professional's name directly 
associated with it; patients come not because of 
any particular individual professional, but because 
of their own needs and the clinic's past delivery 
of high quality service. If that clinic sold for a 
price greater than the value of its tangible assets, 
the value of that excess, goodwill, would not be 
based on the presence at the clinic of any partic-
ular employee or professional. 
Dr. Sorensen's solo dental practice fits 
Parkman's example, at the other extreme, of the 
limited opportunities for goodwill in a small 
professional practice, even one that is smoothly 
operated. See id. His patients come because of 
high quality service. He has a few employees, but 
equally qualified people are readily available. 
Patients would not necessarily return to his office 
location just because they had gone to a doctor 
there before. A new doctor would not pay for his 
practice much in excess of the value of his tang-
ible assets and accounts receivable. 
By distorting the original definition of business 
goodwill to equate it with such subjective factors 
as personal reputation in the professional practice 
context, the majority's decision, like the cases it 
relies on, fabricates the existence of goodwill as as 
asset belonging to every non-salaried professi-
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onal, whether in a solo practice, partnership, or 
professional corporation. I believe an objective 
threshold standard for determining the existence 
of goodwill must be enunciated. 
ANALYSIS OF VALUATION METHODS 
A N D FORMULAS APPLIED TO "NEW" 
GOODWILL 
The majority asserts that the valuation procedure 
employed by Dr. Austin, Mrs. Sorensen's expert, 
is one commonly used by his brokerage firm and 
is also consistent with methodologies recognized 
and approved in other jurisdictions. But they are 
not sure about the method he employed: 
"Although not specifically stated by either party, 
Dr. Austin appeared to use in part a market value 
methodology to value Dr. Sorensen's dental 
practice. A market value approach has been cited 
with approval in other jurisdictions, see, e.g., In 
re Marriage of Hall, 103 Wash.2d 236, 692 P2d 
175, ISO (1984) ...." Footnote 25, supra. Actually, 
Dr. Austin used his own gross revenue capitaliz-
ation formula and merely labeled his method a 
"market, value" approach. Gross revenue formulas 
automatically attribute goodwill to every profes-
sional because every professional has revenue. 
In Hall, the Washington Supreme Court appr-
oved five professional goodwill valuation 
methods, including three capitalization formulas 
based on capitalization of net profits, not of gross 
revenue. In this case, Austin did not use the 
market value method, described by the court in HaU 
as follows: 
The fourth method, the market 
value approach, sets a value on prof-
essional goodwill by establishing what 
fair price would be obtained in the 
current open market if the practice 
were to be sold. This method necessi-
tates that a professional practice has 
been recently sold, is in the process of 
being sold or is the subject of a recent 
offer to purchase. 
HaU, 692 P.2d at 180 (emphasis added).' 
Thus, although Hall approves only a market 
value approach based on a current sale of the 
particular practice at issue, Austin used a past 
sales approach that only involved ax sales of other 
practices, sales generated by his appraisal 
firm at prices created by its methods. The number 
of sales (two each year for three years) is too few 
to establish any market and none were in the 
vicinity of Roy, Utah or Weber County, Utah. 
They are too remote in both time and place to be 
reliable indicators of the value of any goodwill in 
Dr. Sorensen's practice. 
Unlike the majority, I believe courts should not 
be hoodwinked into accepting the valuation test-
imony offered by one party or die other, just 
because one sounds more credible than the other. 
If both experts are out in left field, the court 
should ignore them or require counsel to provide 
the proper data and analysis. 
FAILURE TO DETERMINE WHETHER 
THE PROFESSIONAL'S CAREER ASSET 
WAS ACQUIRED BEFORE MARRIAGE 
Even if there was evidence in this case on which 
to base a finding that goodwill exists in Dr. Sor-
ensen's dental practice, and even if there was 
credible evidence to support the value of that 
goodwill, there is one remaining flaw in the pro-
perty distribution in this case. The trial court 
never examined—and none of the evidence 
addresses—whether the intangible asset of 
professional goodwill was acquired before or after 
the marriage vows. 
Here, the trial court did recognize a timing 
problem with the expert's valuation methods. 
Mrs. Sorensen's expert did not pay attention to 
the time when Dr. Sorensen acquired his reputa-
tion or 'goodwill." The court found that "Itjhe 
only reasonable way to value said practice is to 
proportion it based upon the years the parties 
have been married during practice."7 There is no 
evidence to support that finding. To the contrary, 
there is evidence that virtually all, if not all, of 
the value of the practice, including goodwill or 
reputation, was Dr. Sorensen's pre-marital 
asset. Dr. Sorensen's evidence showed that, when 
adjusted for inflation, net earnings from his 
professional services were essentially the same at 
the time of marriage as at the time of divorce. 
The number of his clients had decreased. Thus, 
there was no increase in the value of his goodwill 
or reputation during the marriage. Whatever it 
was and whatever its value, it was Dr. Sorensen's 
pre-marital asset, not a marital asset.1 
Since Dr. Sorensen owned his career asset, his 
practice, and its "goodwill" prior to marriage, 
that asset should be treated as his separate prop-
erty, to be awarded to him at dissolution in the 
absence of exigent circumstances faced by the trial 
court in fashioning equitable awards of property, 
support, and alimony, circumstances not present 
here. See Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705, 706 
(Utah 1982); see also Mortensen v. Mortensen, 
760 P.2d 304, 310 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring). 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, I dissent from my colleagues* crea-
tion of yet another species of new property 
through their broad redefinition of goodwill in 
the professional practice context, and from their 
erroneous approval of valuation factors and an 
unacceptable valuation method as a substitute for 
evidence of the existence of goodwill, however 
defined. Traditional alimony awards, plus non-
modifiable rehabilitative or reimbursement 
alimony awards, where appropriate, offer the best 
methods for achieving equity and fairness in 
Utah. 
Even if I agreed with the majority's analysis 
and disposition of the professional goodwill issue, 
I would nonetheless vacate the trial court's award 
of part of the value to Mrs. Sorensen because 
there is no evidence to justify not returning it to 
Dr. Sorensen as his pre-marital asset. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1. The Utah Supreme Court has granted Dr. Mart-
inez's petition for a writ of certiorari to consider 
the issue of equitable restitution. Martinez v. Mar-
tinez, 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Sept. 7,1988). 
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2. This approach, which begs the preliminary ques-
tion of existence, is similar to that adopted by the 
Arizona court in Mitchell v. Mitchell, 152 Ariz. 317, 
732 P.2d 208, 214 (1987), despite recognition of the 
need for a two-step determination: 
As a general rule, 'the court should 
clearly state whether it finds the practice 
to have any goodwill, and if so, its 
value, and how it arrived at that value/ 
Poore v. Poore, 75 N.C. App. 414, 331 
S.E.2d 266 (1985) However, because the 
trial court stated that it utilized the gross 
fee approach advocated by appellee's 
own expert, and the valuation was rea-
sonably supported in the record by 
expert testimony, we find no error. 
3. Fleege states that the value of professional goo-
dwill can be determined based partially on the pro-
fessional's "reputation in the community for judg-
ment, skill, and knowledge." Fleege, 588 P.2d at 
1138. But the case it cites as authority for the de-
ments engendering goodwill. In re Estate of Giant, 
57 Wash.2d 309, 356 P.2d 707, 709 (1960), involved 
Pacific Iron and Metal Company, a business part-
nership, and referred only to "reputation for 
honesty and fair dealing/ 
4. Significantly, the primary reason Dr. Sorensen 
would have the "new goodwiT is because he elected 
to work for himself as a non-salaried professional 
rather than work for someone else for a salary. For 
example, assume a lawyer hi solo practice who has 
five winnable wrongful death cases on hand. When 
he wins or settles those cases, the "new goodwillers" 
attribute goodwill to him because he will have excess 
earnings above what the average salaried lawyer 
makes. However, if he were to take his cases to 
another lawyer or firm, turn them over, and agree 
to work on them for a high salary until successfully 
completed, he would not have any "new goodwill" 
as property to be divided upon divorce, although his 
high income is virtually the same. 
The court in Hall reached this absurd result, 
professing to see a distinction with a difference 
between salaried and non-salaried professionals. 
Dr. Judith Hall, a forty-year-old professor at the 
University of Washington, had received a salary 
increase from $32,750 to $42,000 around the time of 
the divorcee She was "widely published and 
enjoy[ed] a reputation as one of the 10 top physic-
ians in the nation in the Meld of pediatric genetics.... 
Numerous medical schools across the nation ha[dj 
offered her employment with salaries up to 
$60,000/ Hall, 692 P.2d at 176. The Washington 
Supreme Court held, as a matter of law, that a sal-
aried employee such as Judith Hall cannot have 
goodwill. Id, at 178. But see L. Weitzman, The 
Divorce Revolution 122 (1985) (suggesting the Cali-
fornia courts and other* have already laid the nec-
essary foundation for tinting "goodwill" in salaried 
employees too). The HaB court apparently reached 
this conclusion because "only the practicing profes-
sional has a business or practice to which the goo-
dwill can attach." Hall, 692 P.2d at 178. Was not 
Judith Hall a practicing professional? Did she not, 
like her physician husband who worked for a prof-
essional corporation, also have health, reputation 
for skill and knowledge, and comparative professi-
onal success? 
5. Professor Allen Parkman, an economist and 
lawyer who teaches at the University of New 
Mexico's Anderson School of Management, attrib-
utes the confusion in the case law to the lack of any 
focus on a clear definition of goodwill, which the 
majority opinion in this case shares. 
The courts can obviously define terms in 
a manner that differs from their 
meaning in accounting and economics. 
However, if they then turn to these 
fields for an evaluation, they have to 
realize the confusion that is going to be 
created. If the courts say that there is 
goodwill in a sole practice, when there is 
none from an accounting or economic 
perspective, a problem of evaluation is 
created. It is like saying that an apple is 
an orange and then, even in the face of 
protests from an agricultural expert, 
asking for an analysis of the apple's 
citrus content. 
Parkman, The Treatment of Professional Goodwill 
in Divorce Proceedings, 18 Fam. L. Q. 213, 216 
(1984). 
6. Even this "past sales" method of valuing profes-
sional goodwill has been criticized as subject to 
manipulation and not necessarily accurate, see e.g., 
2 Valuation and Distribution of Marital Property 
§23.05(2](a) at 23-66 (J. McCahey ed. 1988), 
prompting some courts to insist on the use of acc-
ounting formulas that capitalize excess earnings. 
These, however, have their own faults, including the 
problem of estimating a consistent "normal" return 
on tangible assets by which to measure "excess" 
earnings and the broad leeway given to the appraiser 
to choose a capitalization rate. Id. §29.05(3][c] at 
29-44,45. 
Il is important to note that there is a 
great deal of diverse opinion as to 
whether earnings from a professional 
practice should be capitalized at all and 
if so, what rate is applicable* Critics of 
the use of capitalization point out that a 
generally accepted accounting and app-
raisal principle is that earnings are to be 
capitalized only where it can be assumed 
they will continue in the future. In the 
context of a professional practice, ther-
efore, a court employing the formula 
approach is, either directly or implicitly, 
placing a value on future earnings and 
results. Yet, courts are, often without 
adequate explanation, quick to point out 
that they are not so doing. 
Id. §29.05(3](c] at 29-46 (footnote omitted). 
Often, the professional ends up paying for the new 
goodwill with future earnings. 
[Another] difficulty with these accoun-
ting formulas [for valuing professional 
goodwill] is that the result may be ina-
ppropriately high since factors other 
than goodwill may contribute to the 
excess income. For instance, if a physi-
cian works 60 to 70 hours a week 
instead of the usual 40 to 50, the excess 
earnings generated by this additional 
effort may be attributed to goodwill. 
Comment, Identifying, Valuing, and Dividing Pro-
fessional Goodwill as Community Property at Dis-
solution of the Marital Community, 56 Tul. L. Rev. 
313,333-34 (1981) (footnote omitted). 
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A question not yet brought before the 
courts is the issue of the existence of pre-
marital goodwill when the practitioner 
spouse has married well after the com-
mencement of his practice. This could 
become quite significant. For example, a 
professional who had been in practice 
for twenty or more years could marry 
and then dissolve the marriage a short 
time later. Presumably the value of the 
goodwill accrued as of the date of the 
marriage would be separate property 
and would form a sort of basis. Only 
the goodwill accrued during the marr-
iage would be community property. Its 
value could be determined by calculating 
the difference between the value of 
goodwill as of the date of dissolution 
and the value as of the date of marriage. 
Since goodwill is not accrued at a con-
stant rate, as are pension benefits, the 
application of a simple time-based 
percentage formula to the value on the 
date of dissolution would not suffice. 
Comment, supra note 6, at 340 (footnote omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
t . Another method of analysis, recently set forth by 
Professor Parkman in a thought-provoking law 
review article, better demonstrates that Dr. Sore-
nsen's income-producing ability was his, not 
theirs. See Parkman, The Recognition of Human 
Capital as Property in Divorce Settlements, 40 Ark. 
L. Rev. 439, 440-49 (1987). Dr. Sorensen (or 
someone other than Mrs. Sorensen) made all the 
essential investments in the skill and knowledge he 
has that permits him to generate income in excess of 
the income he could derive from his innate strength 
and intelligence. His investments in himself, which 
increased the expected future income stream that 
would flow to him, were completed at least six years 
prior to his marriage. Usually, 
the greatest impediment to attaining 
access to a professional education is 
probably not the direct costs of the 
education, but the difficulty of obtai-
ning admission. The ability to gain 
admission is the result of earlier human 
capital investments. After admission, the 
most substantial cost of graduate educ-
ation is usually the income sacrificed by 
the student. 
Id. at 444-45. The current value of this income 
stream, his human capital, is a personal asset. See 
id. at 440, 447. That asset has value precisely 
because it will produce a stream of future returns. Id. 
at 439-40 & n.4. Even in a closer case, where a 
professional married while still a medical student, 
Parkman advocates treatment of an investment in 
one's self as non-marital property: 
For a medical doctor, the major increase 
in his future anticipated income stream 
occurs when he enters medical school, 
because the probability is very high that 
he will finish ....(TJhe critical investm-
ents had already occurred when the 
student entered medical school.... 
Under normal circumstances, the 
investment in human capital prior to 
marriage will be so large and essential 
relative to the investment after marriage 
that an individual's human capital 
should be treated as separate property. 
Id. at 448. I 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
PER CURIAM: 
This is a consolidated appeal from convictions 
for exceeding the maximum speed limit, a Cass B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§41-6-46 (1988) (the "traffic case") and for 
filing a written false statement, a Class B misde-
meanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-8-
504(2Xa) (1978) (the "false statement case"). The 
cases were tried in the Tenth Circuit Court on the 
same date, but before separate juries. Defendant 
was sentenced to a term of sixty days in jail, with 
fifty days suspended, and a $65 fine for the spe-
eding conviction, and a fine of $400 plus $100 
surcharge on the false written statement convic-
tion. 
The defendant was also held to be in contempt 
and was sentenced to ten days in jail, to run 
concurrently with the other jail term, and assessed 
a fine of $300. 
Defendant raises some twenty issues for consi-
deration on appeal. Of those issues, we conclude 
that only those discussed herein merit further 
consideration by this court. 
Defendant contends that his rights under the 
sixth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion were denied because he was not tried by a 
jury of twelve persons. In support of this conte-
ntion, defendant relies upon Thompson v. State 
of Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 18 S. Ct. 620 (1898). The 
actual Thompson holding was, however, that 
application of article 1, section 10 of the Utah 
Constitution providing for an eight-member jury 
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Elaine S. Sorensen, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Clifford G. Sorensen, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
ORDER 
No. 870102-CA 
This matter is before the Court upon a Petition for 
Rehearing filed by the Respondent. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Respondent's Petition for 
Rehearing is denied. 
Dated this 23rd day of March, 1989. 
FOR THE COURT: 
ary T. Moofian M _
Clerk *Q£ the Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STffiE OF_UTAH I 
ELAINE S. SORENSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLIFFORD G. SORENSEN, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT & 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
C i v i l No . 3 7 0 7 8 
The above entitled matter having come on regularly for trial 
on the 27th day of October, 1986 and again on the 14th day of 
November, 1986, before the Honorable Rodney S. Page, District Judge; 
plaintiff was present represented by her counsel, Tim W. Healy, Esq; 
defendant was present represented by his counsel, Robert A. Echard, 
Esq. Various witnesses were sworn and testified and documentary 
evidence was received, after which counsel for the respective parties 
argued their positions to the Court. The Court being duly advised 
in the premises now enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the plaintiff was a resident of Davis County at least 
three months prior to the filing of the Complaint in this matter. 
2. That the parties were married on April 10, 1975. 
3. That four children have been born as issue of the marriage. 
4. That the parties have acquired property and debts during 
the course of the marriage. 
5. That the defendant has treated the plaintiff in a cruel 
manner causing her great mental distress. 
6. That each of the parties are fit and proper persons to be 
awarded the care, custody and control of the minor children of this 
marriage. 
* I--u«::ir; 
A-17 
SORENSEN v SORENSEN 
FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Page Two 
7. That plaintiff is presently unemployed but has a master's 
degree and only needs to complete her disertation to get her 
doctorate; that she has worked previously and is capable of 
meaningful employment with adequate income. 
8. That defendant is a dentist and has his own practice and 
building in Roy, Utah. He has been in practice for sixteen years, 
six of those years prior to the parties' marriage. 
9. At the time of the marriage, plaintiff brought assets into 
the marriage with a value of approximately $5,800; the defendant, 
in addition to interest in the dental practice, brought a home 
which he had purchased one year prior to the marriage upon which 
he had vested $15,000 as a down payment. Additionally defendant had 
a $3,214 interest in a pension plan in connection with his dental practic 
10. That defendant paid on the home for one year prior to 
marriage, but the court finds that the amount attributable to 
the principal during that year was negligible and, therefore, 
does not consider the same. 
11. Following marriage, the parties sold the home in question 
and purchased another in which plaintiff presently resides. 
12. The home of the parties has a market value of $100,000 
and is free of lien except for a trust deed securing a loan from 
the Dental Pension Plan to the parties. 
13. That defendant has continued to practice dentistry in 
Roy, Utah, during the course of the marriage and has an office with 
an excellent location; has continued to build his clientele; has 
a good fee collection record and a good reputation in the community. 
14. The Court finds the total value of the practice to be 
$100,000 including accounts receivable and all equipment with the 
exception of the computer. 
15. That dental practices usually sell for approximately 90 
percent of the appraised value and usually on contract with 40 to 
60 percent down and the balance over a four or five year period. 
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16. The parties have also during the course of the marriage 
purchased the building in which the practice is located. 
17. The building is a converted home with an excellent location. 
The building was purchased initially for $50,000 and another $40,000 
was put into it for remodeling. The building also had other spece 
available for rental. 
18. The market value of the dental building is $74,000. 
19. The parties owe a balance of $42,543 to the Thompson 
family on the building. 
20. The defendant, over the course of the marriage, has 
borrowed money from his mother for work on certain of the dental 
offices. The first of said loans was repaid to her in 1978 in 
the amount of $10,000. 
21. That the defendant borrowed $20,000 from his mother to 
assist with the remodeling on the present building; there is no 
documentation to represent said loan; however, defendant in his 
income tax records indicates a payment to his mother in 1982 of 
several thousand dollars. 
22. During the marriage the parties purchased 15.775 acres and 
a home in Ogden Valley for $198,000. 
23. Also during the marriage, the defendant purportedly 
created a limited partnership known as Bienestar Investments with 
himself as general partner and the parties' children as limited 
partners. 
24. Plaintiff had knowledge of the creation of said limited 
partnership but did not sign documents in regards thereto or 
concerning the purchase of any property by the limited partnership 
of which she was aware. Certain joint assets were transferred to 
the partnership without plaintiff's knowledge or consent. 
25. Said limited partnership was primarily created for tax 
purposes by the defendant. 
gave an option to buy 
26. Defendant / the home located on the Ogden Valley property 
and one acre thereof for $42,000. The balance owing of that contract 
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is approximately $42,000. 
27. Defendant sold five acres of the same parcel to Efenestar 
Investments for $46,815 or for $9,300 per acre with the balance 
owing on that contract of $19,165. 
28. That defendant listed the Ogden Valley property for sale 
in 1986 for $8,000 per acre. 
29. The 9.775 acres of the parcel remaining are worth $8,000 
per acre for a total of $78,200. 
30. Also, in connection with the farm, the parties acquired 
certain farm equipment. Equipment all appears to be older but 
in relatively good condition. Many of the items of equipment are 
no longer used in the farm industry and are outdated. The Court 
considers the tractor, the mower, the plow, the disc, the hay 
wagon, the bailer, the harrow, the elevator to still be of 
primary value and use in a farm operation and sets the total 
value of the farm equipment at $4,000. 
31. The furniture and fixtures presently in the plaintiff's 
possession, including freezer, washer, dryer, and et cetera, 
is $6,500. 
32. The grand piano in plaintiff's possession is valued at 
$7,500. 
33. The plaintiff's car is valued at $750 and defendant's 
truck at $400; the motorcycles at $1,500; the Piccolo at $2,000; the 
spa membership at $250; the Wolf Creek Country Club at $1,000; the 
computer at $3,000; the yard equipment at $555; the guitar at 
$160; the video camera at $600. 
34. The Court puts no value on the boat and trailer it being 
a gift from defendant's parents. 
35. The Court finds that the encyclopedias and the bicycles 
belonging to the children are their property and, therefore, 
put no value thereon. 
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36. During the marriage the parties have acquired an interest 
in the Clifford Sorensen Profit Sharing Plan/Trust, Account # 
10-01-170-0895300 administered by First Security Bank of Utah, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, which has a present value less defendant's initial 
interest, of $90,379.00. That said Profit Sharing Plan/Trust consists 
of cash and savings and a note of the parties for $39,034. Said 
note is secured by a Trust Deed for $25,000 on the home of the parties. 
37. The aforesaid funds referred to in paragraph 36 above were 
borrowed from the Clifford Sorensen Profit Sharing Plan/Trust to finance 
purchase of the Ogden Valley Property and for subusequent expenses 
of the parties both business and personal. 
38. That the value of the aforesaid Clifford Sorensen Profit 
Sharing Plan/Trust for the purposes of property distribution is 
$51,345. 
39. The court finds that the parties haVe debts and obligations. 
Primarily, those consist of obligations on the farm and business for 
which credit is given in the evaluations. 
40. The court finds that the plaintiff is presently unemployed 
and that she and the children have reasonable expenses of between 
$1,500 and $1,800 per month. 
41. The court finds that certain debts listed by the defendant 
on his exhibits are in fact business expenses which are paid by 
the corporation or other entities and are not part of his personal 
expenses. 
From the foregoing the Court reaches the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That plaintiff should be awarded a Decree of Divorce from the 
defendant to become final upon entry. 
A-21 
SORENSEN v SORENSEN 
FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Page Six 
2. That it is in the best interest of the children that their 
care and custody should be awarded to the plaintiff subject to 
reasonable and liberal rights of visitation to the defendant 
which are more specifically defined as follows: 
a. Every other weekend from Friday night at 6:00 P.M. 
until Sunday at 7:00 P.M. 
b. Every other major holiday which holidays are defined 
as New Years Day, Martin Luther King Day, Presidents' Day, 
Easter vacation, Memorial Day, July 4th, July 24th, Labor Day & 
Thanksgiving. 
c. Defendant may have the children with him on Father's 
Day each year regardless of when that day falls. 
d. Plaintiff may have the children with her on Mother's 
Day each year regardless of when that day falls. 
e. December 25th at 2:00 P.M. through December 28th 
at 7:00 P.M. 
f. Monday night during the same week in which defendant 
exercises weekend visitation from 5:30 P.M. until 8:30 P.M. 
g. Four weeks each summer provided that said visitation 
shall consist of one week each month during the summer with 
the exception of one of the summer months which shall consist 
of two weeks. Defendant shall notify plaintiff on or before 
May 1st each year of the dates when he desires to exercise the afore-
said four weeks of summer visitation. It is understood that the 
one week each month during the summer when he exercises said 
visitation shall include one weekend of his visitation as set forth 
in sub-paragraph a above. 
3. That the defendant pay to the plaintiff the sum 
of $300 per month per child as support; that he maintain Health & accident 
A-22 
SORENSEN V SORENSEN 
FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Page "Seven 
life insurance on the children and pay one-half of any medical 
expenses not covered by insurance and all dental not covered by 
insurance provided, however, that the defendant is to be given 
the first opportunity to do all dental work on the children and 
to arrange the orthodontic work. Orthodontic expenses to be 
shared equally by the parties. 
4. The plaintiff should be awarded the home of the parties free 
and clear of any claim of the defendant. 
5. The plaintiff should be awarded the vehicle in her possession, 
the furniture and fixtures and piano in her possession, the guitar, 
the Wo IfCreek membership, the yard equipment, the video camera, 
one-half of the photos and sheet music and her own personal 
property and possessions. 
6. The defendant should be awarded the dental building subject 
to the debt thereon to the Thompsons of $42,543 and to his mother of 
$20,000 giving a total equity interest in the building of $11,457. 
7. The defendant should be awarded the dental practice including 
all equipment and accounts receivable the Court feeling that the 
larg* portion of the value of the practice has to do with good will 
and reputation built up in the practice over the years of marriage. 
The only reasonable way to value said practice is to proportion it 
based upon the years the parties have been married during practice. 
Based on their eleven years of marriage over sixteen years of 
practice for the purpose of distribution, the Court values 
the practice at 69 percent of the value as found above for a 
total of $62,100. I 
8. Defendant should be awarded the value of the property conveyed 
to Bienestar, the Court feeling the property conveyed is joint 
property and should be valued as such for purpose of distribution. 
The property consisting primarily of motorcycles valued at $1,500 
and the Piccolo valued at $2,000. 
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9. The defendant should be awarded the balance, of the 
property in Ogden Valley of 9.777 acres and sets the value thereof 
of $8,000 per acre for a total of $78,160. 
10. That defendant should be awarded said property subject to 
the debt thereon to the Shaws of $108,943. 
11. Defendant should be awarded the proceeds of the contract from 
Bienestar from the sale of five acres of the Ogden Valley land 
with a balance of $19,165. 
12. Defendant should be awarded the proceeds from the sale of 
the home and one acre of the Ogden Valley property with a balance of 
$42,000. 
13. Defendant should be awarded the farm equipment with a value 
of $4,000. 
14. Defendant should be awarded the computer acquired by the 
parties having an equity value of $3,000 subject to the debt 
thereon. 
15. Defendant should be awarded the truck valued at $400; boat 
and trailer as a gift from his parents; the spa membership worth 
$250; his own property and possessions, together with items of 
furniture and fixtures in his possession, sufficient of the 
kitchen utensils and dishes to set up his own apartment. 
16. Each of the parties should be awarded one-half of the firewood 
and to divide equally the family photos. 
17. Each of the parties should be awarded the personal 
property brought into the marriage free and clear from any claim 
of the other. 
18. Each of the parties should be entitled to deduct from their 
share of the equity sufficient sums to offset the cash equity 
amount brought into the marriage with no consideration for return 
on investment that not having been the expectation of the parties. 
Plaintiff should be entitled to a credit against equity of $5,800; 
and defendant a credit against equity of $15,000 excluding sums 
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already considered in valuing the practice and the pension interest 
of the parties. 
19. The Court should award to the plaintiff from the pension plan 
the sum of $20,104. Defendant should be awarded all of the 
balance of the interest in the pension plan provided, however, he 
should assume and discharge the note and debt owing to the plan 
by the parties and to hold the plaintiff harmless thereon and to 
see that the li£n securing the same on the home awarded to the 
is 
plaintiff/removed forthwith. The sum awarded to the plaintiff 
should be paid to her within 30 days of the signing of the decree 
herein. 
20. The Court concludes that the plaintiff is capable of going 
back to work and obtaining meaningful employment but that she will 
need alimony at least through the transition period; therefore, 
the Court orders that the defendant pay to the plaintiff the sum 
of $600 per month as and for alimony for a period of six months 
from December 1986; then $500 per month for a period of one year; 
then $250 per month for a period of three years then $1 per year 
for two years at which time alimony shall terminate, and shall 
terminate otherwise as provided by law. 
21. The defendant should have the children for income tax 
purposes so long as he is current on support unless otherwise 
ordered by the court. The plaintiff should sign all necessary 
documents to accomplish the same. 
22. The defendant should assume and discharge any and all tax 
liability occuring through the year 1986 either income or property 
and hold the plaintiff harmless thereon. 
23. Defendant should assume and discharge all debts of the 
parties incurred prior to separation and hold plaintiff harmless 
thereon. 
24. The Court further orders that defendant pay to plaintiff 
for the use and benefit of her attorney the sum of $2,000. Each 
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party should pay their own experts with the exception of Allan 
Heiskenan which shall be shared equally. 
25. The Court refused to set a dollar figure on the human 
resource of the ability of each party to produce income which 
may have been acquired during the course of the marriage. The 
Court specifically fiAds that such a detexmination is too speculative 
in nature and no amount of accounting gymnastics can give to such 
a computation the degree of credibility such that this Court would 
feel justified in setting a dollar figure; however, said ability 
is taken into account by the Court in considering the question 
of support and alimony. 
26. To assist counsel in preparing the findings & decree, the 
court sets forth his calculations as to equity interest as 
follows: 
a. 
as follows: 
PLAINTIFF 
Home 
Car 
Furn. & Fix 
Piano 
Guitar 
The rela 
Wo IfCreek Memb. 
Yard Equipment 
Camera 
Pension plan 
TOTAL 
Less equity 
brought in 
int. 
interest 
*Farm 
Contract(Bienestar) 
tive equity in 
$100,000 
750 
6,500 
7,500 
160 
1,000 
555 
600 
20,104 
$136,169 
5,800 
$131,369 
$ 78,200 
19,165 
terest of the parties i 
DEFENDANT 
Dental practice 
*Farm 
Farm Equipment 
Truck 
Spa 
*Dental bldg. 
Piccolo 
Computer 
Motorcycles 
Pension interest 
TOTAL 
should oe 
$ 62,100 
30,422 
4,000 
400 
250 
11,457 
2,000 
3,000 
1,500 
31,241 
$146,370 
Less equity interest 
brought in 15,000 
$131,370 
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Home contract $42,000 
TOTAL $139,365 
Less $ 30,422 
•Dental bldg. $74,000 
Less contract to Thompsons -42,543 
Less amt. to defendant's mother -20,000 
BALANCE $11,457 
DATED this 20^-day of-cFairaaryl 1987. 
Approved as to Form: 
Attorney for Defendant 
Dli 
k-n 
TIM W. HEALY #7606 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
863 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-2630 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELAINE S. SORENSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLIFFORD G. SORENSEN, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 37078 
The above entitled matter having come on regularly for trial 
on "the 27th day of October, 1986, and again on the 14th day of 
November, 1986, before the Honorable Rodney S. Page, District Judge 
presiding; plaintiff was present represented by her counsel, 
Tim W. Healy, Esq; defendant was present represented by his counsel, 
Robert A. Echard; Esq. Various witnesses were sworn and testified 
and documentary evidence was received after which counsel for the 
respective parties argued their positions to the Court. The Court 
being duly advised in the premises and having entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law in writing, 
Now, Therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce from the 
defendant the same to become final upon entry. 
2. That it is in the best interest of the children that their 
reasonable & liberal 
care and custody is awarded to the plaintiff subject to/rights 
of visitation by the defendant which are more specifically defined as 
f o l l o w s : FILMED 
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a. Every other weekend from Friday night at 6:00 P.M. 
until Sunday at 7:00 P.M. 
b* Every other major holiday which holidays are defined 
as New Years Day, Martin Luther King Day, Presidents' Day, Easter 
vacation, Memorial Day, July 4th, July 24th, Labor Day & Thanksgiving. 
c. Defendant may have the children with him on Father's Day 
each year regardless of when that day falls. 
d. Plaintiff may have the children with her on Mother's Day 
regardless of when that day falls. 
e. December 25th at 2:00 P.M. through December 28th at 
7:00 P.M. 
f. Monday night during the same week in which defendant 
exercises weekend visitation from 5:30 P.M. until 8:30 P.M. 
g. Four weeks each summer provided that said visitation 
shall consist of one week each month during the summer with the 
exception of one of the summer months which shall consist of two weeks. 
Defendant shall notify plaintiff on or before May 1st each year of the 
dates when he desires to exercise the aforesaid four weeks of summer 
visitation. It is understood that the one week each month during the 
summer when he exercises said visitation shall include one weekend of 
his visitation as set forth in sub-paragraph a above. 
3* That the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the sum of 
$300 per month per child as support; that he maintain health and 
accident and life insurance on the cnildren and pay one-half of any 
medical expenses not covered by insurance provided, however, that 
the defendant is to be given first opportunity to do all dental 
work on the children and to arrange the orthodontic work. Ortho-
dontic expenses to be shared equally by the parties. 
4. That plaintiff is awarded the home of the parties free 
and clear of any claim of the defendant. 
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The plaintiff is awarded the vehicle in her possession, 
the furniture and fixtures and piano in her possession, the guitar, 
the Wolfcreek membership, the yard equipment, the video camera, 
one-half of the photos and sheet music and her own personal 
property and possessions. 
6. The defendant is awarded the dental building subject 
to the debt to the Thompsons of $42,543 and to his mother of 
$20,000 giving a total equity interest in the building of $11,457. 
7. The defendant is awarded the dental practice including all 
equipment and accounts receivable the Court feeling that the large 
portion of the value of the practice has to do with good will and 
reputation built up in the practice over the years of marriage. 
The only reasonable way to value said practice is to proportion it 
based upon the years the parties have been married during practice. 
Based on their eleven years of marriage over sixteen years of practice 
for the purpose of distribution the Court values the practice at 
69 percent of the value as found above for a total of $62,100.00. 
8. Defendant is awarded the value of the property conveyed 
to Bienestar, the Court feeling the property conveyed is joint 
property and shall be valued as such for purpose of distribution. 
The property consisting primarily of motorcycles valued at $1,500 
and the Piccolo valued at $2,000. 
9. The defendant shall be awarded the balance of the property in 
Ogden Valley of 9.777 acres and sets the value therof at $8>000 
per acre for a total of $78,160.00. 
10. That defendant shall be awarded said property subject 
to the debt thereon to the Shaws of $108,943. 
11. Defendant shall be awarded the proceeds of the contract 
from Dienestar from the sale of five acres of the Ogden Valley land 
with a balance of $19,165.00. 
12. Defendant shall be awarded the proceeds from the sale of 
the home and one acre of the Ogden Valley property with a balance 
of $42,000. 
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13. Defendant shall be awarded the farm equipment with a value 
of $4,000.00. 
14. Defendant shall be awarded the computer acquired by the 
parties having an equity value of $3,000 subject to the debt thereon. 
15. Defendant shall be awarded the truck valued at $400; boat and 
trailer as a gift from his parents; the spa membership worth $250; 
his own property and possessions, together with items of furniture 
and fixtures in his possession, sufficient of the kitchen utensils 
and dishes to set up his own apartment. 
16. Each of the parties shall be awarded one-half of the firewood 
and divide equally the family photos. 
17. Each of the parties shall be awarded ^he personal property 
brought into the marriage free and clear of any claim of the other. 
18. Each of the parties shall be entitled to deduct from their 
share of the equity sufficient sums to offset the cash equity 
amount brought into the marriage with no consideration for return 
on investment that not having been the expectation of the parties. 
Plaintiff shall be entitled a credit against equity of $5,800; 
and defendant a credit against equity of $15,000 excluding sums 
already considered in valuing the practice and the pension interest of 
the parties. 
19. The Court shall award to the plaintitf from the Clifford 
Sorensen Profit Sharing Trust administered by First Security Bank of Utah, 
Salt Lake City, Utah the. sum of $20,104 in compliance with the 
Retirement Equity Act of 1984, PL 98-397. The parties are ordered 
to submit the appropriate Qualified Domestic Relations Order and such 
Order shall be incorporated by reference and made a part of this 
Decree of Divorce. Defendant shall be awarded all of the balance 
of the interest in the said profit sharing trust provided, however, 
he shall assume and discharge the note and debt owing to said trust 
by the parties and to hold the plaintiff harmless thereon and to see that 
the lien securing the same on the honrg awarded to the plaintiff is 
removed forthwith. The sum awarded to the plaintiff shall be paid to 
her within 30 days of the signing of the decree herein. 
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20. The Court concludes that the plaintiff is capable of going 
back to work and obtaining meaningful employment but that she will 
need alimony at least through the transition period; therefore, 
the Court Orders that the defendant pay to plaintiff the sum of 
$600 per month as and for alimony for a period of six months from 
December, 1986; then $500 per month for a period of one year; 
then $250 per month for a period of three years, then $1 per year 
for two years at which time alimony shall terminate and shall terminate 
otherwise as provided by law. 
21. The defendant shall have the children for income tax 
purposes so long as he is current on support unless otherwise 
ordered by the Court. The plaintiff shall sign all necessary 
documents to accomplish the same. 
22. The defendant shall assume and discharge any and all tax 
liability occuring through the year 1986 either income or property 
and hold the plaintiff harmless thereon. 
23. The Court further orders that judgment is entered in favor of 
as& for partial attorney fees 
plaintiff & against defendant/
 i n the sum of $2,000. Each 
party shall pay their own experts with the exception of Allan 
Heiskenan which shall be shared equally. 
25. The Court refused to set a dollar figure on the human 
resource of the ability of each party to produce income which may 
have been acquired during the course of the marriage. The Court 
specifically finds that such a determination is too speculative 
in nature and no amount of accounting gymnastics can give to such 
c> computation the degree of credibility such that this Court would 
feel justified in setting a dollar figure; however, said ability is 
taken into account by the Court in considering the question of 
support and alimony. 
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26. 
as follows: 
PLAINTIFF 
Home 
Car 
Furn & Fix 
Piano 
Guitar 
WolfCreek Memb 
Yard equipment 
Camera 
The relative equity interest of the parties shall be 
$100,000 
750 
6,500 
7,500 
160 
1,000 
555 
600 
Pension Plan int.20,104 
TOTAL $136,169 
Less equity interest 
brought in 5,800 
*Farm 
$131,369 
78,200 
Contract Bienestar 
19,165 
Home contract 
TOTAL 
Less 
Balance 
*Dental bldg. 
Less contract 
to Thompsons 
42,000 
$139,365 
- 108,943 
$ 30,422 
$ 74,000 
- 42,543 
Less amount to 
defendant's mother 
BALANCE 
- 20,000 
$ 11,457 
DEFENDANT 
Dental practice 
*Farm 
Farm Equip. 
Truck 
Spa 
*Dental bldg. 
Piccolo 
Computer 
Motorcycles 
Pension int. 
$ 62,100 
30,422 
4,000 
400 
250 
11,457 
2,000 
3,000 
1,500 
31,241 
TOTAL $ 
Less equity interes 
brought in _ 
146,370 
t 
15,000 
$131,370 
\eJQSUJLCLLU 
DATED t h i s J ^ day o f JANUARYj 1987 • 
Approved as to Form: 
J. Xa^—_ 
ICTCOURTJUDGE 
ATI* .*NEY FOR L>EFEN..,-.f 
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A. Rulon JACKSON. P la in t i f f 
ami Appellant, 
v. 
Grant R. C A L D W E L L et al. , Defendants 
and Respondents. 
No. 10389. 
Supreme CM .IT of Utah. 
Jm.o 21. ir»iU"i. 
• nncr members in 
accountants for ac-
ind work in process 
Ac-ion hetttccn 
partnerrdiip of public 
counting of good will 
at time of dissolution or, in the alterna-
tive, for damages fcr breach of writ ten 
agreement pertaining to permanent dis-
ability by any partner. The Thi rd Dis-
trict Court, Salt Lake County, Aldon J. 
Anderson, J., rendered judgment for de-
fendant, and plaintiff appealed. T h e Su-
preme Court, Nelson. District Judge, held 
that finding that there was no asset of good 
will in terminated : r.rtncrship was sup-
ported by evidence. 
Affirmed. 
1. Good Will C=s| 
'"Good will*' is :. 
connected with a bu- : 
porcal property, but ::. 
out physical form, an 
for profits in the bus :\ 
See publication W 
for other jmliti.d 
druniiion?. 
transient intangible 
. ? s : it is not cor-
:her an asset with-
Gement responsil)le 
r<i< Mini Phrases 
•!W i nations and 
a'.ue of any busi-
\a lue which results 
:kat old customers 
r to deal with ihc 
hed concern; it is 
customers will re-
2. Good Wi l l C=>! 
The "good wv\" 
ncss enterprise is thai 
from the probability 
will continue to trade 
members of an estal ". 
the probability that o \ 
sort to the old place :r seek old friends, 
and a likelihood of new customers being 
attracted to well-advertised and favorably 
known services or gools. 
3. Good Wil l C==l 
"Good will" is the advantage or bene-
fit which is acquired 'z>y an establishment, accounting upon d i s s . ' tion of partner-
beyond the mere value of the capital, stocks, 
funds or property employed therein, in con-
sequence of the general patronage and en-
couragement which it receives from con-
stant or habitual customers on account of 
its location, or local position or r< put;ihon 
for quality, ski!!, integrity or punctual i ty; 
it is something in business which gives rea-
sonable expectancy of pp'f 'Tcncc in the 
race of competition. 
4. Good Will C=>l, 4 
' 'Good will*' is property and as such is 
subject to bargain and sale, ahhough it is 
not susceptible of being owned and dis-
posed of separately from property rights 
to which it is an incident. 
5. Partnership C=>3I0 
A partnership of public accountants, 
unless the parties have in their partnership 
agreement provided otherwise or unless 
facts and circumstances of particular case 
would require modification of general 
rule, has no good will to distribute as a 
firm asset on its dissolution. U.C.A.1953, 
48-1-37. 
6. Partnership C=>67 
Good will cannot arise as an asset of 
a partnership where the partners contrib-
ute, as capital, only their professional skill 
and reputation, however intrinsically val-
uable these may be. 
7. Partnership C=333 
Where partners concur in practice of 
not carrying good will as an asset on part-
nership books and determine assets upon 
dissolution without u U r u ' c e to good will 
and where t lv re i> insufficient showing 
that p..! tncrirhip pgreement cont<'mphit< d 
that it should be included in computing1 
book \ a lue , it is proper to exclude good 
will as an item requiring an accounting 
by one partner to another. 
8. Partnership C=>336(3) 
Finding that there was no asset of 
good will in terminated partnership of pub-
lic accountants was supported by evidence. 
9. Partnership C=>336(3) 
Contention by plaintiff in action for 
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ship of public accountants that a former 
par tner took advantage oi main t i f f s ill-
ness to influence client to give former part-
ner his business was not s u r : : r t e d by evi-
dence. 
10. Partnership C=*336(3) 
Finding that plaintiff was not per-
manently disabled and that he thus was 
not entitled to damages for aheged breach 
of par tnership agreement providing that 
percentage of partnership earnings would 
be paid to permanently disarmed par tners 
for remainder of year in which disability 
occurred and for two years thereafter was 
supported by evidence. 
George M. McMillan, Sah Lake City, 
for appellant. 
Pugsley, Hayes, Rampton & Watkiss , 
Edward M. Bown, Salt Lake City, for re-
spondents. 
N E L S O N , District Judge. 
This is an action in which the plaintiff-
appellant claims the defendants-respondents 
unlawfully and wrongfully impropriated 
good will inherent in the reiatiDnship be-
tween a firm of public acctantants and 
their clients, of which he was a member, 
and, upon dissolution failed t : account to 
plaintiff for his share of two partnership 
assets, to-wit : 
(a) The good will in the client-public 
accountant relationship, and 
(b) W o r k in process at the time of termi-
nation of the firm. 
Plaintiff claims alternatively that he is 
entitled to damages for breach ::* a writ ten 
agreement dated March 7, 19t'«!\ 
The lower court held that the conduct 
of the defendants toward the th.aintiff was 
not tor t ious; that defendants were not 
guilty of any breach of contract: that there 
was no good will inherent in the relation-
ship between the firm of public accountants 
known as Messina, Caldwell ^ Co. and 
their clients, and the court ado : t :d defend-
ants ' theory of allocation of the- asset known 
as work in progress. Plaintiff seeks re-
versal of the judgment of the District 
Court. 
The record discloses the plaintiff was, 
during the period relevant to this litigation, 
a public accountant. H e was also an at-
torney. However the evidence in this case 
and the matters in issue relate only to his 
rights and property interests as a partner 
in the firm of Messina, Jackson, Caldwell 
& Company, Public Accountants. 
Pr ior to the commencement of this ac-
tion the plaintiff, defendants and Marco 
Messina, now deceased, were engaged as 
a partnership of public accountants under 
the name of Messina, Jackson, Caldwell 
& Company. T h e partnership agreement 
bore the date of April 1, 1958 and was 
amended April 1, 1959. This agreement 
provided that in the event of the death of 
said Marco Messina, who was then ill, the 
partnership would nevertheless continue 
until the close of the second fiscal year 
after the fiscal year in which such death 
occurred, and that the estate or heirs of 
the decedent would be entitled to the same 
participation in the income and profits be-
tween the date of death and the effective 
date of termination of the partnership as 
the decedent would have received had he 
continued to live and participate in the 
partnership. T h e said partnership con-
ducted business on a fiscal year basis com-
mencing April 1 through March 31 of the 
following year. Marco Messina died on 
August 16, 1959. 
After the death of Messina, plaintiff and 
defendants continued to operate the part-
nership under the name of Messina, Jack-
son, Caldwell &. Company pursuant to the 
terms and conditions of the partnership 
agreement of April 1, 195S as amended 
April 1, 1959 until the end of the second 
fiscal year after the fiscal year in which 
the death of M e d i n a occurred, March 31, 
1962. 
Subsequent to the death of Messina dis-
contentment arose among the partners and 
employees regarding management. Begin-
ning in January 1961 meetings were held 
A-35 
JACKSON v. CALDWELL Utah 6 6 9 
Cite as 415 P.2d 007 
in an effort to solve the problems, but to 
no avail. During" the meetings plain:::£ 
was advised by Mr. Caldwell that with 
respect to the partnership he could h:.ve 
any account in the office, or any employ:: , 
and he could have the office space then 
under lease. Plaintiff rejected these of-
fers and continued to devote much of his 
time to his own personal matters . There-
after plaintiff gradually on his own v.'.i-
tion withdrew from active partnership par-
ticipation. 
Defendants gave plaintiff formal writ-
ten notice of the termination of the partner-
ship as of March 31, 1962 by instrument 
dated April 3, 1961. Following receipt of 
this notice plaintiff and defendant, Gr:.::: 
R. Caldwell, agreed that upon the te rm:ra-
tion of the par tnership on March 31, 19:2, 
the clients and accounts were to be allow:-! 
to follow the accountants of their choice-: 
that no solicitation of clients or accounts 
would be made by any party and that the sit-
uation would remain in the status quo t:::::l 
March 31, 1962. The record does not sh :w 
any solicitation by the defendants. 
Mr. Paul J. Maxwell was an employee 
of the old partnership. He and the pi.v.::-
tiff formed a business relationship durire; 
the first part of January 1962, some three-
months prior to the termination of the <:\i 
firm. Immediately thereafter Maxwe".'. 
terminated his employment with the co-
partnership, took certain clients and :.:-
counts and their files and records with hi:::. 
which he and plaintiff used after formr.'.iz-
ing their business relationship into a part-
nership to function as a public accour.::::r 
organization in May 1962. 
Immediately upon the termination of :::•: 
old partnership, March 31, 1962, plain: : : : 
and defendant, Caldwell, met and agre; I 
upon a division of the assets of the f.v. : 
partnership. This division was apprcv-. : 
by the other defendants. Plaintiff imme-
diately thereafter removed all of th . -e 
items selected by him, including the ::i .s 
and working papers of those clients :.:: i 
accounts of the old partnership who c h f e 
to go with him and not theretofore tahen 
by the plaintiff or Mr. Maxwell, from the 
offices of the old partnership to the offices 
of Jackson, Maxwell & Co., Public Ac-
countants. 
At the time of the division, plaintiff did 
not mention or make any reference to any 
breach of any contract, did not assert, nor 
was there any showing made that he was 
permanently disabled. 
Defendants, certain employees, and Mr. 
Nicholas Rhodes, a former individual prac-
titioner, formed a new business relation-
ship to service those clients and accounts 
of the old partnership who chose to go with 
them rather than with plaintiff and Max-
well. 
Certain work in process remained unfin-
ished as of March 31, 1962, with respect 
to certain clients and accounts who chose 
to go with defendants, which has been com-
pleted. As soon as this was accomplished 
Grant R. Caldwell prepared a detailed ac-
counting and furnished the plaintiff said 
accounting. Concurrently with such re-
port, defendant Caldwell requested plain-
tiff to furnish defendants with an account-
ing with respect to those accounts and cli-
ents which belonged to the old firm and 
who had chosen to go with plaintiff. Plain-
tiff has failed to furnish such accounting. 
At the time of the trial the plaintiff was 
ill and incapacitated as a witness. 
The foregoing is a recitation of the facts 
as found by the trial court. 
Upon such findings the District Court 
found for the defendants as hereinbefore 
stated. 
Plaintiff bases his argument for a , rever-
sal of the trial court judgment on live 
points. The first four ma}- be combined in-
to one inclusive question. Did the trial 
court commit error in holding the plain-
tiff failed to c.^abiish by a preponderance 
of the. evidence that the partnership of Mes-
sina, Jackson, Caldwell cc Company had 
an asset of good will, in which plaintiff 
would be entitled to share? 
[1] In answering this question we must 
first determine the meaning of the term 
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"good will." I t is generally understood 
that good will is a transient intangible 
something connected with a business. I t 
is not corporeal p ro r . -y. but rather an as-
set without physical :V/m. an clement re-
sponsible for profits / : the business.1 
[2] The "good v " value of any busi-
ness enterprise is tr...: \ a lue which results 
from the probability that old customers 
will continue to trade r deal with the mem-
bers of an establish* 1 concern. It is the 
probability that old customers will resort 
to the old place or sc^k old friends, and 
the likelihood of nc\/ customers being at-
tracted to well advertised and favorably 
known services or g-^ds.2 
[3] Good will is t'te advantage or bene-
fit which is acquirei by an establishment, 
beyond the mere rah:: or the capital, stocks, 
funds or property e:r.r loved therein, in con-
sequence of the gen:rai patronage and en-
couragement which it receives from con-
stant or habitual customers on account of 
its location, or local rosition or reputation 
for quality, skill, u.:.crrity or punctuality.3 
It is something in b. 5mess which gives rea-
sonable expectancy :£ preference in the 
race of competition 
[4] Good will is property, so recognized 
and protected by \:.w. As such it is sub-
ject to bargain anil sale. There has been 
a rather general acceptance by the courts 
that good will cx:5:s as property incident-
ly to other proper ; / rights and is not sus-
ceptible of being ;-vned and disposed of 
separately from p r : > r t y rights to which 
it is an incident.4 
The case at bar ; - . s u i t s questions which 
may call for a v a r - : J I I or modification of 
the rufes as stated. Jt appears that the sub-
stantial weight of :. ::h<~>rity in this country 
is to the effect that : ? value can be attached 
to the good will of a professional partner-
1. Orr.ira v. Lame. 77 Ariz. S4, 2G7 P. 
2.1 723, 727. 
2. Lima Tel. & T»l Co. v. Public Utilities 
Commission of Ohio. 120 N.E. 330, OS 
Ohio St. 110: Pr ison v. McElrcath, 
210 Miss. 100, 4* So.2«l SGI. 
ship, although there arc cases to the con-
t rary based upon particular facts and cir-
cumstances. 
This court has heretofore held that simp-
ly because each of the parties had the right 
to continue separate businesses after dis-
solution it did not mean that there could 
not be good will which attached to a busi-
ness of a firm during its existence,-1 and in-
sofar as the good will had a transferable 
value it belonged to all the partners, and 
any could insist upon his share of the bene-
fit attached to it. But we have not held, 
nor do we now hold, that such right of good 
will is necessarily created or that it exists 
in every partnership as a joint asset. It 
is always possible and desirable for the par-
ties to amicably settle their differences 
and make division of assets upon dissolu-
tion. 
[5] W e subscribe to the general rule 
as stated in 40 A m j u r . Partnership, Sec-
tion 271, page 316: 
"The general rule is that a professional 
partnership the reputation of which de-
pends on the individual skill of the mem-
bers, such as partnerships of attorneys 
or physicians has no 'good will' to dis-
tribute as a firm asset on its dissolution." 
W c are of the opinion, and so hold, the 
same rule applies in a partnership of pub-
lic accountants, unless the parties have in 
their partnership agreements provided oth-
erwise, or the facts and circumstances of 
the particular case would require a modi-
fication of the general rule. 
It has repeatedly been held there can be 
no "goocf wiff," so caffeef, of a busuiess which 
depends for its existence upon the profes-
sional qualities of the persons who carry 
it on. 
3. ITaverly v. Elliott, 39 N<4>. 201, 57 N.W. 
1010. In re Witkind's Estate, 1G7 Misc. 
8S5, 4 N.Y.S.2d 933. 
4. Yost v. Patrick, 245 Ala. 275, 17 So.2d 
240. 
5. Vcrcimak v. OstoiHi, 118 Utah 253, 221 
P.2d G02. 
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[6] Good will cannot arise as an a«-=e: 
of a partnership where the parties o n \ con-
tribute, as capital, their profession..* -ki'l 
and reputation, howc\e r intrinsica";. \ a l -
u,:h!e these may hc.G 
Tn tiic case at har the trial court fjund 
the partnership did not list good will among 
the assets of the partnership. It further 
noted that the Uniform Par tnership Act, 
4S-1-37, U.C.A.1953, does not contain any 
requirement that a valuation shall l e as-
signed to good will upon dissolution. It 
appears the prevailing view is that c pro-
fessional partnership, upon its disso'/.tion, 
has no good will to he accounted for :.s an 
asset in the ahsencc of a provision in tiic 
partnership agreement relat ing to crood 
will, and this applies to a partnership of 
certified public accountants as well :.s to 
a partnership of attorneys or physicians.7 
Further, the law, upon the dissolution of 
a co-partnership, nothing being agreed as 
to the disposition of the good will c : the 
business, permits the respective parties to 
use what good will remains as will best 
subserve their several interests.8 
The lower court found as a fact th:.: the 
plaintiff, both before and after the dissolu-
tion of the Messina, Jackson, Caldwell ec 
Company, solicited the clients and accounts 
of that firm for his own use and benefit. 
The court further found that Caldwell had 
promptly accounted to the plaintiff r.s to 
assets, etc., and defendants had not so.icit-
ed or taken the entirety of the clients of 
the former partnership, but actually h a : re-
frained from solicitation, all pursuan: to 
their agreement with the plaintiff. 
[7] It appears to this court that v.hire 
the partners had concurred in the practice 
of not carrying good will as an asset on the 
partnership books and had de te rmine ; the 
assets upon dissolution without refer:nee 
to good will; and wdicre there has bet-, in-
6. Masters v. Brooks, 102 App.Div. ST4. 
117 N.Y.S. 5S5; Sheldon v. Houghton. 
21 Fcd.Cas. p. 1239. 
7. Cook v. Lautcn, 1 Ill.App.2d 255, 117 
N.E.2d 414. 
sufficient showing that the par tnership 
agreement contemplated that it should be 
included in computing book \ alue as in this 
ease that it i* proper to exclude good will 
as an item requiring an accounting of one 
party to another.9 
[S] W e conclude the weight of the evi-
dence preponderates that under the facts 
and circumstances of this ca«e there was no 
intangible asset of the old terminated part-
nership of Messina, Jackson, Caldwell & 
Company in the form of good will for 
which the defendants arc responsible for 
or accountable to the plaintiff, and the Dis-
trict Court was correct in so finding. 
[9] The plaintiff has contended fur-
ther that after the death of Messina, he, 
the plaintiff, became ill and unable to ren-
der effective service to clients, and defend-
ants knew of such condition; and Cald-
well in particular took advantage of this 
situation in influencing clients. T h e rec-
ord docs not justify such a conclusion. 
The District Court found that the accounts 
did not tend to go with one or the other 
of the parties to the exclusion of any one, 
but rather tended to follow the part icular 
par tner or employee of the partnership 
who had been serving that client or account. 
The record further discloses the plaintiff 
carried with him accounts and clients upon 
his departure. There is a showing that 
Caldwell actually urged a profitable client 
to go with the plaintiff. 
The trial court further found the plain-
tiff hod become disabled and disqualified 
thereby after the termination of the part-
nership in question. 
Point V of plaintiff 's brief s ta tes : 
"The Lower Court erred in failing to find 
and determine alternatively that Plain-
tiff was entitled to recover damages for 
a breach of contract between the Part ies 
dated March 7, I960." 
8. 40 Am.Tur.: Partnership, § 270, p. 31.r>, 
47 A.L.It.2.1 1420. 
9. Re Witkind's Estate, 1G7 Misc. S-S5, 4 
N.Y.S.2d 933; Minoff v. Marsctts, 14 
N.J.Supor. 30, 81 A.2d 369, cert, den 
7 N.J. 584, S3 A.2d 3S1. 
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[10] It appears this cont-'.ct provided 
that in the event of the perma:*.::it disability 
of any of the parties thereto :'*e remaining 
parties shall continue to mail * .in the busi-
ness with the disabled memK: continuing 
to receive his share of the incc~:e and prof-
its of the firm for the fractional year in 
which the permanent disability occurred 
and for two fiscal years there;.iter. It fur-
ther provided that in the c .nt any able 
partner took advantage of tl.is situation 
and would take business to lur/sdf in com-
petition with the partnership :.::d keep the 
earnings thereby obtained v. ould be re-
quired not only to make a prrper account-
ing of such work and income .:: which the 
disabled party would be entitled to his 
share, but such party would be required 
to pay an additional sum of 55 A) for each 
violation of his covenant plus one-half of 
any compensation derived fr:::i rendering 
the prohibited service. 
The plaintiff has ccnceck . Ite received 
liis share of the partnership .trniugs for 
the year ending March 31, "" >2, but that 
he has not icc.i\e<l a per: •- TC of the 
partnership ei'nings to v r :* he claims 
lie is entitled .\-r tiic \car \:i^r March 
31, 1963 plus C una^es f<">r a- ' r«.ach dur-
ing that peri' d. He ciaimc 1 1 if disability 
dates from M.rch 31, 1962. 
The controlling fact question in this con-
nection is when the plaintiff became dis-
abled. The trial court found the plaintiff 
was not permanently disabled on March 
31, 1962 or any time prior thereto, which 
would entitle him to receive any additional 
pay-out after March 31, 1962, by reason 
of any disability under the agreement of 
March 7, 1960. This court has consistent-
ly held in this type of a case it reviews 
questions of fact most favorable to the 
findings of the trial court, and reverses 
only if the evidence or lack of it renders 
it clearly necessary to do so. 
We find and conclude the record in this 
case justified the conclusions reached by 
the trial courtj 
Judgment of the District Court is af-
firmed. 
McDOXOUGH and CALLISTER, JJ., 
concur. 
IIEXRIOD, C. J., not participating. 
CROCKETT, J., having disqualified him-
self, docs not participate herein. 
WADE, J., heard the arguments but died 
before the opinion was filed. 
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a somewhat similar instruction was harm-
less error. Furthermore, the property sto-
len was not fungible property which de-
fendant might have legitimately possessed. 
Rather, the checks were identified as prop-
erty belonging to others were shown to 
have been forged and would not legitimate-
ly have been in his possession under any 
circumstances. 
Affirmed. 
HALL, CJ., concurs. 
DURHAM, Justice (concurring 
separately): 
I concur in the majority opinion, but 
write separately to emphasize the obli-
gation of defense counsel to notify judges 
who have ruled on pretrial suppression is-
sues that defendants' objections to chal-
lenged evidence are reserved and not with-
drawn, thus alerting those judges to the 
possibility that trial evidence may affect 
the validity of earlier rulings. I agree that 
in this case there was an extensive hearing 
on defendant's motion to suppress, and it is 
quite clear from the record that defense 
counsel did not intend to waive any related 
evidentiary objections at trial. In fact, sev-
eral ambiguous references during trial to a 
"prior motion" may have referred to de-
fendant's pretrial motion to suppress. It is 
important, however, that trial judges be 
given the opportunity to review pretrial 
suppression rulings when and if there is 
any likelihood that they were erroneous. 
When the pretrial judge is also the trial 
judge, unlike the circumstance in State v. 
Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah 1983), this is 
easily accomplished by indicating on the 
record, either at the end of the pretrial 
hearing or at the trial outside the presence 
of the jury, that there is a continuing objec-
tion to the evidence challenged in the mo-
tion to suppress. 
HOWE, and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., 
concur in the concurring opinion of 
DURHAM, J. 
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Divorce decree was entered by the Sec-
ond District Court, Weber County, Ronald 
0. Hyde, J., and wife appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Stewart, Associate CJ., held 
that (1) trial court was required to value 
husband's retirement account; (2) wife was 
entitled to findings in support of denial of 
her request for portion of husband's medi-
cal assets; (3) regardless of whether evalu-
ation and distribution of a professional de-
gree or professional practice is ever appro-
priate, it was inappropriate in the present 
case where marriage was of long duration 
and present earnings and business assets 
provided a more accurate measure of the 
true worth of wife's investment in hus-
band's degree; and (4) alimony award was 
insufficient and inequitable. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Howe, J., filed opinion concurring and 
dissenting. 
1. Divorce «=>286<5) 
Though the Supreme Court may modi-
fy decisions of trial court, trial court's ap-
portionment of marital property will not be 
disturbed unless it is clearly unjust or a 
clear abuse of discretion. 
2. Divorce <*»252.3(4) 
Marital property includes pension fund 
or insurance, but dividing retirement or 
pension funds is not necessarily consistent 
with principles of equitable distribution in 
all cases, and providing for payments when 
GARDNER' 
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payout begins should be employed only in 
rare instances. 
3. Divorce <s=»252.3(4) 
Trial court, in apportioning marital 
property upon divorce, was required to at 
least consider the value of the husband's 
retirement account, and alternatives avail-
able for taking that value into account 
would include requiring husband to pay 
half of net present value to wife in annual 
installments, or reapportioning property 
distribution to offset that value. 
4. Divorce «»253(4) 
Wife was entitled to finding in support 
of denial of her request for a portion of the 
assets of husband's medical assets, and it 
was error to refuse to place present value 
thereon on the ground that the assets were 
"futuristic." 
5. Divorce «=>252.3(1) 
Goodwill is properly subject to eq-
uitable distribution upon divorce. 
6. Divorce <S=>252.3(1) 
Regardless of whether professional de-
gree and professional practice may in ap-
propriate cases constitute marital property 
subject to evaluation and distribution upon 
divorce, wife's request for property inter-
est in husband's medical degree was inap-
propriate where the marriage was of long 
duration and present earnings and business 
assets provided a more accurate measure 
of the true worth of the wife's investment 
in her husband's degree. 
7. Divorce <*»237 
Alimony award should, after marriage 
of long duration and to the extent possible, 
equalize the parties' respective standards 
of living and maintain them at a level as 
close as possible to the standard of living 
enjoyed during the marriage. 
8. Divorce *»24<K2) 
Alimony award of $1,200 per month 
until husband's retirement and $600 per 
month thereafter was an abuse of discre-
tion where husband was a physician with 
earnings of $6,000 per month, wife had not 
been employed for 80 years, husband had 
substantial retirement assets, and wife 
r. GARDNER Utah 1077 
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would qualify for social security payments 
only as an "ex-wife married over 20 years." 
9. Divorce «=»225 
There was no error in divorce case in 
failing to award attorney fees to wife, 
where portion of property award was for 
purpose of assisting wife to pay attorney 
and no showing was made in trial as to the 
nature and amount of fees. 
Pete N. Vlahos, Ogden, for plaintiff and 
appellant 
C. Gerald Parker, Ogden, for defendant 
and respondent 
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff Betty Gardner appeals from a 
decree awarding alimony and attorney fees 
in a divorce action she brought against her 
former husband, William Gardner. We re-
verse and remand for further considera-
tion. 
Mr. and Mrs. Gardner were married at 
Steels Tavern, Virginia, on April 17, 1950. 
No children were born to them, but the 
couple adopted two children who are now 
both adults. Early in the marriage, Mrs. 
Gardner worked full-time as a secretary 
while Mr. Gardner completed his medical 
training. Mr. Gardner also worked various 
jobs, and his parents provided support in 
the form of medical school tuition. Mrs. 
Gardner has not worked since 1958, when 
Mr. Gardner completed his medical train-
ing. Mr. Gardner is now employed as a 
general surgeon, earning $6,000 per month. 
While married, Mr. and Mrs. Gardner 
acquired substantial real and personal 
property. Their major asset was a farm, 
including a home and equipment located 
near Eden, Utah, worth between $246,000 
and $280,000. Other assets included Mr. 
Gardner's medical assets and retirement 
funds with an uncertain valuation of be-
tween $73,000 and $177,000; a contract for 
the sale of stock in the Ogden Clinic Invest-
ment Company; a certificate of deposit; 
household furniture, furnishings and fix-
tures; boats and automobiles; sporting 
equipment; and two horses and associated 
equipment At the time of divorce, the 
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couple's only outstanding debts were a 
first mortgage on the family home and a 
loan for the purchase of one automobile. 
The trial court ordered that the farm, 
home, and equipment be sold and the pro-
ceeds be divided equally. Until the farm 
was sold, Mrs. Gardner was entitled to its 
use, although she had to pay the mortgage, 
taxes, and insurance. The court also or-
dered that the motor vehicles and boats be 
sold and the proceeds divided equally, with 
the exception of one personal automobile 
for each party. The household furnishings 
and other items of personal property were 
divided roughly equally, according to per-
sonal need. Mr. Gardner was awarded his 
medical and business assets, including re-
tirement funds, except Mrs. Gardner was 
awarded one-third of the proceeds from the 
sale of the Old Ogden Clinic building to pay 
her attorney fees. They were to share 
equally a money market certificate. The 
court granted Mrs. Gardner $1,200 per 
month alimony, to be reduced to $600 per 
month following Mr. Gardner's retirement 
Mrs. Gardner was also to have a claim for 
$50,000 against Mr. Gardner's estate in the 
event that he predeceased her. 
Mrs. Gardner asks this Court to reverse 
the judgment of the lower court She cites 
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 
(Utah 1982), for the proposition that she 
has a spousal right to an equitable distribu-
tion of Mr. Gardner's retirement funds. 
She also asserts a property interest in his 
medical degree and business and claims 
that the alimony award was insufficient 
Finally, she asks this Court for an award of 
attorney fees. 
[1] In a divorce proceeding, the trial 
court should make a distribution of proper-
ty and income so that the parties may 
readjust their lives to their new circum-
stances as well as possible. Turner v. 
Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982); Mac-
Donald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 
P.2d 1066 (1951). Although this Court may 
modify decisions of the trial court, its ap-
portionment of marital property will not be 
disturbed unless it is clearly unjust or a 
clear abuse of discretion. Turner, 649 
P.2d at 8. 
The trial court awarded Mr. Gardner his 
retirement account and medical assets, 
without placing a present value on any of 
those assets. The trial court called both 
those types of assets "futuristic" and indi-
cated that their value would be utilized at 
retirement The court did not attempt to 
resolve the differing valuations of the as-
sets and provided little explanation for the 
award to Mr. Gardner. 
Recently, in Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 
996, 999 (Utah 1987), we noted: 
Failure of the trial court to make find-
ings on all material issues is reversible 
error unless the facts in the record are 
"clear, uncontroverted, and capable of 
supporting only a finding in favor of the 
judgment" Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 
P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983). . . . The find-
ings of fact must show that the court's 
judgment or decree "follows logically 
from, and is supported by, the evidence." 
Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 
1986). The findings "should be suffi-
ciently detailed and include enough sub-
sidiary facts to disclose the steps by 
which the ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue was reached." Rucker [v. 
Dalton], 598 P.2d [1336] at 1338 [Utah 
1979]. See also Mountain States Legal 
Foundation v. Public Service Commis-
sion, 636 P.2d 1047, 1051 (Utah 1981). 
The trial court's statement in its findings 
that the retirement account and Mr. Gard-
ner's medical assets are "futuristic" was 
apparently intended to mean that they 
could not be given a present value or 
should not for other reasons be taken into 
account That, however, does not follow 
from the evidence presented at trial, nor is 
it supported by our cases. Regardless of 
how remote the full value of an asset is, it 
still has present value. The testimony ad-
duced at trial devoted to differing valua-
tions by the parties merited more precise 
findings. 
[2] In Woodward v. Woodward, 656 
P.2d at 432, we recognized that retirement 
benefits, whether vested or not, are a form 
of deferred compensation which a court 
should at least consider when dividing mar-
ital assets. A right to deferred compensa-
A-43 
GARDNER v. GARDNER Utah 1079 
Cite a* 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988) 
tion acquired during marriage, or that por- accomplished when necessary. 
tion of one's right to deferred compensa-
tion acquired during marriage, should not 
be entirely ignored in dividing assets, irre-
spective of when the vested funds are pay-
able. Thus, marital property "encompass-
es all of the assets of every nature pos-
sessed by the parties, whenever obtained 
and from whatever source derived; and 
this includes any such pension fund or in-
surance/' Englert v. Englert, 576 P.2d 
1274 (Utah 1978). 
However, an award of a part of a 
spouse's retirement funds may create sig-
nificant problems. In some instances, mar-
ital assets are sparse, income is low, and an 
award of an equitable share of retirement 
assets might work a substantial hardship. 
Courts have, however, awarded the value 
of the assets on a periodic payment plan 
and, in some instances, have provided for 
payments when payout begins. This alter-
native should be employed only in rare 
instances. In Woodward, the Court stated: 
Long-term and deferred sharing of finan-
cial interests are obviously too suscepti-
ble to continued strife and hostility, cir-
cumstances which our courts traditional-
ly strive to avoid to the greatest extent 
possible.... 
. . . [W]here other assets for equitable 
distribution are inadequate or lacking al-
together, or where no present value can 
be established and the parties are unable 
to reach agreement, resort must be had 
to a form of deferred distribution based 
upon fixed percentages. 
656 P.2d at 433 (quoting Kikkert v. Kik-
kert, 177 NJ.Super. 471, 478, 427 A.2d 76, 
79-80 (1981)). 
Obviously, dividing retirement or pension 
funds is not necessarily consistent with 
principles of equitable distribution in all 
cases. The purpose of divorce is to end 
marriage and allow the parties to make as 
much of a clean break from each other as 
is reasonably possible. An award of de-
ferred compensation which ties a couple 
together long after divorce can frustrate 
that objective. 
[3] Nevertheless, the division of retire-
ment funds between two persons can be 
For exam-
ple, in Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238 
(Utah App.1987), a physician was required 
to pay one-half the net present value of his 
retirement plan, $56,850, to his former wife 
in five annual installments. The court 
awarded present value of the share to be 
paid within five years to avoid "leaving the 
parties in a 'financial entanglement that 
would continue for approximately twenty 
or thirty years and would probably result 
in further court hearings and cause future 
animosity between the parties/" Id. at 
241-42. Rayburn provides a possible al-
ternative for dealing with the value of the 
retirement account in this case. Because 
of the sizeable assets in this case, another 
alternative would be reapportionment of 
the property distribution to offset the value 
of the retirement account 
In any event, it will be necessary on 
remand to determine the value of the re-
tirement account The account has a 
present value of between $73,000 and 
$177,000, and the Court should at least 
consider the value of the account in making 
the property distribution. 
Another alternative for the apportion-
ment of property lies in the trial court's 
discretion to award the entire value of a 
solely owned professional corporation to 
the husband. Dogu v. Dogu, 652 P.2d 1308 
(Utah 1982). In Dogu, the earning power 
of the corporation resulted entirely from 
Dr. Dogu's continuing ability to work; 
however, there were questions as to his 
ability to do so. The trial court awarded 
the wife savings certificates, bank ac-
counts, and stock to offset the present liq-
uid assets of the corporation (accounts re-
ceivable and bank accounts). The trial 
court did not attempt to value the future 
earnings potential of the corporation, pre-
sumably because of questions regarding 
the ability of Dr. Dogu to continue to gen-
erate income for the corporation. 
[4,5] The Ogden Clinic, of which Mr. 
Gardner is a member, is a well-entrenched 
institution, whose twenty-three members 
have banded together in a business orga-
nization. It is not likely to be highly sus-
ceptible to earnings interruptions because 
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of the ill health of one of its members. 
The Ogden Clinic is not entirely valueless. 
Mr. Gardner's share, using his own figures, 
is worth at least $3,826 (partnership $3,726, 
corporation $100). Mrs. Gardner's account-
ants value the business much higher. Nei-
ther gave consideration to the good will 
inherent in the professional clinic.1 Mrs. 
Gardner was entitled to findings in support 
of the denial of her request for a portion of 
those assets. Instead, the trial court dis-
posed of the medical assets in the same 
sentence in which it disposed of the retire-
ment account. 
The medical assets at issue here were not 
included in the retirement account, but the 
trial court seems to have assumed that 
they were one and the same. In any event, 
no findings of fact were made as to the 
value of the medical assets. The award to 
Mr. Gardner of his retirement funds and 
medical assets may be proper and eq-
uitable. However, we cannot adequately 
review the trial court's determinations on 
the basis of the sparse findings before us. 
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a 
valuation of the medical assets and retire-
ment accounts and reconsideration of the 
distribution of the marital property on the 
basis of those findings. 
In addition, Mrs. Gardner assets an eq-
uitable and legal property interest in the 
medical degree of her former spouse. 
Whether professional degrees and profes-
sional practice constitute marital property 
subject to valuation and distribution upon 
the dissolution of a marriage has been the 
subject of much debate in recent years, 
especially in the wake of decisions where 
such a valuation has been made. See, e.g., 
Inman v. Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 
1982); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 NJ. 488, 
1. A marriage may be analogized to a partner-
ship. Upon dissolution of the marital "partner-
ship,'' an equitable distribution should be based 
on consideration of all assets, not just those that 
survive the trip to the bottom of the balance 
sheet Where appropriate, value may be given 
to that "something in business which gives rea-
sonable expectancy of preference in the race of 
competition," commonly known as good will. 
Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81, 85, 415 P.2d 
667, 670 (1966). 
The ability of a business to generate income 
from its continued patronage is commonly re-
453 A.2d 527 (1982); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 
66 N.Y.2d 576, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 489 N.E. 
2d 712 (1985). It has similarly been the 
subject of discussion in our Court of Ap-
peals. See Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 
238 (Utah App.1987); Petersen v. Petersen, 
737 P.2d 237 (Utah App.1987). 
One authority has argued that education-
al achievements are susceptible to valua-
tion,2 but there is judicial authority for the 
proposition that the value of an education 
does not fall within the common under-
standing of the concept of property: 
An educational degree, such as an 
M.B.A., is simply not encompassed even 
by the broad views of the concept of 
"property." It does not have an ex-
change value or any objective transfer-
able value on an open market. It is 
personal to the holder. It terminates on 
death of the holder and is not inheritable. 
It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, 
conveyed, or pledged. An advanced de-
gree is a cumulative product of many 
years of previous education, combined 
with diligence and hard work. It may 
not be acquired by the mere expenditure 
of money. It is simply an intellectual 
achievement that may potentially assist 
in the future acquisition of property. In 
our view, it has none of the attributes of 
property in the usual sense of that term. 
In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 
432, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978). See also Maho-
ney, 91 N J . 488 at 496, 453 A.2d 527 at 
531. 
The cases which have refused to hold 
that professional degrees and practice con-
stitute marital property subject to valua-
tion and distribution have nonetheless as-
sessed and divided the value of the degree 
ferred to as good will. Good will is properly 
subject to equitable distribution upon divorce. 
See, &£., Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N J. 423, 457 A.2d 
1 (1983); Matter of Marriage of Fleege, 91 Wash. 
2d 324, 588 P.2d 1136 (1979). But see The 
Treatment of Good Mil in Divorce Proceedings, 
18 Fam.L.Q. 213 (1984). 
2. See Fitzpatrick & Doucette, Can the Economic 
Value of an Education Really Be Measured?, 21 
LFanuL. 51 (1983). 
A-45 
GARDNER 
Cheat 748 POd 
or practice on the basis of other legal and 
equitable remedies. These cases follow a 
common fact pattern. Typically, the hus-
band is supported throughout a long gradu-
ate or professional program by the working 
wife, and the couple is divorced soon after 
graduation. In such cases, there are few 
marital assets to distribute, and the courts 
have considered other ways of compensat-
ing the spouse. In a limited number of 
cases, the courts focus on the educational 
degree or professional practice. See gener-
ally In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 
N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Mahoney, 91 N J. 
488, 453 A.2d 527; Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847; 
O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 
489 N.E.2d 712; and Hubbard v. Hubbard, 
603 P.2d 747 (Okla.1979), for various theo-
ries of valuation. 
[6] We agree that an educational or 
professional degree is difficult to value and 
that such a valuation does not easily fit the 
common understanding of the character of 
property. However, at least in the present 
instance, we need not reach the question of 
whether such a valuation may ever take 
place. Sufficient assets distinguish this 
case from others in which equity and fair-
ness required another solution. Where, as 
here, the marriage is of long duration, 
present earnings and business assets pro-
vide a more accurate measure of the true 
worth of the wife's investment in her hus-
band's degree. The home, farm, automo-
biles, and other assets of approximately 
$500,000 allow for a divisible award be-
tween the Gardners. In a sense, Mrs. 
Gardner has realized benefits from the 
medical degree in the form of a greater 
property settlement and higher alimony. 
We find Mrs. Gardner's request for a prop-
erty interest in Mr. Gardner's medical de-
gree inappropriate under these facts and 
affirm the findings of the trial court in this 
regard 
[7,8] Mrs. Gardner also claims the trial 
court's award of alimony was insufficient 
and inequitable. We agree. An alimony 
award should, after a marriage such as this 
and to the extent possible, equalize the 
parties' respective standards of living and 
maintain them at a level as close as possi-
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ble to that standard of living enjoyed dur-
ing the marriage. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 
1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); Higley v. Higley, 
676 P.2d 379, 381 (Utah 1983). In Jones, 
we enumerated three factors important in 
fixing an alimony award: (1) the financial 
conditions and needs of the wife; (2) the 
ability of the wife to produce sufficient 
income for herself; and (3) the ability of 
the husband to provide support Jones, 
700 P.2d at 1075. See also English v. 
English, 565 P.2d 409, 412 (Utah 1977). 
Mrs. Gardner has not been gainfully em-
ployed since 1958. Though testimony indi-
cated that she was skilled as an executive 
secretary, it will be difficult for her to 
regain these skills and become reemployed 
after a thirty-year absence. Mr. Gardner, 
by contrast, retains his career as a physi-
cian with earnings of $6,000 per month. 
The trial court awarded Mrs. Gardner 
$1,200 per month as alimony, to be reduced 
to $600 per month following Mr. Gardner's 
retirement The court provided no expla-
nation of the basis for the preretirement 
award and stated that the reduction in ali-
mony following Mr. Gardner's retirement 
reflected a drop in his earning potential, 
Mrs. Gardner's eligibility for social securi-
ty, and the fact that the house would be 
sold, providing Mrs. Gardner with liquid 
assets. We think that this award was an 
abuse of discretion. 
Mrs. Gardner executed an affidavit prior 
to trial listing her monthly expenses at 
$1,700 per month. The trial court appar-
ently relied on testimony at the hearing 
and on a prior affidavit which set her 
monthly needs at $1,200. Mrs. Gardner is 
not employed and has little prospect of 
being reemployed. Viewing her future 
earning potential and current monthly ex-
penses, however arrived at, against that of 
Mr. Gardner's, we think it is clear that the 
award is insufficient to equalize the par-
ties' standards of living. 
Similarly, the trial court's award of $600 
monthly alimony following Mr, Gardner's 
retirement is also unreasonably low. Mr. 
Gardner has substantial retirement assets. 
Should Mr. Gardner reach retirement age, 
these assets will have increased substan-
A-46 
1082 Utah 748 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
tially. Mrs. Gardner, however, has no pen-
sion and will qualify for social security 
payments only as an "ex-wife married over 
20 years." She will not qualify for regular 
social security benefits until she has 
worked another thirty-nine quarters. Be-
cause the likelihood of her providing for 
her own retirement is small, we find that 
the trial court's award is insufficient to 
equalize the parties' standards of living 
following Mr. Gardner's retirement 
We reverse and remand for further pro-
ceedings in light of the above and in light 
of the factors enumerated in Jones, 700 
P.2d at 1075. On remand, the trial court 
must evaluate the wife's ability to support 
herself based on findings and conclusions 
under the standards stated in Acton v. 
Deliran, 737 P.2d 996. It is not clear from 
the record before us that Mrs. Gardner will 
be able to meet her monthly needs either 
before or after Mr. Gardner's retirement, 
and this is the focus of our concern. Our 
review of the record therefore indicates 
that the alimony award may have to be 
increased. However, explicit findings 
based on the factors in Jones are needed to 
support that conclusion. 
[9] Finally, Mrs. Gardner asks this 
Court to make an award of attorney fees. 
The trial court made no specific award of 
attorney fees. However, in its findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, the trial court 
made clear that an award of a one-third 
interest in the Old Ogden Clinic building 
account and the division of the money mar-
ket certificate was for the purpose of as-
sisting the wife to pay her attorney. Mr. 
Gardner correctly notes that a request for 
attorney fees must be accompanied by evi-
dence at trial as to the nature and amount 
of such fees. See Warren v. Warren, 656 
P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1982). No such show-
ing was made at trial, and the findings do 
not support Mrs. Gardner's request Inso-
far as we have approved the property set-
tlement of the lower court, the award of 
attorney fees made part of that settlement 
is affirmed. 
HALL, CJ., and DURHAM and 
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
HOWE, Justice (concurring and 
dissenting). 
I concur in the majority opinion except in 
that part dealing with alimony. As to that 
part, I dissent for the following reasons. 
First, in reversing and remanding for a 
valuation of the medical and retirement 
assets and a redistribution of marital prop-
erty on the basis of those findings, Mrs. 
Gardner's financial position will undoubted-
ly improve and her income increase. This 
increase will have a direct bearing on the 
amount of alimony which she should be 
awarded. It is premature for us to now 
hold that the $1,200 per month or the $600 
per month awarded by the trial court is 
inadequate. It may well be that after the 
redistribution of property is made, the 
amounts awarded will be entirely fair and 
could even be excessive. This is especially 
true as to $600 alimony after Mr. Gardner's 
retirement Any amount of his retirement 
awarded to her on remand decreases her 
need for alimony and his ability to pay it. 
The trial judge recognized this reality when 
he wrote in his memorandum decision: 
Upon his retirement, the alimony shall 
reduce to $600 per month. The reasons 
for this reduction are: by the time of 
retirement, the home should be sold and 
the plaintiff should have liquid assets; 
defendant's income will materially de-
crease; plaintiff will also receive some 
social security benefits. It is my intent 
in awarding to the defendant his medical 
assets and retirement assets that alimo-
ny shall be paid therefrom and that the 
plaintiff shall have a claim thereon as 
against the defendant's estate if he 
should predecease her. This claim shall 
be in the amount of $50,000. 
Second, the $l,700-per-month alimony re-
quested by Mrs. Gardner was based on her 
affidavit which listed her monthly needs at 
that amount, but based on her assumption 
that the court would allow her to continue 
to live on the twenty-one-acre country es-
tate of the parties on which is a six-bed-
room home with garages for four cars, a 
barn, and other outbuildings. Consequent-
ly, in arriving at her $l,700-per-month re-
quest, she included the monthly mortgage 
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payment, the property taxes, insurance pre-
miums on that property, monthly utilities 
on that property, and amounts for the care 
of the farm animals and for farm, garden, 
and house maintenance and repairs. How-
ever, the trial court did not award her the 
country estate or allow her to permanently 
stay there, but ordered that the parties sell 
the property as soon as possible. The ma-
jority opinion does not assail this determi-
nation. The sale of the property ordered 
by the court necessarily eliminated many of 
the monthly expenses which formed a basis 
for the $1,700 alimony request The trial 
court, therefore, acted properly in exclud-
ing those items of expense in determining a 
reasonable amount of monthly alimony and 
presumably included instead the cost of 
Mrs. Gardner's living in smaller and less 
expensive quarters. On cross-examination, 
Mrs. Gardner admitted that her cost of 
living would be less if she did not live on 
the estate. Thus, the $1,200 awarded by 
the trial court was clearly within the range 
of the evidence before the court The ma-
jority does not claim that $1,200 was 
"clearly erroneous" as rule 52, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, requires us to conclude 
before we may upset findings of fact by 
the trial court 
We have always accorded trial courts 
considerable latitude in fixing alimony. 
Yet here, the majority sweeps aside the 
trial court's judgment because it is only one-
fifth of Mr. Gardner's monthly income and 
is insufficient to "equalize the parties' stan-
dard of living." Insofar as this writer 
knows, reasonable and fair alimony has 
never been expressed as a percentage of 
the husband's monthly income. This is a 
new concept completely foreign to the test 
recognized in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 
(Utah 1985), for determining an alimony 
award Since the monthly income of di-
vorced husbands is not all the same, the 
monthly needs and financial conditions of 
divorced wives vary widely, and debts and 
other factors have to be considered, per-
centages should not be employed or relied 
on. 
Finally, I strongly dissent from the re-
peated references in the majority opinion 
that alimony is to "equalize" the financial 
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position of the parties after their divorce. 
Again, this concept is contrary to the three 
factors to be considered which we enumer-
ated in Jones v. Jones, supra: (1) the finan-
cial condition and needs of the wife, (2) the 
ability of the wife to produce a sufficient 
income for herself, and (3) the ability of the 
husband to provide support We have said 
that the wife is entitled to enjoy as near as 
possible the same standard of living she 
enjoyed during the marriage and she 
should be prevented from becoming a pub-
lic charge. English v. English, 565 P.2d 
409, 411 (Utah 1977). But this is not the 
same as "equalizing" their incomes. The 
instant case is a good example. Mr. Gard-
ner is a highly skilled surgeon earning 
$6,000 per month. Mrs. Gardner was not 
employed at the time of the divorce. She 
thought she could maintain the standard of 
living to which she had become accustomed 
if she received $1,700 per month alimony. 
If their financial positions after divorce are 
to be equal, she presumably should have 
$3,000 per month alimony. I do not think 
the majority intends that result. 
The object of divorce is to set the parties 
free of each other after an equitable divi-
sion of property is made and, if needed, an 
award of alimony is made which will enable 
both parties to maintain as near as possible 
the standard of living they enjoyed during 
the marriage. The parties then go their 
separate ways and attempt to rebuild their 
lives. But because of the disparity in their 
earning ability, the wife here, who has 
training as a secretary but has not been 
employed for thirty-three years, will never 
earn as much as her husband-surgeon. 
Our cases do not suggest that the divorce 
decree should attempt to cure this disparity 
by "equalizing" their future incomes. 
(O { KEY NUMKR SYSTEM > 
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Having found that defendants have not 
made the requisite showing on the first 
prong of the "fairly attributable" test, we 
find it unnecessary to address the second 
prong of the test, and hold that there was 
no violation of the due process clause of 
the Constitution giving defendants a right 
to notice prior to the destruction of their 
security interest 
The trial court's judgment is affirmed. 
Defendants are assessed costs. 
BILLINGS and ORME, JJ., concur. 
Glade STEVENS, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Ellen L STEVENS, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 860138-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 28, 1988. 
Wife filed divorce proceedings against 
husband, and the Fourth District Court, 
Millard County, George E. Ballif, J., grant-
ed divorce, custody of children, made prop-
erty distribution and awarded alimony and 
child support Wife appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, Jackson, J., held that (1) wife 
failed to demonstrate good will existed in 
husband's business; (2) trial court's lack of 
findings of fact as to distribution of proper-
ty, alimony, and child support required re-
mand; and (3) wife's business appraisal 
costs, while perhaps necessary to litigation 
were not recoverable as costa. 
Vacated in part and remanded. 
1. Divorce <S=>287 
When trial court fails to base its distri-
bution of property award, pursuant to di-
vorce, upon written findings of fact, and 
one party challenges findings and the dis-
tribution, appropriate remedy is for remand 
to have the necessary findings made. 
2. Divorce <s=»286(l) 
Since wife was not author of trial 
court's findings of fact supporting its prop-
erty distribution award pursuant to di-
vorce, wife did not waive her ability to 
challenge the facts1 adequacy on appeal. 
3. Divorce <s»287 
Failure of trial court, in its distribution 
of property award pursuant to divorce, to 
identify items of marital property and debt, 
assign values to distributed property and 
debt, or to include other items of property 
in its distribution decree, required remand 
for more specific findings of fact regarding 
the distribution. 
4o Divorce <&=>253(2) 
Wife in divorce case failed to demon-
strate that husband's farm and hay opera-
tions had asset of good will; wife's apprais-
er's failure to distinguish good will value 
from going concern value, as well as testi-
mony demonstrated that husband's busi-
ness activities did not enjoy type of patron-
age or reputation necessary to establish 
good will. 
5. Divorce «=»252.3(1) 
Where appropriate, good will of busi-
ness enterprise is subject to equitable dis-
tribution pursuant to divorce decree. 
6. Good Will e»2 
The presence of good will in a business, 
may be evidenced by proof of an ongoing 
competitive enterprise having continuity of 
place and commercial name, and enjoying 
favorable reputation founded upon sales of 
goods or services. 
7. Good Will <*»2 
There can be no good will in a business 
that is dependent for its existence upon an 
individual who conducts the enterprise, 
where the business would vanish were the 
individual to die, retire or quit work. ?U 
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8. Divorce <*=>253(2) 
Trial court's determination, that farm 
equipment which wife claimed was owned 
by husband was in fact owned by hus-
band's parents, as demonstrated by written 
security agreement, was not clearly errone-
ous. 
9. Divorce <8»287, 312,7 
Failure of trial court to make specific 
findings of fact as to husband's ability to 
pay alimony and child support, as well as 
wife's earning ability and financial condi-
tion, required remand for those specific 
findings of fact 
10. Divorce «»237 
In exercising discretion in determining 
amount of alimony to be awarded, trial 
court must consider financial condition and 
needs of spouse claiming support, and that 
spouse's earning ability, in conjunction 
with ability of respondent spouse to pro-
vide support; failure to do so is an abuse 
of discretion. 
11. Divorce <s=»296 
Failure of trial court to consider statu-
tory factors in making award of child sup-
port pursuant to divorce was an abuse of 
discretion. U.C.A.1953, 78-45-7(2). 
12. Divorce «»221 
Appraisal expenses incurred by wife 
during divorce proceeding, to learn value of 
husband's business interests, assets and 
liabilities, while perhaps necessary to 
wife's presentment of her case, were not 
"costs" within meaning of statute which 
would allow her recovery of those expenses 
from husband. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 
54(dXD. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
13. Divorce <*»308 
Denial of wife's motion to place limit 
on amount of deductible in health insur-
ance, which husband was required to pro-
vide for children's benefit, was not an 
abuse of discretion, particularly where hus-
band was liable for one half of medical 
costs not covered by the insurance. 
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Donald R. Jensen, McGullough, Jones, 
Jensen & Ivins, Orem, for defendant and 
appellant 
Eldon A. Eliason, Delta, for plaintiff and 
respondent 
Before ORME, JACKSON and 
BENCH, JJ. 
OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Ellen Stevens appeals from a judgment 
and decree of divorce, seeking a reversal or 
readjustment of the property distribution, 
alimony and child support provisions of the 
decree. We vacate portions of the judg-
ment and decree and remand for entry of 
adequate factual findings in all three of 
these areas, including the assignment of 
values to specifically identified items of the 
distributed marital property. 
Appellant and respondent were married 
for approximately six and one-half years, 
from March 26, 1977, until November of 
1984. Three children were born to them, 
ranging in age from four to seven at the 
time of trial. When the parties married, he 
was engaged in farming and hay-hauling 
operations, which he continued to pursue 
for the duration of the marriage. Several 
hundred acres of land were farmed by him. 
At least twenty of those acres were bought 
by the parties. The remaining land was 
leased under various sharecropper arrange-
ments with Milton Stevens, respondent's 
father, and four other landholders. Re-
spondent retained seventy-five percent of 
crop proceeds and paid twenty-five percent 
to each landholder. 
Prior to the marriage, appellant was em-
ployed in a garment factory and a dairy; 
she had previously held a clerical position 
in a dentist's office. She was thirty-one 
years old at the time of trial, had a high 
school education, and was unemployed. 
She called as a witness Dr. Cregg Ingram, 
a professor of educational psychology, who 
testified that she suffered from a learning 
disability which placed her academic skills 
in approximately the fifth grade range. 
Dr. Ingram predicted that she would have 
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difficulty acquiring a college education, but 
that she "has the capability to perform on 
about any level that she wants to per-
form." Ingram further opined that "[Qt's 
not uncommon to see her type of problems 
in college students." Appellant testified 
that she had not formulated plans for con-
tinued education or employment, and that, 
while she might be willing to earn income, 
she believed that her husband would con-
tinue to provide for her after the divorce. 
The trial court granted a divorce to ap-
pellant on November 27, 1984, reserving 
the custody, property and support issues 
for trial. The main dispute at trial involved 
the identification and valuation of the mari-
tal estate. Appellant submitted an apprais-
al prepared by Thomas Kysar of Certified 
Business Appraisals, Inc. concerning the 
value of the parties' two homes, twenty 
acres of farmland, the "good will" value of 
the farming and trucking business, and the 
value of the equipment and harvest Ky-
sar testified that he received information 
about the identity and value of each ap-
praised item from appellant, income tax 
returns from 1979 through 1983, doc-
uments filed with the county recorder, per-
sonal observations from some distance, 
conversations with dealers in the field, and 
discovery documents produced by respon-
dent Kysar acknowledged on cross-exami-
nation that his appraisal included values of 
hay and certain items of farming equip-
ment that did not belong to the parties and 
that some of the values assigned to equip-
ment were not the product of his personal 
observation. He estimated that respondent 
and appellant held $27,700 in cash, based 
upon an examination of the parties' prior 
tax returns. 
Appellant testified that she had no 
knowledge of her husband's income or of 
their assets and liabilities. Respondent 
called several witnesses, including his fa-
ther, who testified that the parties held no 
ownership interest in certain items of prop-
erty claimed as marital assets by appellant 
in the appraisal prepared by Kysar. There 
was also testimony from the local bank 
branch manager, who reported substantial 
overdrafts in the personal and business 
banking accounts held by the parties. In 
written final arguments, respondent 
claimed that the marital estate's net worth 
was $84,858. Appellant argued that the 
marital estate's net worth totaled $498,697, 
of which $101,686 represented the good will 
value of the farming and trucking opera-
tions. 
o. 
The trial judge issued a memorandum 
decision on January 28, 1985, describing 
the property award and deciding all other 
issues reserved for trial. He directed re^ 
spondenfs attorney to prepare findings o? 
fact, conclusions of law and a judgment 
and decree consistent with the decisioii^ 
The court found that the marital estate 
consisted of the two homes occupied by tfie^  
parties, twenty acres of farm land, four 
vehicles, a 1980 Preightliner hay truck^ 
"miscellaneous" farm equipment, afaal 
household furniture, fixtures and appl£ 
ances. The court awarded appellant {JuL 
newer home, all of the household furniture,* 
fixtures and appliances, and the automotive! 
driven by her. Respondent was awarded 
the older home, the 1980 Preightliner 
truck, the Ford trucks, the "miscellaneous^ 
farm equipment, proceeds from the har-?i 
vested crops, and the twenty acres of landj 
The court found that appellant failed,to 
establish that respondent had any interest 
in property owned by his father, including 
real estate located in Fillmore and StT 
George, Utah. The court found there was 
substantial indebtedness against the mark 
tal estate and ordered respondent to pay! 
the remaining debts against the home and 
the automobile awarded to appellant I&s 
well as all business and marital debts iny 
curred prior to the parties' separation. 'She^ 
was awarded $4,000 in attorney fees and 
$700 in private investigator fees. *jj|j% 
Appellant objected to the proposed find-1 
ings of fact conclusions of law, and judg-^  
ment and decree prepared by opposing j 
counsel She submitted, along with'h&fl 
objections, her own draft of the proposed* 
documents. At the same time, she ffledjbj 
memorandum of costs and disbursements! 
which was objected to by respondent l50frj 
April 11, 1985, the trial court basic J 
adopted respondent's version of the^fiid 
ings of fact conclusions of law, and; 
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ment and decree, but amended two para-
graphs to conform with language proposed 
by appellant regarding custody, visitation 
and income. The trial court approved all of 
her costs, except for the $2,531.15 paid to 
Certified Business Appraisals, Inc. 
Appellant presents several issues on ap-
peal: (1) did the trial court err by not 
assigning dollar values to each item of 
marital property and debt and by not deter-
mining the monthly income of respondent; 
(2) was there an equitable distribution of 
all items of marital property; (3) was there 
an abuse of discretion in setting alimony at 
$175 per month and child support at $175 
per child per month; and (4) did the court 
err by not awarding appellant costs in-
curred in obtaining an appraisal of the par-
ties' farming and hauling operations? 
I. PROPERTY VALUATION AND 
DISTRIBUTION 
[1,2] Ordinarily, this court must assess 
the merits of appellant's claim of inequity 
in the distribution of marital property by 
reviewing the trial court's findings of fact 
and the values it assigned to the distribut-
ed items. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 
1074 (Utah 1985). "[WJien one of the par-
ties to a property distribution raises a seri-
ous question as to the value of one or more 
of the assets, the trial court's distribution 
of those assets should be based upon writ-
ten findings of fact that will permit appel-
late review." Id. Where the trial court 
fails to do so, and appellant has not waived 
the claim,1 the appropriate remedy is to 
remand for necessary factual findings. Id. 
at 1074-75. See Peek v. Peck, 738 P.2d 
1050 (Utah CtApp.1987). 
The Utah Supreme Court recently faced 
such a problem in Gardner v. Gardner, 
748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988), in which the 
appellant ex-wife challenged the property 
distribution by the trial court as ineq-
uitable. The trial court had failed to as-
sign values to the ex-husband's retirement 
account and medical assets. The court 
pointed out that the failure to make find-
!• Because appellant was not the author of the 
findings, she did not waive her ability to chal-
lenge their adequacy on appeal. See Jones, 700 
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ings on all material issues is reversible 
error unless the facts in the record are 
clear, uncontroverted, and capable of sup-
porting only a finding in favor of the judg-
ment Id. at 1078 (quoting Kinkella v. 
BaugK 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983)). 
See also Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953, 
957 (Utah 1983) ("Proper findings are es-
sential to enable this Court to perform its 
function of assuring that the findings sup-
port the judgment and that the evidence 
supports the findings."). 
[3] In this case, the trial court found 
that the marital property consisted of two 
homes and contents, four vehicles, twenty 
acres of land and miscellaneous farm 
equipment, all of which was found to be 
heavily indebted. The values of these as-
sets were sharply disputed by the parties. 
Excluding the good will value of the farm-
ing and trucking operation, the parties' es-
timates of the total value of the marital 
estate differed by $312,153. Likewise, 
there was controverted evidence of the na-
ture and amount of the indebtedness each 
party was ultimately ordered to pay. 
Nonetheless, in its memorandum decision 
and findings of fact, the trial court did not 
(a) identify the items of marital property 
and debt; and (b) assign values to each 
item of distributed property and debt or a 
total value to the cumulative share award-
ed to each party. 
We conclude, as did the Gardner court, 
that we cannot perform our reviewing 
function and determine whether the par-
ties' property was equitably distributed 
without the trial court's detailed identifica-
tion and valuation of the assets and debts 
awarded to each party. We therefore va-
cate that portion of the judgment and de-
cree pertaining to property and debt distri-
bution and remand for adequate factual 
findings. The trial court may adjust the 
property distribution as necessary after as-
signing values to ensure equity. See 
Smith v. Smith, 738 P.2d 655, 658 (Utah 
CtApp.1987). 
?2d at 1074-75; Boyle v. Boyle, 735 PJd 669, 
671 (Utah CtApp.1987). 
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Appellant also claims that the trial court 
erroneously failed to include as distributa-
ble marital property certain items identified 
in her brief as: the Honda three-wheeler, 
snowmobile, children's savings, credit un-
ion account, Mike Frazier debt, fuel tank, 
grain drill, crust buster plow, trailer, trac-
tor, Morris rod weeder, compressor, ditch-
er, and hay lift Respondent was awarded 
the "miscellaneous" farm implements and 
machinery. Those implements and machin-
ery are not identified Some of the items 
listed by appellant may fit within the defi-
nition of "miscellaneous19 farm implements 
and machinery. 
Due to lack of specificity in the court's 
findings, we are unable to determine 
whether these items were included in the 
property distribution* On remand, the trial 
court should clarify its disposition of these 
items appellant claims should be distribut-
ed as marital assetSo See Berger v. Ber-
ger, 713 P.2d 695, 698 (Utah 1985). 
II. GOOD WILL 
[4-7] Appellant's next contention is 
that the trial court erroneously failed to 
value and distribute the farming and hay-
hauling operations as a going concern. 
Thomas Kysar of Certified Business Ap-
praisals, InCo testified that respondent's 
farm operations had a "good will" value of 
$101,686, a figure derived from an exami-
nation of profit and loss statements at-
tached to the couple's prior income tax 
returns. Appellant argues that the court 
should have distributed the good will value 
because the farming and hay-hauling oper-
ations are similar to other businesses which 
lease equipment or which provide services 
to the public. 
Good will is the advantage or benefit 
which is acquired by an establishment, 
beyond the mere value of the capital, 
stocks, funds or property employed 
therein, in consequence of the general 
patronage and encouragement which it 
receives from constant or habitual cus-
tomers on account of its location, or local 
position or reputation for quality, skill, 
integrity or punctuality. It is something 
in business which gives reasonable ex-
pectancy of preference in the race of 
competition. 
Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81, 85,415 
R2d 667, 670 (1966) (footnote omitted); see 
also 38 C J.S. Good will § 1 (1943). Good 
will is to be distinguished from going con-
cern value, going value, or going business. 
Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Rail-
road Comm'n, 289 U.S. 287, 313, 53 S.Ct 
637, 647, 77 L.E& 1180 (1933); 38 Am: 
Jur.2d Good will § 2 (1968). The presence 
of good will may be evidenced by proof of 
an on-going competitive enterprise having 
continuity of place and commercial name 
and enjoying a favorable reputation found-
ed upon prior sales of goods or services. 
38 AmJur.2d Good will §§ 4-8 (1968). 
The presence or absence of good will de? 
pends upon the facts and circumstances of 
the particular case. See Jackson, 18 Utah" 
2d at 86-87, 415 P.2d at 670-71. Where* 
appropriate, the good will value of a bush 
ness enterprise is subject to equitable dis-
tributionc Gardner Vo Gardner, 748 P.2d 
1076, 1080 n. 1 (Utah 1988). There can be 
no good will in a business that is dependent 
for its existence upon the individual who 
conducts the enterprise and would vanish 
were the individual to die, retire or quit 
work. Jackson, 18 Utah 2d at 86, 415 P.2d 
at 670. <? 
Appellant's claim that the farming and 
hay-hauling operations have an asset of 
good will fails on two grounds. First, she 
failed to establish that her husband's busi-
ness activities met the requisite elements 
forming the intangible asset known as 
good will. She testified that she under-' 
stood respondent's farming operation to be 
"working out an interest in .. . [the farm' 
land] where he was the sole operator of i t 
If it was the financial buying of it with 
money, or putting all of the assets back 
into the farm, I'm not sure." 
Gordon Ogier, a hay broker, testified 
that he purchased the hay presently avail* 
able for sale, even though he described the 
quality of the hay as "mediocre," because 
respondent did not have a buyer and Ogier 
was in a position to buy the hay. Ogier 
testified at length that hay is purchased 
based upon the quality of the hay, the time 
A - 5 4 
STEVENS 
Cite as 754 PJA S 
of the year, and the condition of the econo-
my. He stated that he had purchased hay 
from several different farmers at varying 
prices. 
Respondent testified that his farming 
and hay-hauling operations were performed 
under a lease arrangement and that the 
number of acres farmed by him depended 
upon the number of acres made available 
by the leaseholder. He testified that one 
leaseholder had sold part of the land for-
merly leased to him and that land held by 
another leaseholder had become unsuitable 
for farming. The success of his business, 
he opined, depended largely upon the econ-
omy and the weather. 
Milton Stevens testified that he began a 
feed-hauling operation in 1935 under the 
name of "Stevens' Feed." That business 
was discontinued in 1965. Some time later, 
respondent assumed the "Stevens' Feed" 
name for purposes of convenience and to 
permit respondent to write checks against 
his father's checking account 
The appraisal prepared by Certified Busi-
ness Appraisals, Inc. lists "business loca-
tions" among the twelve factors considered 
in determining the value of the farm and 
hauling operations, but it fails to connect 
location with the amount of patronage the 
businesses received In summary, the evi-
dence presented did not support a finding 
that respondent's business activities en-
joyed the type of patronage or reputation 
found within the term "good will." 
Second, appellant failed to distinguish 
"good will" value from the "going concern 
value" of the business. She asserts in her 
brief that expert testimony proved that the 
farming and hauling operations had value 
as a going concern. Kysar testified that 
his appraisal utilized standard procedures 
for valuing going concern businesses. Be-
cause appellant confused "good will" with 
"going concern value" and failed to meet 
her burden of proof, we conclude that ap-
pellant failed to prove the existence of an 
intangible asset in the form of good will. 
III. OWNERSHIP OF 
SECURED PROPERTY 
[8] Appellant's final claim of error with 
respect to the marital property is that the 
754P.24-42 
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trial court erroneously found that certain 
items of farm equipment and machinery 
were owned by respondent's parents and 
were not a part of the marital estate. 
Paragraph six of the findings of fact 
states: 
The Court finds that defendant has 
failed to establish that the plaintiff Glade 
Stevens has any interest in and to the 
property identified on the security agree-
ment to Milton Stevens 
The Court finds that although Glade 
Stevens, plaintiff herein, has had the 
right to use many of the items in his 
farming operation and has economically 
benefited from them, there has been no 
showing that he has any equity interest 
in and to those items to which the de-
fendant has any proper claim at this 
time. 
In order to prevail on appeal, the party 
challenging the findings of fact made by 
the trial judge must show that they are 
clearly erroneous, after giving "due regard 
. . . to the opportunity of the trial court to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses." 
Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). See State v. Walker, 
743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); Lemon v. 
Coates, 735 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1987); Dav-
ies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah Ct 
App.1987). See also Newmeyer v. Netv-
meyer, 745 P.2d 1276,1277 (Utah 1987). A 
finding is clearly erroneous if it is against 
the great weight of the evidence or if we 
are otherwise definitely and firmly con-
vinced that a mistake has been made. 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d at 193. 
There is substantial record evidence to 
support the trial court's finding that cer-
tain items of farm equipment and machin-
ery, which appellant .claimed were owned 
by respondent, were actually owned by his 
parents. Over the course of two days of 
trial, the parties presented conflicting testi-
mony and evidence concerning the identifi-
cation and ownership of this property. The 
record shows that the trial judge properly 
identified the marital property after a care-
ful consideration of all the evidence. Be-
cause appellant has failed to show that the 
court's determination of ownership is clear-
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ly erroneous, we affirm the trial court's 
finding that the farm equipment and ma-
chinery listed in the security agreement 
were not included in the marital estate. 
IV. ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT 
[9] Appellant's next assignment of er-
ror is that the trial court abused its discre-
tion in setting alimony in the amount of 
$175 per month and child support in the 
amount of $525 per month. 
The purpose of alimony is to "equalize 
the standard of living for both spouses, 
maintain them at their present standard as 
much as possible, and avoid the neccesity 
of one spouse receiving public assistance." 
Boyle, 735 P.2d at 671; accord Gardner, 
748 P.2d at 1081. In setting an award of 
alimony, the trial court may exercise con-
siderable discretion, and an award will not 
be overturned absent a showing of a clear 
and prejudicial abuse of discretion. Pqffel 
v. PaffeU 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986); 
Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 
CtApp.1987). 
[10,11] In exercising its discretion in 
determining the amount of alimony to be 
awarded, the trial court must consider the 
financial condition and needs of the spouse 
claiming support, the ability of that spouse 
to provide sufficient income for him or 
herself, and the ability of the responding 
spouse to provide the support Paffel> 732 
P.2d at 101. Failure to consider these 
factors constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
Id. Likewise, in setting a child support 
award, the court must consider the factors 
set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7(2) 
(1987). The trial court's failure to consider 
these statutory factors is also an abuse of 
discretion. Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 
909 (Utah App.1988). 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly held 
that the trial court must make findings on 
all material issues. Acton v. Deliran, 737 
P.2d 996 (Utah 1987). These findings 
"should be sufficiently detailed and include 
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the 
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on 
each factual issue was reached." Id, at 
999 (quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 
1336, 1338 (Utah 1979)). 
In the case before us, the trial cov 
made only three limited, conclusory fii 
ings regarding alimony and child suppo 
2. The Court finds that a reasonat 
sum for the plaintiff to pay to the c 
fendant for the support and maintenan 
of each child is the sum of $175 per ch 
per month... . 
3. The Court further finds that it 
reasonable for the plaintiff to pay to t 
defendant alimony in the sum of $175 p 
month.... 
8. The Court finds that although t 
income tax returns supplied by the pla 
tiff on their face may not justify t 
award of support and alimony here 
above provided, the Court has defc 
mined from the evidence submitted 
the trial, that a substantial amount 
tax-free income is generated by the pla 
tiffs activities, and that he can afford 
pay the sums for support and alimony 
hereinabove provided. 
Based upon these findings, responde 
was ordered to pay $175 per month 
alimony; to pay $175 per child per month 
child support; to pay all of the man 
debts and obligations; to provide medi< 
and dental insurance for the children a 
one-half of expenses not covered by insi 
ance; and finally, to pay $4,700 towa 
appellant's attorney fees and court cos 
AJS previously stated, respondent ^ 
awarded the farm and trucking operatioi 
The findings of fact made by the tr 
court do not specifically set forth app 
lant's financial condition and need for si 
port, including her earning capacity, or 
spondenf s income and ability to pay. Su 
a failure to address the Paffel factors < 
plicitly in the findings of fact requires 
mand to the trial court Gardner, 748 P 
at 1082. The trial court's failure to ma 
explicit findings regarding the statute 
factors pertinent in a child support deter: 
nation requires the same relief. Jeffen 
at 911. 
Under the Acton standard, the ta 
court's sparse findings are clearly ina 
quate to demonstrate that the trial co 
considered the relevant factors in detent 
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ing both the alimony and child support 
awards. Detailed findings of fact and con-
clusions of law are necessary for this re-
viewing court to ensure that the trial 
court's discretionary determination of the 
alimony and child support awards was ra-
tionally based.2 See Martinez v. Martinez, 
728 P.2d 994 (Utah 1986); see also Davis v. 
Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1988). 
We therefore vacate those portions of 
the judgment pertaining to alimony and 
child support and remand this case to the 
district court for specific findings that sup-
port new judgment and decree provisions 
addressing both these issues. 
V. APPRAISAL COSTS 
[12] Appellant's final claim on appeal is 
that the trial court erred by not awarding 
her costs incurred in obtaining an appraisal 
of the parties' farming and hay-hauling 
operations. Generally, costs are "allow-
able only in the amounts and in the manner 
provided by statute." Frampton v. Wil-
son, 605 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1980). The 
term "costs" as used under Utah R.Civ.P. 
54(dXl) has been defined as court and wit-
ness fees which are required to be paid and 
for which a statute authorizes payment 
Id. at 774. Other expenses incurred in the 
preparation of litigation, even though nec-
essary, are not chargeable as costs. Id.; 
Hatanaka v. Struhs, 738 P.2d 1052, 1055 
(Utah Ct.App.1987). 
Appellant testified that she had little or 
no knowledge about the parties' earnings, 
2. In support of her argument that the amount of 
child support awarded by the trial court is insuf-
ficient, appellant attaches to her brief a copy of 
the Uniform Child Support Schedule under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45-7(4) (1987). That section 
authorizes the use of a statewide assessment 
formula, established by the Utah Department of 
Social Services, to determine the amounts of 
temporary child support pending a final order. 
It is inapplicable to permanent orders or this 
case. Furthermore, attachment of the schedule 
to appellant's brief is improper since it was not 
offered into evidence at trial. See Reick v. 
ReicK 652 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah 1982); Hansen v. 
Hansen, 736 V2& 1055,1056 (Utah CtApp.1987). 
3. Appellant may, of course, recover the statu-
tory witness fee plus mileage incurred by the 
appraiser. See Kerr v. Kerr, 610 ?2d 1380,1384 
(Utah 1980). 
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assets or liabilities. After this suit was 
filed, she secured the services of an ap-
praiser who was able to testify at length 
about his opinion of the identity, nature 
and net value of the marital estate after his 
inspection of various property and doc-
uments. His research and preparation, al-
though essential to the presentation of ap-
pellant's case, cannot be considered a 
"cost"* See Hatanaka, 738 P.2d at 1055. 
We therefore affirm the trial court's deter-
mination of appropriate costs. 
CONCLUSION 
[13] Appellant's remaining arguments 
are without merit4 The portions of the 
judgment and decree relating to property 
division, alimony, and child support are va-
cated The case is remanded for findings 
in accordance with sections I and IV of this 
opinion. No costs awarded. 
BENCH and ORME, JJ., concur. 
I O IKEYNUMMI SYSTEM 5> 
4. Appellant also claims that the trial court erred 
by not establishing a maximum amount of de-
ductible permitted under the medical and dental 
insurance respondent is required to provide for 
the children's benefit Both parties testified 
about the need for health insurance, but neither 
party raised the issue of deductible levels during 
trial or within proposed findings of fact After 
findings of fact were entered, appellant sought 
to have the insurance provisions amended to 
include a ceiling on the amount of deductible. 
That motion was denied. The asserted inequity 
cannot be deemed an abuse of discretion. The 
trial court ordered respondent to pay one-half 
of the children's health expenses not covered by 
insurance. It is to both parties' advantage that 
the insurance deductible be as low as possible. 
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20. As of the date of such assignment 
[to plaintiff], the United States con-
sidered the provisions of the Tripartite 
Agreement as in full force and effect; 
nor has the United States, since the exe-
cution of the said Tripartite Agreement 
and repayment agreement herein re-
ferred to, done anything to abrogate, re-
scind, waive or repudiate the provisions 
thereof or to release Defendants or either 
of them from their obligations thereun-
der. 
21. In his oral argument before this 
Court on February 4, 1981, defense coun-
sel acknowledged that the pertinent pro-
visions of the Tripartite Agreement as 
regards the Gooseberry Project were 
binding upon the defendants Carbon 
Water Conservancy District and the 
predecessor in interest of the defendant 
Price River Water Users Association. 
The same reservations and limitations are 
contained in the repa\ment contract of 
February 28, 1944. 
22. There is nothing in the record that 
would support a finding or determination 
that the provisions of the agreements re-
ferred to in Finding No 21 are no longer 
valid or binding, or that any rights or 
obligations thereunder nave been altered 
or abrogated. 
The preceding findings, even in the ab-
sence of any finding concerning estoppel on 
the part of defendants, would adequately 
support the trial court's conclusions con-
cerning defendants' continued obligation 
under the tripartite contract. Because the 
trial court's estoppel theory does not consti-
tute a necessary part o: its declaratory 
judgment, we need not address the proprie-
ty of the court's use of estoppel terminolo-
gy-
We affirm the declaratory judgment of 
the trial court as modifiec above. 
STEWART, OAKS, HOWE and DUR-
HAM, JJ., concur. 
Edith Ellen DOGU, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Turhan S. DOGU, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 17603. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 2, 1982. 
Former wife appealed from provisions 
of a divorce decree entered in the Second 
District Court, Weber County, Ronald A. 
Hyde, J. The Supreme Court, Oaks, J., held 
that trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in awarding husband as his separate proper-
ty the entire interest in his professional 
corporation, but the court should have 
considered the value of his retirement funds 
at the time of the divorce as a marital asset 
subject to equitable division with considera-
tion for its role in assuring the payment of 
alimony if the husband predeceases the 
former wife. 
Order in accordance with opinion. 
1. Divorce o= 252.3(3) 
In divorce action, trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in awarding husband as 
his separate property the entire interest in 
his professional corporation, of which he 
was sole shareholder and the only employee 
and from which he drew salary and bonuses 
as needed. 
2. Divorce 0=252.3(4), 287 
Trial court properly treated husband's 
retirement funds, which had a definite val-
ue and which could not be presently with-
drawn by husband, as a marital asset where 
such asset was inextricably involved with 
court's alimony award; however, decree 
would be remanded in order to treat the 
contingency of husband's predeceasing for-
mer wife, either before or after husband's 
retirement. 
3. Divorce ®=>287 
While determinations of trial court are 
given deference and not disturbed lightly, 
changes should be made if that seems essen-
tial to accomplishment of desired objectives 
of divorce decree, i.e., to make such an 
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arrangement of the property and economic 
resources of the parties that they will have 
the best possible opportunity to reconstruct 
their lives on a happy mutual basis for 
themselves and their children. 
4. Divorce e=> 252.3(1) 
District court's disposition of a condo-
minium in Turkey, which could not be legal-
ly held or disposed of b\ the parties after 
having given up their Turkish citizenship, 
did not constitute an abuse of discretion. 
Pete N. Vlahos of Vlahos, Perkins & 
Sharp, Ogden, for plaintiff and appellant. 
C. Gerald Parker of Parker, Thornley & 
Critchlow, Ogden, for defendant and re-
spondent 
OAKS, Justice: 
This appeal from a divorce decree chal-
lenges the district court's division of (1) the 
assets and value of the husband's profes-
sional corporation, (2) his rights under vari-
ous retirement funds, and (3) a condomini-
um located in Turkey. 
The parties were divorced in 1981, after 
nearly 24 years of marriage. Of the three 
children born during the marriage, only one 
was not yet emancipated, a 17-year-old 
daughter who resided with her mother. At 
the time of the divorce, the husband was 56 
years of age. He had a well-established 
medical practice in anesthesiology. His 
wife, appellant here, was 60 years of age. 
She had been employed only minimally dur-
ing the marriage, was unemployed at the 
time of the divorce, and was entirely de-
pendent on her husband for her financial 
support. 
With the exceptions challenged on appeal 
and described hereafter, the district court 
ordered an essentially equal division of the 
parties' property, including the net proceeds 
from sale of the family home. Appellant 
was granted custody of their minor daugh-
ter, together with $200 per month child 
support. Appellant was awarded alimony 
of $1,500 per month, to be reduced to $750 
per month on respondent's retirement. 
'. DOGU Utah 1309 
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I. PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
[1] The district court awarded respon-
dent as his separate property the entire 
interest in his professional corporation, of 
which he is the sole shareholder and only 
employee and from which he draws a salary 
and bonuses as needed. Aside from its 
liquid assets of $25,000 in accounts receiva-
ble and $26,300 in bank accounts and sav-
ings certificates, the corporation's only 
earning power is in respondent's ability to 
work. Consequently, the corporation's val-
ue and respondent's income fluctuate. In 
1977, his taxable income from the corpora-
tion was $36,973; in 1978, it was $60,854. 
In 1979, his income was $108,675, but that 
amount of salary and bonuses reflected a 
year in which respondent consistently 
worked between 60 and 110 hours a week. 
He testified that he would be unable to 
sustain that pace because of his age and ill 
health. In addition, the hospital where he 
worked as one of three anesthesiologists 
would soon engage a fourth, which would 
reduce his hours and income in the future. 
We find no abuse of discretion in the 
district court's disposition of the value of 
the professional corporation. The value of 
the corporation's bank accounts and savings 
certificates were an equitable offset to the 
court's award of an equivalent amount in 
savings certificates, bank accounts, and 
stock to appellant. The corporation's 
accounts receivable represent deferred in-
come from which respondent may meet his 
ongoing alimony and child support obliga-
tions to appellant. 
II. RETIREMENT FUNDS 
[2] Respondent argues that since none 
of his separate retirement funds can be 
withdrawn until he retires, the total value 
of these funds, $86,730, should not be sub-
ject to division between the parties even 
though they were accumulated during the 
marriage. 
In Bennett v. Bennett, Utah, 607 P.2d 839 
(1980), we held that it was error for the 
trial court to view as a marital asset that 
half of a husband's retirement fund contrib-
uted by his employer. But that holding 
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reflected a failure of proof I; was based 
on the fact that the employer^ contribution 
had "no present value" and therefore 
should not have been used " ^ one of the 
significant predicates in the Court's deter-
mination of property division between the 
parties " Id. at 840-41. In contrast, 
the district court included in the marital 
property the portion of the retirement fund 
contributed by the husband, e\en though he 
had not yet retired and his actual enjoy-
ment of any retirement benefit was purely 
prospective. This inclusion, which was not 
challenged on appeal, is in accord with the 
general rule established in Englert v. Eng-
lert, Utah, 576 P.2d 1274, 1276 (1978), that 
the trial court's duty to make an equitable 
division of property in a divorce action "en-
compasses all of the assets of every nature 
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained 
and from whatever source derived; and 
that this includes any such pension fund or 
insurance." 
Although the record in this case indicates 
that respondent has not yet retired and 
therefore cannot withdraw any of his 
retirement funds, there is no question on 
the value of these funds. Respondent him-
self testified that his retirement funds con-
sist of (1) TIAA and CREF accounts creat-
ed while he was a medical school professor 
in Pennsylvania, and totalling approximate-
ly $27,000; (2) a Keogh account containing 
$10,075; and (3) a pension and profit-shar-
ing trust, set up through his professional 
corporation, totalling $49,655 n certificates 
and savings accounts. Under the rule of 
Englert, supra, these retirement funds, to-
talling $86,730 at the time o: the divorce, 
were a marital asset which tne court was 
required to consider in its determination of 
an equitable property division between the 
parties. Since it appears that this was not 
done, this portion of the property settle-
ment decree will be vacated and remanded 
for reconsideration by the '"/strict court 
1. This is in accord with the ge---al rule that a 
spouse's right to pei iodic pa\n r Ub ot alimon\ 
terminates upon the death of :ne supporting 
spouse Hilton v. McNitt. 49 Cal 2d 79. 315 
P.2d I (1957), Elmer \ Elmer 132 Colo 57, 
285 P2d 601 (1955). O'Neal \ Moms. 7 Wash 
App 157, 498 P 2d 326 (1972) Warren \ War-
To aid in that reconsideration, we elabo-
rate on considerations appropriate to the 
division of marital property in retirement 
funds where, as in this case, that subject is 
inextricably involved with the court's 
award of alimony. 
Respondent argues that even if his retire-
ment funds are considered a marital asset, 
the district court made a fair and equitable 
decision to award him the entire $86,730 as 
a res from which he would pay the $750-
per-month alimony to appellant after his 
retirement. If the decree had been drawn 
so that this marital asset would assure the 
payment of alimony in all events, it would 
be well within the bounds of discretion on 
the facts of this case. But respondent's 
argument fails because there is no such 
assurance. 
The decree fails to treat the contingency 
of respondent's predeceasing appellant, ei-
ther before or after respondent's retire-
ment. This is not a remote contingency. 
At the time of trial, respondent was 56 
years old. He testified that he was tired 
and in ill health, that he had suffered a 
slight stroke and had been hospitalized for 
double vision in 1978, and that a surgeon on 
the hospital staff told him informally that 
with his condition he had only a 50% likeli-
hood of surviving 5 years. 
If respondent predeceased her, appellant 
would lose her means of support. Under 
the district court's decree, the right to ali-
mony terminates "upon the death of either 
[party] " l Appellant has no retire-
ment benefits of her own. So far as the 
record discloses, she has no social security 
entitlement.2 Neither would she have any 
claim against respondent's estate for her 
support since an ex-wife does not qualify as 
a "surviving spouse" entitled to an elective 
share of her husband's estate. U.C.A., 1953, 
§§ 75-2 201, 75 2-803(1). Hence, under 
ren. W\o . 361 P 2d 525 (1961), Annot, 39 
A L R 2 d 1406 (1955) 
2. On remand, further e\ idence mav disclose 
that appellant is entitled to some social security 
benefits as a "divorced wife" ot respondent 
under 42 U S C * 402(b) (1976 & Supp IV 
1980) and 20 C f R * 404 331 (1981) 
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the decree challenged here, where respon-
dent receives all retirement funds accumu-
lated during the marriage, appellant may 
be deprived of all ongoing financial support 
at the very time of life when she is most in 
need. Such a result frustrates the purpose 
of alimony to "provide support for the wife 
. . . and to prevent the wire from becoming 
a public charge." George ies v. Georgedes, 
Utah, 627 P.2d 44, 46 (1981); English v. 
English, Utah, 565 P.2d 409, 411-12 (1977). 
Such a result is also at odds with the closely 
related equitable principles that govern the 
division of the parties' marital property. 
* [3] As this Court said :n DeRose v. De-
Rose, 19 Utah 2d 77, 79, 426 P.2d 221, 222 
(1967), 
[W]hile the determinations of the trial 
court are given deference and not dis-
turbed lightly, changes snould be made if 
that seems essential to the accomplish-
ment of the desired objectives of the de-
cree: that is, to make such an arrange-
ment of the property and economic re-
sources of the parties that they will have 
the best possible opportunity to recon-
struct their lives on a happy and useful 
basis for themselves and their children. 
This is such a case. 
On remand, the district court may repair 
this deficiency in several different ways. 
(1) The court could order :hat respondent 
elect a joint and survivor annuity under 
each retirement fund where that is an op-
tion, with appropriate adjustment to his 
alimony obligation during the period follow-
ing retirement. (2) If respondent's retire-
ment rights permit this option, the court 
could order that respondent elect that upon 
his retirement appellant be paid, in lieu of 
alimony after retirement, a .ump sum equal 
to one-half the value of the retirement ben-
efit as of the date of divorce, plus invest-
ment income accumulated thereafter. (3) 
The court might order that appellant's 
rights to alimony continue after respon-
dent's death (until her own death or remar-
riage). E.g., DeRiemer v Old National 
Bank, 60 Wash.2d 686, 6%. 374 P.2d 973, 
3. Contra: Chappeil v. Sasr. Mo App., 399 
S.W.2d 253, 256 (1965); In r r Estate of Bern-
'. DOGU Utah 13H 
652 P.2d 1308 
975 (1962); Cross v. Cross, 5 Ill.2d 456, 462, 
125 N.E.2d 488, 491 (1955). Cf. Wilson v. 
Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 (1956) 
(affirming alimony award of $50 per month 
until the plaintiffs remarriage or until the 
sum of $2,400 is paid, said sum to be "a 
charge upon the estate of defendant should 
he die prior to the full payment thereof').3 
Under this alternative, respondent would 
have full ownership of the retirement 
funds, but appellant would have a claim 
against his estate for continued alimony. 
Each of the foregoing alternatives as-
sumes that respondent lives long enough to 
retire. In a case like this, the court should 
also provide for the eventuality that respon-
dent dies before retirement. If respondent 
is awarded full ownership of the retirement 
funds, the court could order that upon his 
death before retirement the commuted val-
ue of appellant's post-retirement alimony 
for the period of her life expectancy be a 
claim against respondent's estate. In the 
alternative, if respondent's retirement 
rights permit this option, it could also order 
that respondent elect that upon his death 
prior to retirement appellant be paid the 
cash value of one-half of the retirement 
right as of the date of the divorce, plus 
investment income accumulated thereafter. 
There may be other alternatives. In any 
case, the district court may require addi-
tional evidence on the nature of the retire-
ment funds and the needs and preferences 
of the parties in order to exercise its statu-
tory power to divide the retirement funds 
equitably. 
III. TURKISH CONDOMINIUM 
[4] In 1962, the parties acquired a con-
dominium in Turkey for approximately 
$5,000. Since 1964, respondent's sisters 
have lived there rent-free. Neither party 
could do more than guess at the present 
value of the property. (The guesses varied 
from $2,900 to $50,000.) In any event, evi-
dence at trial indicated that only persons 
who are citizens of Turkey can own real 
stein, 25 Misc.2d 717, 203 N.Y.S.2d 191 (1960). 
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estate in that country. Because both of 
these parties gave up their Turkish citizen-
ship after 1962 (to become U.S. citizens), 
neither can now legally hold or dispose of 
this property. The trial court ordered 
"[t]hat if either of the parties is able to 
exercise ownership over the condo" each 
shall be entitled to a half interest therein. 
Appellant argues that the condominium 
should have been awarded to respondent 
with an equivalent award of liquid assets to 
her. To the contrary, we think the district 
court's order was a sensible and equitable 
resolution of an unusual problem and cer-
tainly no "clear abuse of discretion." Geor-
gedes v. Georgedes, 627 P 2d at 46; Kerr v. 
Kerr, Utah, 610 P.2d 1380. 1382 (1980). 
For the reasons stated herein, the decree 
is affirmed except insofar as it relates to 
the retirement funds and any portion of the 
provisions for alimony that may require 
modification in relation thereto, and the 
cause is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. No costs 
awarded. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
Debbie Ann ZAHARIAS, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
George Richard ZAHARIAS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 17636. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 12, 19*2. 
Divorced husband filed lis pendens on 
house and petitioned for order to show 
cause requesting that he be awarded owner-
ship of house under divorce decree. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
David B. Dee, J., entered judgment award-
ing divorced wife proceeds of sale of house 
less amount of two payments made by di-
vorced husband, and he appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Howe, J., held that: (1) in 
awarding proceeds to divorced wife, lower 
court did not modify divorce decree, but 
merely construed its language, and (2) di-
vorced wife was not in default on house 
payments, and thus, divorced husband was 
not entitled to proceeds from its sale. 
Affirmed. 
1. Divorce o=164 
Moving party must demonstrate that 
change of circumstances has occurred be-
fore decree of divorce can be modified. 
2. Divorce c=*254(2) 
Lower court's determination that di-
vorced wife was not in default on house 
payments within meaning of divorce decree, 
because of extension given her by mortga-
gee, did not modify decree, but merely con-
strued its language, and thus did not re-
quire showing of change of circumstances. 
3. Divorce o=>254(1) 
Where mortgagee had extended time 
for divorced wife to make payment on 
house, her failure to do so at regular time 
was not "default" within meaning of di-
vorce decree, and thus divorced husband 
who tendered payments did not become 
owner of house and was not entitled to 
proceeds from its sale. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
G. Blaine Davis, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and appellant. 
Larry N. Long, Virginia Curtis Lee, Salt 
Lake City> for plaintiff and respondeat. 
HOWE, Justice: 
The defendant, George Richard Zaharias, 
appeals from a judgment which ordered 
that the proceeds from the sale of a house 
and lot, the parties' former residence, be 
distributed in the sum of $18,151.20 to 
plaintiff Debbie Ann Zaharias, and $411.05 
to him. 
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Gary V. PETERSEN, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Julie A. PETERSEN, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 860007-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 18, 1987. 
Parties' marriage was dissolved by the 
Second District Court, Weber County, Cal-
vin Gould, J., and husband appealed from 
court's division of marital property. The 
Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that: (1) 
medical degree that husband earned during 
marriage while wife was principal wage 
earner did not constitute "property" sub-
ject to division in connection with parties' 
divorce, but (2) award of $1,000 per month 
to wife, to compensate her for her "share" 
in husband's advanced degree, could be 
sustained by recharacterizing it as provi-
sion for additional alimony. 
Affirmed and remanded with di-
rections. 
1. Divorce e=>184(4) 
Generally, trial court is permitted con-
siderable discretion in adjusting financial 
and property interests of parties to divorce 
action, and its determinations are entitled 
to presumption of validity. 
2. Divorce <S=>252.3(1) 
Medical degree that husband earned 
while wife was principal wage earner was 
not "property" subject to division in con-
nection with parties' divorce. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Divorce <3=>252.3(1) 
Advanced degree is or confers intangi-
ble right which cannot properly be charac-
terized as "property," subject to division 
between spouses in connection with their 
divorce; declining to follow Daniels v. 
Daniels, 20 Ohio Op.2d 458,185 N.E.2d 773. 
. PETERSEN Utah 237 
7 (UtahApp. 1987) 
4. Divorce <3=>2&7 
Traditional alimony analysis is appro-
priate and adequate method for making 
adjustments between spouses, one of whom 
has helped finance the other's advanced 
education, where divorce does not take 
place until several years after second 
spouse has earned his/her degree. 
5. Divorce <s=>247 
"Rehabilitative" or "reimbursement" 
alimony not terminable upon remarriage 
may be appropriate, to compensate one 
spouse for sacrifice of helping to finance 
other spouse's advanced degree, where di-
vorce takes place shortly after degree is 
obtained, before first spouse has had 
chance to enjoy comfortable life-style 
which degree will permit. 
6. Divorce <s=>240(2) 
Award of $1,000 per month to doctor's 
wife, to compensate wife for her "share" in 
husband's medical degree, could be sus-
tained by recharacterizing not as property 
settlement but as provision for additional 
alimony, to extent such additional alimony 
was warranted under circumstances. 
7. Divorce <®=*237 
Criteria considered in determining rea-
sonable award of support must include fi-
nancial conditions and needs of spouse in 
need of support, ability of that spouse to 
produce sufficient income for his or her 
own support, and ability of other spouse to 
provide support. 
8. Divorce <3=»240(2) 
Alimony of $2,000 per month was not 
unreasonable, where wife had substantially 
financed husband's medical education, sub-
sequently became accustomed to comforta-
ble life style that medical degree made 
possible, and enjoyed much different earn-
ing potential than that of husband, to 
whom all of income-producing assets had 
been awarded. 
Paul M. Belnap, Strong & Hanni, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant. 
Pete N. Vlahos, Vlahos & Sharp, Ogden, 
for plaintiff and appellant. 
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Before ORME, JACKSON and 
BENCH, JJ. 
OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
The appellant seeks a reversal or read-
justment of the property division and ali-
mony awarded to his former wife upon 
their divorce. His challenge focuses on a 
$120,000 property settlement given to his 
ex-wife to reflect her interest in his medical 
degree. We affirm the trial court's basic 
disposition, but require amendment of the 
decree insofar as the $120,000 award is 
concerned. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The parties were married in September 
1963 when they were both entering their 
senior year of college. Both graduated 
with Bachelor's degrees. Dr. Petersen con-
tinued his education and obtained a Mas-
ter's degree, while Mrs. Petersen worked 
as an elementary school teacher to help 
finance her husband's education. After re-
ceiving his Master*s degree, Dr. Petersen 
entered medical school. During medical 
school, Dr. Petersen earned approximately 
$1,000 per year in income. The couple also 
took out a student loan and received some 
money from Mrs. Petersen's parents. 
While her husband was in medical school, 
Mrs. Petersen worked one year on a full 
time basis and three years part time. 
When Dr. Petersen began his internship, 
Mrs. Petersen stopped working to stay at 
home with their child. During the next 
fifteen years, Mrs Petersen was not em-
ployed outside the home and her teaching 
certification expired. 
By the time of their divorce, the parties 
had been married twenty years and had six 
children under the age of 18. The decree 
gave Mrs. Petersen custody of the six mi-
nor children, the family residence subject 
to the first mortgage, most of the family 
furniture, and two automobiles. She was 
awarded $300 per month per child as child 
support, $1,000 per month alimony, and the 
cash property settlement of $120,000, 
which Dr. Petersen was to pay in install-
ments of $1,000 per month without inter-
est. 
Under the decree, Dr. Petersen received 
his professional corporation, the total inter-
est in his pension and profit sharing plan, 
two condominiums, a boat, an undivided 
one-seventh interest in a cabin near Bear 
Lake, and other rental property. He also 
was given the right to claim all six children 
as dependents for income tax purposes. 
The trial court explained the $120,000 
cash settlement as follows: 
The Court believes that this case is clas-
sic, in that defendant is entitled to a 
property award reflecting an ownership 
interest of the defendant in plaintiffs 
medical degree. It is abundantly clear 
that defendant helped plaintiff earn that 
degree during their marriage, and that 
plaintiffs ability to earn is based upon 
that degree. Further, that following the 
earning of the degree and the entry into 
the medical practice, by mutual agree-
ment, defendant undertook the raising 
and nurturing of the children as her re-
sponsibility to the marital partnership, 
while plaintiff practiced medicine. It is 
difficult to find in the evidence presented 
any system for the measurement of the 
value of the degree, and the Court must 
therefore deal with the case mostly upon 
an alimony basis. To deal with the case 
fully upon an alimony basis is not fair to 
the defendant, inasmuch as any effort to 
restructure her life by seeking to better 
her employment opportunities or to re-
marry will operate against her alimony 
rights. Defendant is therefore awarded 
$1,000 per month permanent alimony and 
a lump sum property award in respect to 
the medical degree in the amount of 
$120,000, payable in installments of 
$1,000 per month from the date of the 
decree. 
On appeal, Dr. Petersen argues that the 
division of marital property was ineq-
uitable, particularly the $120,000 property 
settlement given to his wife. Dr. Petersen 
argues that it was error to characterize 
"his" medical degree as marital property 
and require him to cash out Mrs. Peter-
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sen's interest therein over a 10-year peri- 000 as a property award, payable in $1,000 
od. monthly installments. Characterization of 
these payments as a property award cre-
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRE- ated the main issue for appeal. 
LIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
[1] Generally, the trial court is permit-
ted considerable discretion in adjusting the 
financial and property interests of the par-
ties to a divorce action, and its determina-
tions are entitled to a presumption of validi-
ty. E.g., Burnham v. Burnham, 716 P.2d 
781, 782 (Utah 1986). And although appel-
late courts may weigh the evidence and 
substitute their judgment for that of the 
trial court in divorce actions, as the Su-
preme Court stated in Turner v. Turner, 
649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982), "this court will not 
do so lightly and merely because its judg-
ment may differ from that of the trial 
judge. A trial court's apportionment of 
property will not be disturbed unless it 
works such a manifest injustice or inequity 
as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion." 
649 P.2d at 8. 
In the present case, the trial court appro-
priately attempted to equalize the parties' 
respective standards of living. See Olson 
v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1985). 
Dr. Petersen was found capable of earning 
$100,000 per year while Mrs. Petersen's 
ability to obtain recertification and secure a 
teaching contract was found to be specula-
tive at best. Even if she succeeded, she 
would earn only one-fourth to one-fifth of 
what Dr. Petersen would earn annually. 
The trial court spoke of the difficulty of 
measuring the value of Dr. Petersen's de-
gree. The court chose to balance the ine-
qualities between the parties partly with 
the alimony award. However, the trial 
court did not want Mrs. Petersen to lose all 
of her entitlement upon remarriage, so the 
trial court provided for an additional $120,-
1. In Dogu v. Dogu, 652 ?.2d 1308 (Utah 1982), 
the Utah Supreme Court dealt with the valua-
tion of a professional corporation. In Dogu, the 
husband was awarded his professional corpora-
tion, and his wife was awarded property to 
offset its value. 652 P.2d at 1309. Although the 
proper characterization of a medical degree, as 
in the present case, and the % aluation of a pro-
fessional medical corporation, as in Dogu, may 
involve related questions, the legal issues re-
garding the two are distinct. 
DEGREES AS PROPERTY 
[2] The question of whether an ad-
vanced degree is a property interest sub-
ject to division upon divorce is one of first 
impression at the appellate level in Utah.1 
However, the majority of jurisdictions that 
have considered the issue have held that 
advanced degrees or professional licenses 
are not property. Wisner v. Wisner, 129 
Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115, 122 (Ariz.App. 1981) 
(husband's medical license and board certif-
icate are not property subject to division, 
but education is a factor to be considered in 
arriving at equitable property division, 
maintenance, and child support); In re 
Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal.App.3d 446, 
152 Cal.Rptr. 668, 677 (1979) (legal edu-
cation not a property right); In re Mar-
riage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 
75, 77 (1978) (MBA degree not marital 
property subject to division); In re Mar-
riage of Hortsman, 263 N.W.2d 885, 891 
(Iowa 1978) (law degree is not a distributa-
ble asset upon divorce; future earnings 
are); Olah v. Olah, 135 Mich.App. 404, 354 
N.W.2d 359, 361 (Mich.App. 1984) (medical 
degree not property or marital asset); Ma-
honey v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 
527, 536 (1982) (courts may not make any 
permanent distribution of the value of pro-
fessional degrees and licenses, whether 
based on estimated worth or cost); Ruben 
v. Ruben, 123 N.H. 358, 461 A.2d 733, 735 
(1983) (graduate degree acquired by one 
spouse during the marriage is not an asset 
subject to division upon divorce); Muckler-
oy v. Muckleroy, 84 N.M. 14, 498 P.2d 
1357, 1358 (1972) (medical license is not 
In Tremayne v. Tremayne, 116 Utah 483, 211 
P.2d 452 (1949), the Supreme Court upheld the 
trial court's property division and award of ali-
mony to the wife, referring to the wife's work-
ing to help her husband through school; the 
fact that, with the divorce, the wife was de-
prived of the benefits of his increased earnings; 
and the discrepancy in their earning capacities. 
Tremayne does not address the issue of whether 
an advanced degree or license is marital proper-
ty. 
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community property); Hubbard v, Hub-
bard, 603 P.2d 7*47, 750-51 (Okl.1979) 
(medical license not property but wife enti-
tled to compensation for her investment).2 
These cases and others are consistent 
with our understanding of what "property" 
is and what an educational degree is. 
Property can be bought, sold, and devised. 
Bona fide degrees cannot be bought; they 
are earned. They cannot be sold; they are 
personal to the named recipient. Upon the 
death of the named recipient, the certificate 
commemorating award of the degree might 
be passed along and treasured as a family 
heirloom, but the recipient may not, on the 
strength of that degree, practice law or 
medicine. In this case, the court awarded 
the parties' home to Mrs. Peterson. But it 
might have awarded the home to Dr. Peter-
sen or it might have ordered the home sold 
and the net proceeds divided. The court 
had no such alternatives with the medical 
degree, precisely because the degree is not 
property. Consideration of some of the 
cases cited above and others supports our 
fundamental conclusion and demonstrates 
the range of related problems. 
In Muckleroy v. Muckleroy, 84 N.M. 14, 
498 P.2d 1357 (1972), it had been argued 
that the husband's education was the prod-
uct of the joint labor and industry of both 
parties, so that after their marriage it was 
community property. The New Mexico Su-
preme Court rejected this argument and 
concluded: 
A medical license is only a permit issued 
by the controlling authority of the State, 
authorizing the individual licensee to en-
gage in the practice of medicine. The 
medical license may be used and enjoyed 
by the licensee as a means of earning a 
livelihood, but it is not community prop-
erty because it cannot be the subject of 
joint ownership. 
84 N.M. at 15, 498 P.2d at 1358. 
The same issue arose as to an M.B.A. 
degree earned by the husband in In re 
2. The question of u nether an advanced degree 
or professional license is marital property sub-
ject to division upon divorce has attracted con-
siderable attention from legal scholars. For 
one of the better reasoned discussions, see Note, 
Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 
P.2d 75 (1978). Again, the concept of an 
advanced degree being property was reject-
ed: 
An educational degree, such as an 
M.B.A., is simply not encompassed even 
by the broad views of the concept of 
"property." It does not have an ex-
change value or any objective transfer-
able value on an open market. It is 
personal to the holder. It terminates on 
death of the holder and is not inheritable. 
It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, 
conveyed, or pledged. An advanced de-
gree is a cumulative product of many 
years of previous education, combined 
with diligence and hard work. It may 
not be acquired by the mere expenditure 
of money. It is simply an intellectual 
achievement that may potentially assist 
in the future acquisition of property. In 
our view, it has none of the attributes of 
property in the usual sense of that term. 
194 Colo, at 432, 574 P.2d at 77. 
The wife in Graham had worked full 
time throughout the couple's six-year mar-
riage, and had contributed 70 percent of 
the family income in addition to most of the 
household work while her husband was ac-
quiring his degree. The trial court found 
that the degree was jointly owned property 
and had determined that the future earning 
value of the M.B.A. degree to Mr. Graham 
was $82,836.00. Mrs. Graham was award-
ed $33,134.00 of that amount. On appeal, 
the state supreme court affirmed the rever-
sal of the trial court by the court of ap-
peals. 574 P.2d at 76. The fact that the 
decision left Mrs. Graham with nothing to 
show for her six years of labor prompted a 
three judge dissent which strongly urged 
that the husband's increased earning power 
represented by the degree should be con-
sidered marital property, where there was 
no accumulated property and the spouse 
Property Distribution in Domestic Relations Law: 
A Proposal for Excluding Educational Degrees 
and Professional Licenses from the Marital Es-
tate, 11 Hofstra L.Rev. 1327 (1983). 
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who subsidized the degree was ineligible 
for maintenance.3 574 P.2d at 78-79. 
The equitable concerns addressed in the 
Graham dissent are reflected in the few 
cases that have found an advanced degree 
or professional license to be marital proper-
ty. 
In Daniels v. Daniels, 185 N.E.2d 773 
(Ohio 1961), the court held that the right to 
practice medicine was in the nature of a 
franchise and constituted property which 
the trial court had a right to consider in 
making an award of alimony. In Daniels, 
the parties to the action were married while 
students at a university. During the time 
of their marriage the wife received her 
degree in business administration and the 
husband received a degree in medicine one 
year later. Each contributed toward his or 
her own maintenance and education, the 
balance in financial support for the family 
coming from the wife's father, who contrib-
uted sizable sums to the marriage. At the 
time of their divorce, neither party had 
much in the way of tangible assets. The 
court awarded $24,000 in lump sum alimo-
ny, but did not actually divide the value of 
the medical degree. 185 N.E.2d at 776. 
Recently, in O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 
N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 
743 (1985), the New York Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court's holding that a 
license to practice medicine acquired during 
the marriage is marital property subject to 
division. In O'Brien, the wife was held 
entitled to a 40 percent interest in her 
husband's medical license. The wife had 
contributed approximately 76 percent of 
the couples' total income while the husband 
obtained his license. The breakdown of the 
marriage occurred shortly after the hus-
band completed his schooling, and the only 
tangible asset existing after their nine-year 
marriage was the husband's medical li-
cense. 
The New York court distinguished its 
analysis in O'Brien from that of other jur-
isdictions which have found a license or 
advanced degree not to be marital proper-
ty. As the O'Brien court explained: 
3. In Graham, the wife did not request alimony 
because a Colorado statute, Colo.Rev.Stat. § 14-
10-114 (1973), restricted the court's power to 
Plaintiff does not contend that his license 
is excluded from distribution because it 
is separate property; rather, he claims 
that it is not property at all but repre-
sents a personal attainment in acquiring 
knowledge. He rests his argument on 
decisions in similar cases from other jur-
isdictions and on his view that a license 
does not satisfy common-law concepts of 
property. Neither contention is control-
ling because decisions in other States 
rely principally on their own statutes, 
and the legislative history underlying 
them, and because the New York Legis-
lature deliberately went beyond tradition-
al property concepts when it formulated 
the Equitable Distribution Law. 
66 N.Y.2d at 583, 489 N.E.2d at 715, 498 
N.Y.S.2d at 746. New York's highest court 
acknowledged in 0 'Brien that their statute 
creates a new species of property previous-
ly unknown at common law or under prior 
statutes. 66 N.Y.2d at 586, 489 N.E.2d at 
719, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748. Critical portions 
of the New York Equitable Distribution 
Law provide that in making an equitable 
distribution of marital property, the court 
shall consider the efforts one spouse made 
to the other spouse's career or career po-
tential and the difficulty of evaluating an 
interest in a profession. 66 N.Y.2d at 584, 
489 N.E.2d at 715-16, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 
746-47. Thus, the analysis in O'Brien, al-
though illustrative of the equitable con-
cerns for the working spouse who supports 
the other through an advanced degree, 66 
N.Y.2d at 585-88, 489 N.E.2d at 716-18, 
498 N.Y.S.2d at 746-48, is limited in appli-
cation because of the pivotal role of the 
unusual and expansive distribution statute 
enacted in New York. 
[3-5] We agree with the majority opin-
ion in Graham that an advanced degree is 
or confers an intangible right which, be-
cause of its character, cannot properly be 
characterized as property subject to divi-
sion between the spouses. No special stat-
ute, as in New York, permits us to treat 
the degree as though it were property. On 
award maintenance to cases where the spouse 
seeking it was unable to support himself or 
herself. 574 P.2d at 79. 
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the other hand, criteria for an award of 
support in Utah are not so rigid as in 
Colorado, preventing the harsh result of 
Graham. In this state, traditional alimony 
analysis is the appropriate and adequate 
method for making adjustments between 
the parties in cases of this type.4 
AWARD IN THIS CASE 
[6] As indicated, the trial court was in 
error when it awarded Mrs. Petersen the 
$120,000 cash settlement to reflect her 
share of the value of her husband's medical 
degree. Nonetheless, the court's basic dis-
position was fair and can be sustained if 
the $1,000 monthly payments which Dr. 
Petersen was to make in satisfaction of 
that obligation are recharacterized as addi-
tional alimony, a result which is readily 
supported by the trial court's findings. 
In reviewing the court*s findings, we find 
ampfe evidence to affirm the property divi-
sion aside from the $120,000 cash settle-
ment. As the Supreme Court stated in 
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 
1980), "[t]here is no fixed formula upon 
which to determine a division of properties, 
it is a prerogative of the court to make 
whatever disposition of property as it 
deems fair, equitable, and necessary for 
the protection and welfare of the parties." 
615 P.2d at 1222. Although Dr. Petersen 
was awarded a smaller percentage of the 
marital assets, he received all but one of 
the income producing assets: his profes-
sional corporation, his pension and profit 
sharing plan, two condominiums, and other 
business interests. The parties were to 
share evenly in a $10,000 investment corpo-
4. In cases like the instani one, life patterns have 
largely been set, the earning potential of both 
parties can be predicted with some reliability, 
and the contributions and sacrifices of the one 
spouse in enabling the other to attain a degree 
have been compensated by many years of the 
comfortable lifestyle which the degree permit-
ted. Traditional alimon> analysis works nicely 
to assure equity in such cases. 
In another kind of recurring case, typified by 
Graham, where divorce occurs shortly after the 
degree is obtained, traditional alimony analysis 
would often work hardship because, while both 
spouses have modest incomes at the time of 
divorce, the one is on the threshhold of a signifi-
cant increase in earnings. Moreover, the 
ration. We find the basic property division 
equitable. 
[7] As for the cash settlement payable 
in monthly installments of $1,000, it is 
properly affirmed as alimony, making Mrs. 
Petersen's entire alimony award $2,000 per 
month. Criteria considered in determining 
a reasonable award of support must in-
clude the financial conditions and needs of 
the spouse in need of support, the ability of 
that spouse to produce sufficient income 
for his or her own support, and the ability 
of the other spouse to provide support. 
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 
1985). 
[8] In this case, then, the first factor to 
be considered is the financial condition and 
needs of Mrs. Petersen. For over ten 
years, Mrs. Petersen and her family en-
joyed a very comfortable lifestyle. She 
now must make mortgage payments on the 
home and pay for the ordinary expenses of 
food, clothing and transportation. Other 
than the one-half interest in the investment 
corporation, Mrs. Petersen was awarded 
none of the income-producing assets. She 
has no outside income. 
The second factor to be considered is 
Mrs. Petersen's ability to produce a suffi-
cient income for herself. Although Mrs. 
Petersen is a college graduate with a Bach-
elor's degree and is trained as a school 
teacher, she is not currently certified. She 
would require additional training to become 
certified and, even if certified, her ability to 
produce income would be one-fourth to one-
fifth of what Dr. Petersen's income has 
provided the family. The trial court found 
spouse who sacrificed so the other could attain 
a degree is precluded from enjoying the antici-
pated dividends the degree will ordinarily pro-
vide. iSfonethefess, such a spouse is typically 
not remote in time from his or her previous 
education and is otherwise better able to adjust 
and to acquire comparable skills, given the op-
portunity and the funding. In such cases, ali-
mony analysis must become more creative to 
achieve fairness, and an award of "rehabilita-
tive" or "reimbursement" alimony, not termina-
ble upon remarriage, may be appropriate. See, 
e.g., Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis.2d 200, 343 
N.W.2d 796 (1984); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 
N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982). 
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that the chance of her being able to secure 
a teaching contract was "speculative." 
During most of the marriage, Mrs. Peter-
sen was not employed outside the home. 
She stopped working, primarily at the urg-
ing of her husband, and devoted her time 
to raising their six children. It is unrea-
sonable to assume that she will be able 
immediately to enter the job market and 
support herself in the style in which she 
had been living before the divorce. See 
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 
1985). 
The final factor to be considered is the 
ability of Dr. Petersen to provide support. 
This is the proper realm in which to consid-
er advanced degrees or professional licens-
es. An advanced degree is ordinarily an 
indicator of potential future earnings. In 
addition, the attainment of a degree by one 
spouse often results in a disparity of in-
come that is likely to last for a great time, 
particularly in cases like the present one. 
Dr. Petersen has a history of earning more 
than $100,000 a year and Mrs. Petersen has 
not worked for the past fifteen. But it is 
the discrepancy in their earning power 
which is the basis for alimony, not the 
discrepancy in their educations. There is 
no logical reason, for example, for treating 
differently a self-trained artist without for-
mal education who earns and will earn 
$100,000 a year and a doctor with a medical 
degree who earns and will earn $100,000 a 
year. Other things being equal, if such an 
artist divorces his or her spouse, he or she 
should pay alimony comparable to that paid 
by such a doctor. Whether a spouse's abili-
5. It is clear the court viewed the payments to 
Mrs. Petersen, both those it specifically called 
alimony and the additional $1,000 monthly pay-
ments, as appropriate for her support. It uti-
lized the "property" label in characterizing some 
of the monthly total as a means to preclude 
termination of the payments to Mrs. Petersen 
upon her remarriage. Although the court pro-
vided that the $1,000 per month payments not 
called alimony would terminate in ten years, 
nothing in the court's findings establishes any 
particular significance to that point in time. 
We accordingly see no basis, now that the entire 
monthly payment is properly characterized as 
alimony, to require that half of the $2,000 
monthly total automatically and arbitrarily ter-
minate at the end of ten years. Cf Olson v. 
Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 567 (Utah 1985) (court 
. PETERSEN Utah 243 
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ty to provide support is the result of an 
advanced degree or professional license is 
irrelevant to the analysis. The key is the 
spouse's ability. 
In Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 
1983), the Supreme Court explained: 
Where a marriage is of long duration and 
the earning capacity of one spouse great-
ly exceeds that of the other, as here, it is 
appropriate to order alimony and child 
support at a level which will insure that 
the supported spouse and children may 
maintain a standard of living not unduly 
disproportionate to that which they 
would have enjoyed had the marriage 
continued. 
658 P.2d at 1205. See Jeppson v. Jeppson, 
684 P.2d 69 (Utah 1984). 
In Savage, the parties had enjoyed a high 
standard of living during the marriage and 
the court upheld an award of $2,000 per 
month alimony and child support of $500 
per month per child. 658 P.2d at 1205. In 
Yelderman v. Yelderman, 669 P.2d 406 
(Utah 1983), the Supreme Court upheld an 
alimony award of $2,500 per month as not 
excessive. 669 P.2d at 409. We agree that 
$2,000 per month alimony to Mrs. Petersen 
is sufficient to help her maintain a stan-
dard of living not unduly disproportionate 
to that which she would have enjoyed if the 
marriage had continued.5 
Accordingly, this case is remanded to 
District Court to amend the decree to pro-
vide that Mrs. Petersen receive $2,000 per 
month alimony and, correspondingly, to de-
lete the $120,000 cash award. The decree 
modified divorce decree to delete provision that 
alimony would terminate after two years where 
monthly amount was reasonable but two-year 
limit was not). Of course, it would be proper 
for the district court to readjust the amount of 
alimony awarded to Mrs. Petersen if at any 
point in time there develops a material change 
of circumstances, such as Mrs. Petersen secur-
ing gainful employment or if Dr. Petersen's sala-
ry drops dramatically through no fault of his 
own. See, e.g., Naylor v. Naylor, 700 P.2d 707, 
710 (Utah 1985); Haslam v. Haslam, 657 P.2d 
757, 758 (Utah 1982). The district court retains 
continuing jurisdiction in divorce actions to 
amend alimony. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 
(1986). In addition, the alimony awarded to 
Mrs. Petersen automatically terminates under 
certain circumstances. Id. 
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is otherwise affirmed. Each party shal) 
bear his or her own costs of appeal. 
BENCH and JACKSON, JJ., concur. 
Dawn W. HORNE, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
W. Reid HORNE, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. S60060-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 18, 1987. 
The 3rd District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Kenneth Rigtrup, J., entered nunc 
pro tunc order distributing property inci-
dent to previously granted divorce. Ex-
husband appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Billings, J., held that: (1) statute commit-
ting broad discretion to trial courts in 
granting nunc pro tunc orders in domestic 
relations matters was not limited in scope 
to cases involving marital status of the 
parties; (2) statute eliminated the common-
law requirement of previously made final 
order; and (3) good cause did not exist for 
entry of the order nunc pro tunc. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Courts <3=>114 
The court has the power to act nunc 
pro tunc—to do act upon one date and 
make it effective as of prior date; the 
common-law power of nunc pro tunc allows 
the court to correct errors or supply omis-
sions to permit the record to accurately 
reflect that which in fact took place. U.C. 
A.1953, 30-4a-l. 
2. Statutes <3=>189 
In construing legislative enactments, 
the reviewing court assumes that each 
term in the statute was used advisedly, and 
thus, interprets and applies the statute ac-
cording to its literal wording unless it is 
unreasonably confused or inoperable. 
3. Divorce <3=>254(1) 
Statute committing broad discretion to 
trial courts in granting nunc pro tunc or-
ders in domestic relations was not limited 
in scope to cases involving marital status of 
the parties, but could also apply to proper-
ty division problems; by its wording, the 
statute applies to any and all matters relat-
ing to divorce proceedings. U.C.A.1953, 
30-4a-L 
4. Statutes <®=*222, 239 
Statutes are not to be construed as 
effecting any change in the common law 
beyond that which is clearly indicated; 
however, where statute is in derogation of 
the common law, and is also remedial in 
nature, the remedial application should be 
construed so as to give effect to its pur-
pose. 
5o Divorce &*W2 
Statute committing broad discretion to 
trial courts in granting nunc pro tunc or-
ders in domestic relations matters eliminat-
ed the common-law nunc pro tunc require-
ment of previously made final order; literal 
reading of statute indicated legislative in-
tent to change standard for entry of nunc 
pro tunc orders in domestic proceedings 
from requiring previously made final order 
as delineated by common law to requiring 
finding of "good cause," and legislative 
history indicated that statute was remedial 
in nature; Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298 
(Utah), superseded by statute. U.C.A.1953, 
3(Ma-l. 
6. Divorce <3=>254(1) 
"Good cause" did not exist to enter 
nunc pro tunc order distributing property 
incident to previously granted divorce; 
agreement between parties expressly stat-
ed that property was to be transferred to 
equalize the marital assets in order to in-
sure that the transfer of property would 
not be taxable event, and in entering order 
prior to effective date of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1984 and without the essential and 
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possession of the property 25 Thib can be 
accomplished either by a red .ction in the 
purchase price, in the amount uf the encum-
brance, or payment of the tot.il price after 
defendants remove the eneumhrance 
CROCKETT, C J., and HALL. WILKINS 
and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
fa | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM^ 
Beverly KERR, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Thomas Alden KERR, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 16495. 
Supreme Court of titan 
April 29, 1980. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Dean E. Conder, J., awarded each 
party a decree of divorce, and h-sband ap-
pealed from that portion of decree which 
provided for division of marita property 
and payment of property taxes, expert wit-
ness fees and attorney fees. Th* Supreme 
Court, Hall, J., held that: (1) tna <x>urt did 
not abuse its discretion in awardirg greater 
portion of marital property to wife than to 
husband; (2) trial court did not rrr in re-
quiring husband to pay one half of property 
taxes on residence for year while case was 
pending trial; (3) husband woulc only be 
required to provide for payment of child 
support until minor child's 18th birthday, at 
which time if support was still needed wife 
might petition for continuation of support; 
(4) award of witness fees was excessi\e, and 
(5) amount awarded as attorney fees was 
remanded for reconsideration. 
Remanded for further proceed.rigs. 
Maughan, J., filed a concurring opinion. 
25. See 71 Am Jur Jd Specii 
1. Divorce <s=> 252.1, 286(5) 
Division and distribution of marital 
property between parties to divorce action 
is matter wherein trial court has been in-
vested with broad discretion and order 
bearing thereon will not be disturbed ab-
sent clear abuse of such discretion. 
2. Divorce <s=» 252.2 
In light of testimony that wife had not 
been gainfully employed outside home for 
nearly 22 years and that her skills were in 
clerical and sales work, while husband had 
well-established profession netting him in 
excess of $40,000 per year, where due to her 
willingness to work while he attended 
school, wife had not increased her earning 
capacity to same extent, and where it was 
undisputed that wife had contributed $15,-
000 from her own separate funds during 
marriage, trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in awarding greater portion of mari-
tal property to wife than to husband in 
divorce action. 
3. Divorce <a=> 252.3(5), 252.5(1) 
Although real estate awarded wife and 
furniture were of more solid value than 
unsecured notes and mortgages awarded 
husband in divorce action, trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in awarding entire 
house and lot to wife and entire invest-
ments to husband instead of splitting them 
between parties in some fashion where in-
vestments were interest bearing and hus-
band presented no evidence as to their val-
ue other than that they were "speculative/* 
especially since there appeared a good possi-
bility that husband would reap handsome 
return from investment. 
4. Divorce ®=> 252.5(3) 
Where even had wife had been charged 
with $100 per month for payment of taxes 
on parties' residence out of temporary ali-
mony, she received temporary alimony and 
support money only for ten months, leaving 
$675.30 remaining unpaid, and where hus-
band obtained modification of temporary 
: Performance, Sec 137, p 177 
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award, reducing it by SlOO per month, trial 
judge had authority to and did not err in 
requiring husband to pa\ one half of prop-
erty taxes on residence for year in which 
case was pending trial despite temporary 
order requiring that she satisfy and dis-
charge property taxes out of temporary ali-
mony awarded her. 
5. Divorce <s=>310 
Husband would only be required to pay 
child support until minor child's 18th birth-
day, at which time if support was still need-
ed, wife could petition for continuation of 
support based on circumstances existing at 
that time. U.C.A.1953, 15-2-1. 
6. Appeal and Error <s=* 970(4) 
Trial <s=»66 
It is within discretion of trial court to 
permit party to reopen a case following 
submission to court, and such action is not 
grounds for reversal in absence of some 
prejudice demonstrable by opposing party. 
7. Divorce <s=> 286(9) 
Where no explanation was offered by 
husband regarding injur, occasioned by tri-
al court's decision to hear testimony regard-
ing witness and attorney fees after wife 
had ostensibly rested her case in divorce 
action, no reversible error occurred thereby. 
8. Divorce <s=>192 
Award of $1,250 in expert witness fees 
was excessive in divorce action in light of 
recent holding that expert witness fees may 
not be taxed as costs o\er and above statu-
tory rate. U.C.A.1953, 21-5-4. 
9. Divorce <s=»221, 223 
Court in divorce proceeding is empow-
ered to award such sums as will permit 
opposing party to bring or defend action 
and decision to make such an award, to-
gether with amount thereof, rests primarily 
with sound discretion of the trial court. 
U.C.A.1953, 30-3-3. 
10. Divorce <s=»224 
As with award of alimony, award of 
attorney fees in divorce case must rest on 
basis of evidence of need and reasonable-
ness; relative ability of respective parties 
. KERR Utah 1 3 8 1 
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to shoulder expenses of litigation is relevant 
inquiry in this regard. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-3. 
11. Divorce <3=»287 
Where at no point in divorce proceed-
ings was any evidence addressed to whether 
wife would be able to cover costs of litiga-
tion and indeed no suggestion was made by 
her that she would not be in better position 
than husband, in light of substantial prop-
erty settlement, to furnish counsel with 
compensation, and where evidence did not 
reflect any attempt to characterize request-
ed award of attorney fees as reasonable, 
remand was necessary for reconsideration 
of amount awarded wife as attorney fees. 
U.C.A.1953, 30-3-3. 
12. Costs <s=>172 
In determining proper attorney fee, 
factors to be considered include his back-
ground of learning and experience, his abili-
ty, his integrity and his dedication to causes 
with which he identifies himself, reputation 
he has acquired, nature and importance of 
matter, and amount of money or value of 
property involved as well as how he is to be 
paid. 
13. Costs <s=>172 
Within limits of reason and good con-
science, where there is no overreaching, un-
due influence or oppression, parties should 
be at liberty to contract concerning attor-
ney fees as they desire. 
J. Franklin Allred and Richard G. Mac-
Dougall, Salt Lake City, for defendant and 
appellant. 
Robert S. Campbell, Jr. and Glen E. Dav-
ies of Watkiss & Campbell, Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff and respondent. 
HALL, Justice: 
The trial court awarded each of the par-
ties a decree of divorce. Defendant appeals 
from that portion of the decree which pro-
vides for the division of the marital proper-
ty and the payment of property taxes, ex-
pert witness' fees and attorneys' fees. 
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The parties were married on November 
22, 1946, and lived together as husband and 
wife for nearly 31 years until their separa-
tion on August 18, 1977. They ha\e three 
children, two of whom have attained their 
majority and a son, Stephen, wh<> at the 
time of trial was 15 years of age and whose 
custody was awarded to the plaintiff. 
From the time of their marriage until the 
summer of 1957, when their first child was 
born, the plaintiff worked and provided 
substantial financial support to tne mar-
riage. Defendant attended dental school 
during this time and graduated :n 1955. 
Following his graduation, he established his 
own practice of dentistry which in 1977 
produced a net income before taxes of $42,-
542 which included a deduction for tax pur-
poses of $4,235.77 for depreciation Plain-
tiff had not been gainfully employed out-
side the home since the birth of their first 
child in 1957 but had kept and maintained 
the home of the parties and cared for the 
three children. Plaintiff had been given by 
her father certain separate property and 
investments which in 1978 produced a total 
income of $3,829. 
The defendant contends that the division 
of property made by the lower court was 
inequitable to the defendant both in the 
proportion awarded to him and al>-' in the 
type of property allocated to him. He com-
plains that the plaintiff was awarded full 
ownership of the house and lot wh.ch was 
fully paid for and which was appraised at 
$182,000 to $186,000 together w.:h the 
household furniture and furnishings which 
he estimated to have a value of an addition-
al $50,000, while he was awarded certain 
unsecured notes and contracts wh.ch the 
parties had purchased as investments with 
AFCO Development Corporation and which 
the president of AFCO testified were specu-
lative in nature. 
[1] The division and distribution f mar-
ital property between parties to a iivorce 
action is a matter wherein the tria. court 
has been invested with broad di>cretion. 
1. U.C.A., 1953, 30 3 5, see also English v 
Naylor, Utah. 563 P 2d 184 (1977) 
An order bearing thereon will not be dis-
turbed absent a clear abuse of such discre-
tion.1 
[2] The division of property made by 
the trial judge falls within his ambit of 
discretion. According to defendant's own 
valuation placed upon the assets, the total 
value of the property distributed to him 
was $176,691.97 if the AFCO notes and con-
tracts are valued at cost. Defendant pro-
duced no evidence as to the value of the 
notes and contracts while plaintiff produced 
testimony that the company was solvent 
and would be able to meet payments on the 
notes and obligations as they fell due. The 
president of that corporation testified that 
the corporation would be able to meet its 
obligations and that at the request of the 
defendant, payment on one of the notes had 
been deferred for one year. Against the 
property awarded to the defendant were 
obligations in the amount of $50,400 leaving 
him a total net distribution of $126,291.97. 
The portion of the marital assets distribut-
ed to the plaintiff total $247,325 according 
to defendant's valuations. Thus, according 
to defendant's figures, plaintiff received ap-
proximately two-thirds of the marital assets 
and defendant received one-third. 
If the valuations presented by the plain-
tiff are used, then defendant received as-
sets with a net value of $200,774.45 as 
against $240,950 for her which is approxi-
mately 55 percent to plaintiff and 45 per-
cent to defendant. 
The trial court had before it testimony 
that plaintiff had not been gainfully em-
ployed outside the home for nearly 22 years 
and that her skills were in clerical and sales 
work. On the other hand, the defendant 
had a well-established profession netting 
him in excess of $40,000 per year. The fact 
that, due to her willingness to work while 
he attended school, plaintiff has not in-
creased her earning capacity to the same 
 English, Utah, 565 P.2d 409 (1977). Naylor v. 
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extent as had defendant, speaks in favor of was pending trial 
the trial court's distribution.2 
Furthermore, it was undisputed that 
plaintiff contributed $10,000 from her own 
separate funds to completely furnish the 
first home of the parties and when that 
home was sold and their current home was 
purchased, many of those furnishings were 
moved to and are still in the new residence. 
Plaintiff contributed another $5,000 of her 
own funds in 1967 to retire the mortgage on 
this residence. In view of these undisputed 
facts the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in awarding a greater portion of the 
marital property to the plaintiff than to the 
defendant. 
[3] It is true that the real estate award-
ed to the plaintiff and the furniture were of 
a more solid value than the unsecured notes 
and mortgages awarded to the defendant. 
However, these investments, unlike the 
house and )ot, are interest bearing and de-
fendant presented no evidence as to their 
value other than that they were "specula-
tive." The fact that the defendant, how-
ever, voluntarily waived one of the annual 
payments on one of the contracts would 
indicate that he did not seriously question 
the solvency of AFCO or doubt its ability to 
pay its obligations. We certainly cannot 
say as a matter of law that the defendant 
will not eventually recover his entire invest-
ment and there appears a good possibility 
that he will reap a handsome return. De-
fendant had purchased the AFCO invest-
ments at his own instance and the plaintiff, 
while apparently not objecting, did not have 
much involvement in their purchase. For 
these reasons, we believe the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in awarding the 
entire house and lot to the plaintiff and the 
entire AFCO investments to the defendant 
instead of splitting them between the par-
ties in some fashion. 
Utah 1383 
n early 1978 the plain-
tiff had petitioned the lower court to award 
her temporary alimony and support money, 
estimating her monthly expenses to be 
$1,617 which included an allocation for 
property taxes in the amount of $100. The 
lower court awarded her $1,375 per month 
temporary alimony and support and ordered 
that she satisfy and discharge the obliga-
tions listed in her affidavit out of that 
award. The first payment to her com-
menced with the month of March 1978. 
The total property taxes on the residence 
for the year 1978 were $1,675.30. 
We hold that there was no error in this 
regard. Even had plaintiff been charged 
with $100 per month for the payment of the 
taxes, she received temporary alimony and 
support money only for ten months, or a 
total of $1,000. This would still leave 
$675.30 remaining unpaid. Furthermore, 
defendant obtained a modification of the 
temporary award on August 14, 1978, re-
ducing it by $100 per month. These were 
both temporary orders and the trial judge 
clearly had authority to modify them in 
making his final determination. 
[4] Defendant next complains of the re-
quirement in the decree of divorce that he 
pay one-half of the property taxes on the 
residence for the year 1978 while this case 
2. See Tremayne v. Tremayne, 116 Utah 483, 
211 P.2d452 (1949). 
[5] Defendant next complains of the re-
quirement that he pay $450 per month for 
the support of his 15 year old son Stephen 
as long as he continues to reside with the 
plaintiff and is attending college full time 
or serving a mission for his church. This 
objection is well taken. U.C.A., 1953, 15-
2-1 as amended, provides that minors at-
tain their majority at age 18 unless sooner 
married but that courts in divorce actions 
may order support to age 21. The decree 
here did not limit the support to age 21 and 
more seriously was not based upon any 
finding of circumstances which would justi-
fy the order compelling the defendant to 
support his son beyond the age of IS. We 
held in Carlson v. Carlson? that in the 
absence of such a finding an order of sup-
port for a child over 18 cannot stand. We 
appreciate that since Stephen's 18th birth-
day was at the time of trial more than 
3. Utah, 584 P 2d 864 (1978) 
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three years in the future, the co^rt could 
not know and therefore could not f.r.d what 
his specific needs would be at age 18. We 
therefore modify the decree to pr-vide for 
the payment of child support until his 18th 
birthday at which time if support is still 
needed, the plaintiff may petition for a 
continuation of support based upon circum-
stances existing at that time. 
Defendant's final argument on appeal 
challenges the award of expert witness' 
fees, and attorneys' fees. Defendant sug-
gests that these were improper in that (1) 
evidence thereon was introduced after 
plaintiff had ostensibly rested her case, and 
(2) the amounts awarded were excessive. 
[6,7] It is within the discretion of the 
trial court to permit a party to reopen its 
case following submission to the court, and 
such action is not grounds for reversal in 
the absence of some prejudice demonstrable 
by the opposing party,4 As no explanation 
was offered by defendant regarding the 
injury which was occasioned by the court's 
decision to hear testimony regarding wit-
ness' and attorneys' fees, we are unable to 
agree that reversible error occurred there-
by. 
[8] We are inclined to agree, r.owever, 
that the award of $1,250 in witness' fees 
was excessive. This Court has recently 
held, in the decision in Frampton v Wilson? 
that expert witness' fees may not :~ taxed 
as costs over and above the statutory rate.6 
We therefore remand to the trial c:urt for 
an adjustment of the award. 
[9,10] We remand also for a reconsider-
ation by the trial court of the amount 
4. Davis v. Riley, 20 Utah 2d 325, 43" ? 2d 453 
(1968). 
5. Utah, 605 P.2d 771 (1980). 
6. U.C.A., 1953. 21 5-4 provides for pa ment of 
witnesses in the amount of $14 per :a> plus 
mileage. 
7. U.C.A., 1953, 30-3 3 
8. Adams v. Adams, Utah, 593 P.2d 14" < 1979); 
Bader v. Bader, 18 Utah 2d 407, 424 ? 2d 150 
(1967); Morrison v. Fedenco. 120 Lta- "5. 232 
P.2d 374 (1951). 
awarded as attorneys' fees in the present 
action. Pursuant to statute,7 a court in a 
divorce proceeding is emjwwered to award 
such sums as will permit the opposing party 
to bring or defend the action. The decision 
to make such an award, together with the 
amount thereof, rests primarily with the 
sound discretion of the trial court.8 As 
with the award of alimony, however, an 
award of attorneys' fees must rest on a 
basis of evidence of need 9 and reasonable-
ness.10 
[11] In the instant case, counsel for 
plaintiff took the stand and set forth the 
number of hours dedicated by himself and 
an associate to the case, the hourly rate 
charged by each ($90 for the attorney him-
self, $50 for his associate), together with a 
rough tally of expenses incurred during the 
action. On the basis of this calculation, the 
attorney asserted a fee of $10,628. The 
trial court, without making a finding of 
fact thereon, refused this figure, but 
awarded $8,500 in attorneys' fees. 
At no point in the proceedings was any 
evidence addressed to whether or not plain-
tiff would be unable to cover the costs of 
litigation; indeed, no suggestion was made 
by her that she would not be in a better 
position than defendant, in light of the sub-
stantial property settlement,11 to furnish 
counsel with compensation. 
Neither does the evidence reflect any at-
tempt to characterize the requested award 
as reasonable. Testimony regarding the ne-
cessity of the number of hours dedicated, 
the reasonableness of the rate charged in 
light of the difficulty of the case and the 
9. Weiss v Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 179 P.2d 1005 
(1947); see also Coons v. Coons, 6 Wash.App. 
123, 491 P.2d 1333 (1971); De Lima v. De Lima, 
24 Cai.Rptr. 179, 207 CA.2d 74 (1962). 
10. See generally Anno.: Amount of Attorney's 
Fees in Matters Involving Domestic Relations, 
59 A.L.R.3d 152; Nelson on Divorce, Sec. 29-
06, p 226. 
11. That the relative ability of the respective 
parties to shoulder the expenses of litigation is 
a relevant inquiry in this regard, see Ghost v. 
Ghost, 26 Utah 2d 398, 490 P.2d 339 (1971). 
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result accomplished, and the rates common-
ly charged for divorce actions in the com-
munity, is conspicuously absent. 
Inasmuch as this case is remanded for 
further proceedings, we deem it appropriate 
to make some observations about the meth-
od of proof of the value of attorneys' serv-
ices.12 
It is neither practical nor productive for 
the profession or for the public, to present 
the impression that compensation for a law-
yer's services can always be gauged on a 
scale of dollars per hour. Perhaps this can 
be done as to many of the perfunctory 
services a lawyer performs, but his services 
in other areas may run the gamut of the 
complexities of the human condition. 
The lawyer's service may include the 
sharing and identifying with his client in 
problems of the deepest emotional content, 
such as the losing or the saving of family 
relationships, or even at times of life itself, 
wherein the extremes of sorrow or of happi-
ness may depend upon his failure or success. 
The same observation can be made in a 
lesser degree in regard to business matters 
in which his role is to provide the founda-
tion, guidance and protection of vital rights 
and property interests. All of these may be 
materially affected by the quality of the 
service of the lawyer chosen to serve in 
such matters. 
[12] The choice of a lawyer, and the 
value of his services, may depend upon a 
number of factors, including his background 
of learning and experience, his ability, his 
integrity and his dedication to the causes 
with which he identifies himself. Also to 
be considered is the reputation he has ac-
quired, the nature and importance of the 
matter, and the amount of money or value 
of property involved.13 There is also the 
matter as to how the lawyer is to be paid: 
cash in advance, extended credit, whether a 
fixed amount, or contingent on success, or 
other conditions. 
12. See Rule 76(a), U.R.C P . see also, LeGrande 
Johnson Corporation v Peterson, 18 Utah 2d 
260, 420 P.2d 615 (1966) 
13. For a list of some of the factors to be con^ 
sidered in fixing attorne>s' fees, see Rule 2 
[13] What the lawyer has to offer 
should be determined by considering the 
composite of all of the factors which the 
parties themselves think iclevant. Within 
the limits of reason ana good conscience, 
and where there is no over-reaching undue 
influence or oppression, the parties should 
be at liberty to contract as they desire.1^ 
This case is remanded for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. No 
costs awarded. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and WILKINS and 
STEWART, JJ., concur. 
MAUGHAN, Justice (concurring): 
With one exception, I concur with the 
opinion of the majority. That exception is 
to the holding concerning support for the 
15-year old son. In my view, the ruling of 
the trial court passed muster. Its limita-
tion is well controlled by the two conditions 
attached. 
( o ^ KEYNUMBERSYSTEMS 
KIXX, INC., also known as KIXX Radio, 
a Utah Corporation, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
STALHUIN MUSIC, INC., a Tennessee 
Corporation doing business in the State 
of Utah, and Bill Anderson, Defendants 
and Appellants. 
No. 16514. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 30, 1980. 
Seller of radio station brought action 
against purchasers to recover for the total 
106A, Rules of Professional Conduct of the 
Utah State Bar; 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client 
325. 
14. See In re Hansen, Utah, 586 P.2d 413 (1978); 
7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 304. 
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30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health 
care of parties and children — Court to have con-
tinuing jurisdiction — Custody and visitation — 
Termination of alimony — Nonmeritorious peti-
tion for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equita-
ble orders relating to the children, property, and parties. The court shall 
include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; and 
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the 
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental 
care insurance for the dependent children. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the non-custodial parent to provide 
the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the support and maintenance of the oarties. the custody of the 
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the dis-
tribution of the property as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
relatives, the court shall consider the welfare of the child* 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically termi-
nates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage 
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if 
the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his 
rights are determined. 
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further 
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or associa-
tion is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
(7) When a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions 
of a court order is made and denied, the court may order the petitioner to pay 
the reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, 
if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted in 
good faith. 
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Paul Sletten & Associates, Inc. 
7150 E. Hampden Ave Suite 306 
Denver. Colorado 80224 
(30316914338 
Paul Sletten & Associates, Inc. 
185 South State Street, Suite 310 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 363-6026 
October 26, 1986 
Tim W. Healy, P.C. 
Attorney at Law 
863 25th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Re: Dr. Clifford Sorensen's Dental Appraisal 
Dear Mr. Healy: 
We have completed our review of Dr. Sorensen's dental practice 
and are submitting to you our final report. The time spent 
there along with the hours spent here in the office reviewing 
the material that has been accumulated has provided the necessary 
information to evaluate and determine fair market value for 
this practice. 
I would like to explain three important points of this appraisal 
that will provide some insights. 
1. You are now aware of the current market value 
of this business. If it were sold totally or 
in part at the present time and under the current 
conditions, with the value of the practice having 
already been identified, any subsequent negotiations 
regarding purchase options would be quickly 
understood. 
2. This evaluation is made under the assumption that the 
Doctor would be available during the transition period 
and be helpful in transferring the patients to the 
incoming Doctor. Also, it should be understood, this 
evaluation is made under the current conditions of 
the practice. 
3. The value of the dental practice changes when cir-
cumstances of the practice change. In the event of 
death or disability, the value of the practice would 
then depend on how quickly a transition could be.made. 
The longer period of time you are absent from the 
practice, the faster the value declines. The 
arrangements previously made to effect a disposition 
or transition of the business to another dentist will 
greatly affect the value of the business. 
Several factors have been taken into consideration in determining 
the value of the practice. 
PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
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The age of a dental practice plays an important role in determining 
its value. Dr. Sorensen has been practicing in the community for 
a number of years and has established a good reputation for family 
dental care. The number of patients of record and the maintenance 
of healthy production figures attest to this. 
Dr. Sorensen's practice location is on a very highly traveled street 
and is in an excellent location for visibility and public exposure. 
Parking is convenient. The office space is adequate and functional. 
However, updating equipment and leasehold improvements would increase 
the value of this practice. 
The aging of the accounts receivable indicates that the practice has 
a healthy collection policy and that the receptionist is doing a 
good job of collecting. 
The community of Roy has a healthy, growing economy. The influx 
of new dentists into the area quickly absorbs patients seeking 
new dentists. The patient base, is made up of young families. 
The tangible assets of this practice as presented in Interrogatory #33 
and #35 have been deemed by PSA to be reasonable fair market value. 
Fair market value is determined by the replacement cost, depreciation, 
physical condition of the equipment, the age of the equipment, and the 
market demand for used equipment. 
It is important to realize that this evaluation has been made with 
the standards that are currently acceptable for this purpose. 
Existing market trends in the state of Utah for the disposition 
of dental practices were given consideration. PSA in no way implies, 
either written or otherwise, the sale of this practice at the appraised 
value. There are many circumstances surrounding the sale of every 
practice that affect the final purchase price. The amount of down 
payment, carryback financing, and the Doctor's cooperation during 
the transition are among the controlling factors. 
This appraisal has been made based on financial and practice 
information supplied by the owner. We have not audited this 
information, and, accordingly, do not express an opinion or any 
other form of assurance. 
Enclosed please find the appraisal value sheet and accompanying copies 
of previously itemized assets. 
Thank you for giving us the opportunity to work with you. If you have 
any questions concerning the enclosed information or any of our 
services, please do not hesitate to contact our office. 
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OCTOBER 26, 1986 
DR. CLIFFORD SORENSEN 
DENTAL PRACTICE 
TANGIBLE ASSETS 
Excluding Computer 
$15,330 
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE 
Accounts 120 days and 
older excluded. 
Accounts 0-120 days 
discounted 12%. 
As of October 21, 1986 
$22,170 
INTANGIBLE ASSETS 
34% of last four years' 
revenues, 1986 projected, 
$184,000 
$62,560 
TOTAL PRACTICE VALUE $100,060 
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Itemization of tangible assets of Dr. Clifford Sorensen 
DENTAL PRACTICE APPRAISAL 
Dental unit, chair, light, GE X-ray, chairs $5,500 
Green Dentaleze chair 
Pelton Crane light 
G.E. X-ray head 
Dr. & Nurse chairs 
Mobile Cabinet 
Mobile Cabinet 
Instrument cabinet 
Incubator 
Nitrous oxide delivery 
Ritter dental chair 
Mobile cabinet 
Ritter star trak light 
Nitrous oxide delivery 
Cavitron ultrasonic 
Instrument cabinet 
Microscope viewer 
G.E. X-ray head 
Sterilizer 
Dr. & nurse stools 
Microscope 
Culturing equipment 
VCR patient education 
TV patient education 
File cabinet 
File cabinet 
Office chair 
Sofa 
2 chairs 
Lazyboy recliner 
TV stand 
2 end tables 
vacuum cleaner 
flowers 
Refridgerator 
Private office desk 
Private office file cabinet 
Air compressor 
Evacuator 
Chairs and tables 
Adding machine 
Copier 
900 
600 
300 
150 
50 
100 
50 
90 
100 
1,000 
90 
50 
100 
100 
50 
800 
50 
50 
150 
800 
90 
300 
200 
400 
250 
100 
150 
45 
80 
25 
150 
15 
15 
190 
300 
300 
500 
500 
400 
40 
300 
TOTAL $15,300 
This page to accompany Dr. Sorensen appraisal report. 
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